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14 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1959–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gurewitz v. Commissioner of Jobs & Traininggreen1 sentence2015Cf. Gurewitz v. Commissioner of Jobs and Training, 444 NW2d 299, 301 (Minn Ct App 1989) (concluding that rules imposing a 35-day time limit for filing a continued claim were “not applicable” when the agency re-determined the claimant’s unemployment benefits, at that point triggering the claimant’s right to receive more weeks of unemployment benefits well after the 3 5-day limit had run; to conclude otherwise would be “unjust” and “would result in an absurd and unreasonable” interpretation of Minnesota law). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. A. P.
neutral
2 sentences2025Cite as 344 Or App 116 (2025) 119 The juvenile court held another hearing on September 28, 2023. 2025Cite as 344 Or App 116 (2025) 119 The juvenile court held another hearing on September 28, 2023. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Cable
neutral
2 sentences2024You need an attorney to issue subpoenas * * *.” The trial court continued its warnings throughout that hearing: Cite as 335 Or App 711 (2024) 717 “THE COURT: * * * But I’m telling you right now, you’re at an incredible disadvantage * * *. 2024You need an attorney to issue subpoenas * * *.” The trial court continued its warnings throughout that hearing: Cite as 335 Or App 711 (2024) 717 “THE COURT: * * * But I’m telling you right now, you’re at an incredible disadvantage * * *. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Hecker v. Fella
neutral
2 sentences2024Cite as 336 Or App 857 (2024) 869 At the April 4 setting, defendant Fella continued to appear pro se, and the parties reported no resolution. 2024The court continued the hearing to April 4, 2022, so that counsel might attempt to resolve the issue without further Cite as 336 Or App 857 (2024) 869 litigation. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Earleywine
neutral
1 sentence2024Nonprecedential Memo Op: 334 Or App 426 (2024) 429 the court continued the hearing because of a problem at the correctional institution. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Higgins v. Employment Dept.
neutral
1 sentence2023Nonprecedential Memo Op: 327 Or App 309 (2023) 311 Hearings mailed claimant notice of the continued hearing on August 9, 2021, which was well within the required time- frame. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. EUMANA-MORANCHEL
green
1 sentence2018The court went on to note, however, that, when the breath test indicates a BAC under .08 percent, more evidence may be necessary because the precise rate of dissipation "is not necessarily common knowledge." Id. *409 As the court continued its analysis, it once again reiterated that an inference that blood alcohol rates dissipate over time can serve as the necessary connection between a breath test and the defendant's BAC at the time that he or she was driving: "[ ORS 813.010(1)(a) ] requires the chemical analysis to 'show' the actual presence of alcohol in the blood at the time of driving; it | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Fearing v. Bucher
green
1 sentence2014Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Allen
green
1 sentence2010Moreover, the state offered no justification for that three-month delay. 10 Accordingly, we conclude — consistently with our opinion in Allen I, 205 Or App at 228 — that the total delay attributable to the state, “approximately 15 months,” is, “in the circumstances presented here, * * * ‘unreasonable’ for purposes of ORS 135.747.” We emphasize that our conclusion that the 15-month delay attributable to the state was “unreasonable” for purposes of ORS 135.747, under the circumstances of this case. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Pruett v. Employment Division
neutral
2 sentences1990Pruett v. Employment Division, 86 Or App 516 , 740 P2d 196 (1987). 1990Pruett v. Employment Division, 86 Or App 516 , 740 P2d 196 (1987). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Anderson v. Richards
green
2 sentences1959Dec. 137 : ‘That neither actual occupation, cultivation, or residence are necessary to constitute actual possession when the property is so situated as not to admit of any permanent useful improvement, and the continued claim of the party has been evidenced by public acts of ownership, such as he would exercise over property which he claimed in his own right, and would not exercise over property which he did not claim.’ ” Anderson v. Richards, 100 Or 641, 651 , 198 P 570 , says: “Adverse possession is founded upon the in *611 tent with which the occupant has held possession, and this intent is 1959Dec. 137 : ‘That neither actual occupation, cultivation, or residence are necessary to constitute actual possession when the property is so situated as not to admit of any permanent useful improvement, and the continued claim of the party has been evidenced by public acts of ownership, such as he would exercise over property which he claimed in his own right, and would not exercise over property which he did not claim.’ ” Anderson v. Richards, 100 Or 641, 651 , 198 P 570 , says: “Adverse possession is founded upon the in *611 tent with which the occupant has held possession, and this intent is | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Rowland v. Williams
green
2 sentences1959Dec. 137 : ‘That neither actual occupation, cultivation, or residence are necessary to constitute actual possession when the property is so situated as not to admit of any permanent useful improvement, and the continued claim of the party has been evidenced by public acts of ownership, such as he would exercise over property which he claimed in his own right, and would not exercise over property which he did not claim.’ ” Anderson v. Richards, 100 Or 641, 651 , 198 P 570 , says: “Adverse possession is founded upon the in *611 tent with which the occupant has held possession, and this intent is 1959Dec. 137 : ‘That neither actual occupation, cultivation, or residence are necessary to constitute actual possession when the property is so situated as not to admit of any permanent useful improvement, and the continued claim of the party has been evidenced by public acts of ownership, such as he would exercise over property which he claimed in his own right, and would not exercise over property which he did not claim.’ ” Anderson v. Richards, 100 Or 641, 651 , 198 P 570 , says: “Adverse possession is founded upon the in *611 tent with which the occupant has held possession, and this intent is | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Reeves v. Porta
green
2 sentences1959Dec. 137 : ‘That neither actual occupation, cultivation, or residence are necessary to constitute actual possession when the property is so situated as not to admit of any permanent useful improvement, and the continued claim of the party has been evidenced by public acts of ownership, such as he would exercise over property which he claimed in his own right, and would not exercise over property which he did not claim.’ ” Anderson v. Richards, 100 Or 641, 651 , 198 P 570 , says: “Adverse possession is founded upon the in *611 tent with which the occupant has held possession, and this intent is 1959Dec. 137 : ‘That neither actual occupation, cultivation, or residence are necessary to constitute actual possession when the property is so situated as not to admit of any permanent useful improvement, and the continued claim of the party has been evidenced by public acts of ownership, such as he would exercise over property which he claimed in his own right, and would not exercise over property which he did not claim.’ ” Anderson v. Richards, 100 Or 641, 651 , 198 P 570 , says: “Adverse possession is founded upon the in *611 tent with which the occupant has held possession, and this intent is | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.