continued hearing in California

2023(Citing In re Phillip F. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 250, 258 [notice inadequate when mailed to mother’s former address after she had notified the court of her new address]; In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204, 208 [mother’s waiver of her appearance for a permanency planning hearing did not apply to the continued hearing].) Father points out that the United States Postal Service Web site indicates that first class mail is delivered within one to five business days.9 Father argues that notice via first class mail a mere five days before the hearing, two of which fell on a weekend, was not a rea

2021(In re Phillip F. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 250, 258 (Phillip F.).) Renotice of a continued hearing must be “ ‘ “ ‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the [continued] pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Thus, interested parties need only receive actual notice of the continued hearing date, which may be shown when they are notified by first class mail, written notice from counsel, or oral notice in court.

2016Selma claims “[a] precise date for the continued hearing must be specified in order for a continuance to be effective.” It cites In re Angela C. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 389 , 392-393 and City etc. of San Francisco v. Carraro (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 509 in support of this assertion.

2016Selma claims “[a] precise date for the continued hearing must be specified in order for a continuance to be effective.” It cites In re Angela C. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 389 , 392-393 and City etc. of San Francisco v. Carraro (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 509 in support of this assertion.

2025(Compare Parkview Villas, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210 [where the party opposing summary judgment filed an inadequate, but not “wholly deficient,” separate statement, trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment rather than allowing the party an opportunity to cure the defect].) Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion pursuant to section 437c, subdivision (b)(3). 9 IV.

2025(Compare Parkview Villas, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 1210 [where the party opposing summary judgment filed an inadequate, but not “wholly deficient,” separate statement, trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment rather than allowing the party an opportunity to cure the defect].) Under these circumstances, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion pursuant to section 437c, subdivision (b)(3). 9 IV.

2022(Italics added; see In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61, 67 [if the factors for determining de facto parent status apply, “it is immaterial whether the adult was the ‘child’s current or immediately succeeding custodian’”].) In light of Abigail’s lengthy placement with Heather and Heather’s experience with Anahi, Heather likely would have had unique and relevant information to provide the court at the continued hearing in February 2021, and the record leaves no doubt Heather and Abigail still would have had a psychological bond.

2022(Italics added; see In re Patricia L. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 61, 67 [if the factors for determining de facto parent status apply, “it is immaterial whether the adult was the ‘child’s current or immediately succeeding custodian’”].) In light of Abigail’s lengthy placement with Heather and Heather’s experience with Anahi, Heather likely would have had unique and relevant information to provide the court at the continued hearing in February 2021, and the record leaves no doubt Heather and Abigail still would have had a psychological bond.

2021The litigation of custody issues in family court does not estop the juvenile court from reconsidering factually identical issues.” (Id. at pp. 292–293, italics added; see also In re Travis C. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 492, 503 [“despite the fact that there was a continued hearing pending in the family law court which involved factual allegations of sexual abuse by minors’ father, the juvenile court had jurisdiction over a petition containing the same factual allegations, in its role as parens patriae”]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917) 176 Cal. 440 , 441–442 [“The mere fact that a litigation is pend

2021The litigation of custody issues in family court does not estop the juvenile court from reconsidering factually identical issues.” (Id. at pp. 292–293, italics added; see also In re Travis C. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 492, 503 [“despite the fact that there was a continued hearing pending in the family law court which involved factual allegations of sexual abuse by minors’ father, the juvenile court had jurisdiction over a petition containing the same factual allegations, in its role as parens patriae”]; Dupes v. Superior Court (1917) 176 Cal. 440 , 441–442 [“The mere fact that a litigation is pend

2021(See Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985 [Pro. per. litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys]).

2013We reject this argument. 4 Although “„any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved in favor of the party seeking relief from default‟” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th at 975, 980) because the law favors matters being tried on their merits (New Alberstons, Inc. v. Superior Court (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1408 ), there are no such doubts in this matter.

2020Brown v. iMergent, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 333, 342 [prohibition on continued violation of consumer protection laws]), and second, that the IT Corp. framework applies even where the injunction authorized by statute is mandatory.

2020Brown v. iMergent, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 333, 342 [prohibition on continued violation of consumer protection laws]), and second, that the IT Corp. framework applies even where the injunction authorized by statute is mandatory.

2020They rely upon long-established case law holding that preliminary mandatory relief is restricted to “ ‘extreme’ ” cases in which “ ‘the right thereto is clearly established . . . .’ ” (Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286, 295 , quoting Hagen v. Beth (1897) 118 Cal. 330, 331 ; accord, Integrated Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. VitaVet Labs, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1184 .) The trial court rejected this argument, concluding first, that an injunction that restrains a continued violation of state law is prohibitory in nature (see People ex rel.

2020They rely upon long-established case law holding that preliminary mandatory relief is restricted to “ ‘extreme’ ” cases in which “ ‘the right thereto is clearly established . . . .’ ” (Board of Supervisors v. McMahon (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 286, 295 , quoting Hagen v. Beth (1897) 118 Cal. 330, 331 ; accord, Integrated Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. VitaVet Labs, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1184 .) The trial court rejected this argument, concluding first, that an injunction that restrains a continued violation of state law is prohibitory in nature (see People ex rel.

2018At the initial hearing, the court selects tribal customary adoption as the permanent plan; at the continued hearing, the court addresses the specific tribal customary adoption order, and determines whether to afford it full faith and credit. 12 ( §§ 366.26, subd. (b)(2) ; 366.24, subd. (c)(6); see B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168 , 189, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 , 361 P.3d 319 [courts harmonize the various parts of a statutory enactment].) Similarly, the All-County Letter describes a two-part hearing for tribal customary adoptions.

2018At the initial hearing, the court selects tribal customary adoption as the permanent plan; at the continued hearing, the court addresses the specific tribal customary adoption order, and determines whether to afford it full faith and credit. 12 ( §§ 366.26, subd. (b)(2) ; 366.24, subd. (c)(6); see B.H. v. County of San Bernardino (2015) 62 Cal.4th 168 , 189, 195 Cal.Rptr.3d 220 , 361 P.3d 319 [courts harmonize the various parts of a statutory enactment].) Similarly, the All-County Letter describes a two-part hearing for tribal customary adoptions.

2003(In re Malcolm D. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 904, 913 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 ].) That was because “duplication of the more demanding and time-consuming service requirements of [former] section 366.23, where the permanent plan recommendation is not changed, would do nothing to enhance the likelihood the parent would appear at the continued hearing.” (In re Phillip F. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 250, 258-259 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 ].) Actual notice of the continued hearing date was sufficient so long as the Department’s recommendation concerning the child’s placement was unchanged.

2003(In re Malcolm D. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 904, 913 [ 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 ].) That was because “duplication of the more demanding and time-consuming service requirements of [former] section 366.23, where the permanent plan recommendation is not changed, would do nothing to enhance the likelihood the parent would appear at the continued hearing.” (In re Phillip F. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 250, 258-259 [ 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 693 ].) Actual notice of the continued hearing date was sufficient so long as the Department’s recommendation concerning the child’s placement was unchanged.

2023(Citing In re Phillip F. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 250, 258 [notice inadequate when mailed to mother’s former address after she had notified the court of her new address]; In re Julian L. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 204, 208 [mother’s waiver of her appearance for a permanency planning hearing did not apply to the continued hearing].) Father points out that the United States Postal Service Web site indicates that first class mail is delivered within one to five business days.9 Father argues that notice via first class mail a mere five days before the hearing, two of which fell on a weekend, was not a rea

2000Mother should have received notice of the continued hearing.” (In re Julian L., supra, 67 Cal.App.4th at p. 208 .) Based on these authorities, a parent who fails to appear at a properly noticed section 366.26 hearing must be notified of the continued hearing.

2007In contrast to those few cases in which errors of constitutional proportion involving inadequate notice of dependency proceedings have been found to be structural (see, e.g., Judith P. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535, 553-558 , 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 [failure to provide parent and children with status report at least 10 days before hearing as required by statute per se reversible error absent a continued hearing or express waiver]; In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1116 , 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 394 [failure to attempt to provide parent with statutorily required notice of selection

2007In contrast to those few cases in which errors of constitutional proportion involving inadequate notice of dependency proceedings have been found to be structural (see, e.g., Judith P. v. Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 535, 553-558 , 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 14 [failure to provide parent and children with status report at least 10 days before hearing as required by statute per se reversible error absent a continued hearing or express waiver]; In re Jasmine G. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1116 , 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 394 [failure to attempt to provide parent with statutorily required notice of selection

2013“A request to reopen for further evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court whose determination is binding on appeal in the absence of palpable abuse.” (Guardianship of Phillip B. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 407, 428 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 781 ].) Generally, the better practice is to consider all information bearing on the best interests of a child.

2013“A request to reopen for further evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court whose determination is binding on appeal in the absence of palpable abuse.” (Guardianship of Phillip B. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 407, 428 [ 188 Cal.Rptr. 781 ].) Generally, the better practice is to consider all information bearing on the best interests of a child.

2024In addition, Bajah relies on purported events at the continued hearing but, as discussed in more detail post, has not provided a transcript of that hearing. 13 Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 [“We are not bound to develop appellants’ argument for them”]; see also Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564 ; Rhule v. WaveFront Technology, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1223, 1229, fn. 5 ; Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483 .) DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

2013If the witness list is not served prior to the hearing, the court may, on request, grant a brief continuance and may make appropriate temporary orders pending the continued hearing." 17 Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 823 .) "When a witness is not under subpoena, his or her absence generally does not constitute good cause for the continuance of a trial." ( Jensen, supra, at p. 271 .) " 'The decision whether to grant a continuance of a hearing to permit counsel to secure the presence of a witness rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. . . .

2022(In re Marriage of Swain, supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at pp. 839-840 & fn. 7; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.113(a).) Where a party fails to request oral testimony, section 217 does not preclude the court from proceeding without it.

2022Department of Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840 , 857.) Section 217, however, applies only “[a]t a hearing on any order to show cause or notice of motion brought pursuant to this code” — i.e., the Family Code. (§ 217, subd. (a); see generally In re Marriage of Swain (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 830, 839-840 [discussing legislative history of § 217].) A guardianship proceeding is not a proceeding under the Family Code.