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21 Pennsylvania opinions name it 7 courts 1941–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Belasco v. Board of Public Educationgreen2 sentences2021Likewise, in Belasco v. Board of Public Education of the School District of Pittsburgh, [ 510 A.2d 337, 339 (Pa. 1986)], our Supreme Court held that because a teacher had not been informed that giving a student a “love tap” with a wooden paddle violated the school district policy against corporal punishment, the teacher’s conduct was not a willful violation of school law. 2010Likewise, in Belasco v. Board of Public Education of the School District of Pittsburgh, 510 Pa. 504, 507 , 510 A.2d 337, 339 (1986), our Supreme Court held that because a teacher had not been informed that giving a student a “love tap” with a wooden paddle violated the school district policy against corporal punishment, the teacher’s conduct was not a willful violation of school law. | 2 | 2 |
Cowdery v. BD. OF ED., SD OF PHILA.green2 sentences2021In Cowdery v. Board of Education of the School District of Philadelphia, [ 531 A.2d 1186, 1188 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987)], this Court held that a teacher’s continued violation of the board’s sick-leave policy was not willful because the teacher did not know of this policy. 2010In Cowdery v. Board of Education of the School District of Philadelphia, 110 Pa.Cmwlth. 164 , 531 A.2d 1186, 1188 (1987), this Court held that a teacher’s continued violation of the board’s sick-leave policy was not willful because the teacher did not know of this policy. | 2 | 2 |
In the Interest of: A.N.P., a Minor Appeal of: E.green1 sentence2022See In Interest of A.N.P., 155 A.3d at 66 (“Due process requires nothing more than adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself in an impartial tribunal having jurisdiction over the matter.”). | 1 | 1 |
In re the Adoption of J.N.F.green1 sentence2022See In re Adoption of J.N.F., 887 A.2d. at 781 (noting that it is the burden of the incarcerated parent to notify the trial court if he desires to participate in a termination hearing). - 14 - J-S12002-22 Having determined that Father’s counsel was properly given notice of the continued hearing date, and that Father was represented by counsel at the October 27, 2021 hearing, we reject Father’s argument that the trial court violated his right to due process. | 1 | 1 |
In the Interest of: R.W., a Minor, Appeal of: WCCBgreen1 sentence2018R.W., 169 A.3d at 140-41 (Strassburger, J., concurring and dissenting). 4 The orphans’ court continued the hearing from June 30, 2017. | 1 | 1 |
Stanford-Gale v. Tax Claim Bureau of Susquehanna Countygreen1 sentence2016For purposes of due process, “actual notice of the continued hearing date will suffice.” In re Phillip F., 78 Cal. App. 4th 250, 259 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 2000); see also Stanford-Gale v. Tax Claim Bureau of Susquehanna County, 816 A.2d 1214, 1217 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (concluding that “actual notice of a pending tax sale waives strict compliance with statutory notice requirements[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Phillip F.green1 sentence2016For purposes of due process, “actual notice of the continued hearing date will suffice.” In re Phillip F., 78 Cal. App. 4th 250, 259 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 2000); see also Stanford-Gale v. Tax Claim Bureau of Susquehanna County, 816 A.2d 1214, 1217 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (concluding that “actual notice of a pending tax sale waives strict compliance with statutory notice requirements[.]”). | 1 | 1 |
T.M. v. Elwyn, Inc.green1 sentence2014The court continued that this rule “shield[s] the mental processes of an attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client’s case ... without fear that [his] work product will be used against [his] clients.” Id. at 812 (quoting T.M. v. Elwyn, Inc., 950 A.2d 1050, 1062 (Pa.Super.2008)); see also Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3 cmt. (expressing that the rule “means exactly what it says” and “immunizes the lawyer’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, memoranda, notes, summaries, legal research and legal theories, nothing more”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Millergreen1 sentence2011See Commonwealth v. Miller, 868 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 584 Pa. 685 , 881 A.2d 819 (2005) ("When a PCRA court grants a request for reinstatement of direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, it may address, but not ‘reach’ the merits of any remaining claims.’’). . | 1 | 1 |
Com. v. Mussergreen2 sentences2011See Commonwealth v. Miller, 868 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 584 Pa. 685 , 881 A.2d 819 (2005) ("When a PCRA court grants a request for reinstatement of direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, it may address, but not ‘reach’ the merits of any remaining claims.’’). . 2011See Commonwealth v. Miller, 868 A.2d 578, 580 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 584 Pa. 685 , 881 A.2d 819 (2005) ("When a PCRA court grants a request for reinstatement of direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc, it may address, but not ‘reach’ the merits of any remaining claims.’’). . | 1 | 1 |
Childers v. Shannongreen1 sentence1986See e.g., Childers v. Shannon, supra: “The flaw in Judge Ackerman’s analysis [in Bulloch] is that the continued requirement of marriage as an element of a claim for loss of consortium is not a matter of reward or punishment. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Chubb/Pacific Indemnity Groupgreen1 sentence1983See Davis v. Chubb/Pacific Indemnity Group, supra. *98 Appellant contends finally that refusing to permit a malicious prosecution suit to proceed based on an ARD disposition is unconstitutional because it denies appellant’s right to a continued presumption of innocence. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth Ex Rel. Henderson v. Baldigreen1 sentence1955The requisition papers from the demanding State are in order, as they are required to be: Commonwealth ex rel. v. Baldi, 372 Pa. 463, 466 (1953); and charge the defendant in Camden County, N. J., with the willful neglect of his two minor children, Florence and John Houser, in destitute and necessitous circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
KC Equities v. Department of Public Welfare
green
1 sentence2023She further found that such request would violate Mr. Ortega‘s deliberative process privilege as a high ranking official pursuant to KC Equities v. Department of Public Welfare, 95 A.3d 918 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Anders v. California
green
2 sentences2017At the time of the continued hearing, counsel for the ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 2017At the time of the continued hearing, counsel for the ____________________________________________ * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. 1 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Barrick v. Holy Spirit Hospital of the Sisters of Christian Charity
green
1 sentence2014The court continued that this rule “shield[s] the mental processes of an attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client’s case ... without fear that [his] work product will be used against [his] clients.” Id. at 812 (quoting T.M. v. Elwyn, Inc., 950 A.2d 1050, 1062 (Pa.Super.2008)); see also Pa.R.C.P. 4003.3 cmt. (expressing that the rule “means exactly what it says” and “immunizes the lawyer’s mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, memoranda, notes, summaries, legal research and legal theories, nothing more”). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Izenson v. Izenson
green
1 sentence2010Plaintiff’s request is based on additional testimony showing a continued violation of the court’s preliminary injunction dated June 16, 2010. [Plaintiff’s petition for preliminary supplemental injunctive relief, 8/20/10, ¶ 18.] In Izenson v. Izenson, 418 A.2d 445 (Pa. Super. 1980), the Pennsylvania Superior Court stated that “[wjhere a preliminary injunction is in force, the issuance of a permanent injunction terminates the preliminary injunction.” Because the preliminary injunction issued on June 16, 2010, will cease to be in effect upon the filing of the present opinion and order granting pe | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Capenos v. Lawrence County Tax Claim Bureau
green
1 sentence1995In Cápenos v. Lawrence County Tax Claim Bureau, 149 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 323, 613 A.2d 112 (1992), we determined that a hen-holder must be advised of a pending judicial sale so that he may object. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
In re the Tax Claim Bureau
green
2 sentences1995In In re Petition of Tax Claim Bureau of Westmoreland County, 149 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 532 , 613 A.2d 634 , appeal denied, 533 Pa. 615 , 618 A.2d 404 (1992), we held that because a hearing on the rule to show cause is required to afford an opportunity to object to the judicial sale, a mortgage was not divested by the judicial sale of property where the trial court continued the hearing on the rule to show cause without notifying the mortgagee of the new hearing date. 1995In In re Petition of Tax Claim Bureau of Westmoreland County, 149 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 532 , 613 A.2d 634 , appeal denied, 533 Pa. 615 , 618 A.2d 404 (1992), we held that because a hearing on the rule to show cause is required to afford an opportunity to object to the judicial sale, a mortgage was not divested by the judicial sale of property where the trial court continued the hearing on the rule to show cause without notifying the mortgagee of the new hearing date. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Corbin v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1986Jones v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 44 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 610 , 404 A.2d 755 (1979); Corbin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 50 , 399 A.2d 1202 (1979). 1986Jones v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 44 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 610 , 404 A.2d 755 (1979); Corbin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 50 , 399 A.2d 1202 (1979). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Jones v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences1986Jones v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 44 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 610 , 404 A.2d 755 (1979); Corbin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 50 , 399 A.2d 1202 (1979). 1986Jones v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 44 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 610 , 404 A.2d 755 (1979); Corbin v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 42 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 50 , 399 A.2d 1202 (1979). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp.
green
2 sentences1983Although § 2-318 12 of the Code extended the cause of action for breach of warranty to members of the buyer’s family, his household or a guest in the purchaser’s home, this Court continued the requirement of privity as to an employee of the purchaser of a product in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610 , 187 A.2d 575 (1963) (horizontal privity). 13 Both horizontal privity, determinative of who may sue, and vertical privity, which decides who may be sued, have been considered undesirable. 14 The primary rea *565 sons offered for the condemnation of the privity requirement centered upon t 1983Although § 2-318 12 of the Code extended the cause of action for breach of warranty to members of the buyer’s family, his household or a guest in the purchaser’s home, this Court continued the requirement of privity as to an employee of the purchaser of a product in Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610 , 187 A.2d 575 (1963) (horizontal privity). 13 Both horizontal privity, determinative of who may sue, and vertical privity, which decides who may be sued, have been considered undesirable. 14 The primary rea *565 sons offered for the condemnation of the privity requirement centered upon t | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.
green
2 sentences1983The decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358 , 161 A.2d 69 (1960), is considered the fall of privity in products liability cases. 1983The decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358 , 161 A.2d 69 (1960), is considered the fall of privity in products liability cases. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
National Wood Preservers, Inc. v. Commonwealth Department of Environmental Resources
green
1 sentence1982In Note 18, 489 Pa. at pages 239-240, 414 A.2d at 46 , the Court continued its analysis: 18. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Commonwealth ex rel. Travitzky v. Travitzky
green
2 sentences1982Travitsky v. Travitsky, 230 Pa.Super. 435 , 326 A.2d 883 (1974). 1982Travitsky v. Travitsky, 230 Pa.Super. 435 , 326 A.2d 883 (1974). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Commonwealth v. Davis
green
1 sentence1977Commonwealth v. Davis, supra. Here, so far as the record discloses, appellant was not given such written notice, either before the first hearing on March 18, 1975, or before the continued hearing on September 29, 1975. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Commonwealth v. Stratton
green
2 sentences1977In Commonwealth v. Stratton, 235 Pa.Super. 566 , 344 A.2d 636 (1975), (JACOBS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which WATKINS, P. J., joined), the appellant was granted a new probation revocation hearing because there was “no evidence in the record to show that the appellant received written notice.” Id. 235 Pa.Super. at 569 , 344 A.2d at 638 . 1977In Commonwealth v. Stratton, 235 Pa.Super. 566 , 344 A.2d 636 (1975), (JACOBS, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which WATKINS, P. J., joined), the appellant was granted a new probation revocation hearing because there was “no evidence in the record to show that the appellant received written notice.” Id. 235 Pa.Super. at 569 , 344 A.2d at 638 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Casper v. Philadelphia
green
1 sentence1965Defendants also ask that this court either distinguish or overrule Casper v. Philadelphia, 55 Pa. Superior Ct. 266 , (1913). | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Cawley v. Bohan
neutral
2 sentences1941Cf. Cawley v. Bohan, 120 Pa. 295 , 14 A. 59 . 1941Cf. Cawley v. Bohan, 120 Pa. 295 , 14 A. 59 . | 1 | 1941–1941 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.