12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lennar Corp. v. Auto-Owners Insurancegreen2 sentences2021See Advance Roofing, 163 Ariz. at 481 (affirming summary judgment on duty to investigate when insured "did not come forward and appropriately demonstrate that the [underlying plaintiff] was seeking damages within the coverage of" the insured's policy); cf. Lennar Corp., 214 Ariz. at 265, ¶ 33 (noting that insured's factual showing triggering the duty to investigate was "more than speculation"). 2 In Advance Roofing, we noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court's "formulation of the insurer's duty to investigate [was] sound." 163 Ariz. at 480 (citing Johnson v. Aid Ins. 2010As we said in Lennar Corp., “[T]he insurer would have the duty to defend a suit alleging facts that, if true, would give rise to coverage, even though there would ultimately be no obligation to indemnify if the facts giving rise to coverage were not established.” Id. at 261, ¶ 11, 151 P.3d at 544 . ¶ 24 As to whether a duty to defend may apply absent litigation, the standard CGL policy expressly refers to a lawsuit: “We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any ‘suit’ seeking ... damages [covered by the policy].” 4 By contrast, the policy’s insuring clause (“We will pay th | 1 | 2 |
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Corp. v. Advance Roofing & Supply Co.green2 sentences2021See Advance Roofing, 163 Ariz. at 481 (affirming summary judgment on duty to investigate when insured "did not come forward and appropriately demonstrate that the [underlying plaintiff] was seeking damages within the coverage of" the insured's policy); cf. Lennar Corp., 214 Ariz. at 265, ¶ 33 (noting that insured's factual showing triggering the duty to investigate was "more than speculation"). 2 In Advance Roofing, we noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court's "formulation of the insurer's duty to investigate [was] sound." 163 Ariz. at 480 (citing Johnson v. Aid Ins. 2021See Advance Roofing, 163 Ariz. at 481 (affirming summary judgment on duty to investigate when insured "did not come forward and appropriately demonstrate that the [underlying plaintiff] was seeking damages within the coverage of" the insured's policy); cf. Lennar Corp., 214 Ariz. at 265, ¶ 33 (noting that insured's factual showing triggering the duty to investigate was "more than speculation"). 2 In Advance Roofing, we noted that the Minnesota Supreme Court's "formulation of the insurer's duty to investigate [was] sound." 163 Ariz. at 480 (citing Johnson v. Aid Ins. | 1 | 1 |
MT BUILDERS, LLC v. Fisher Roofing Inc.green2 sentences2012MT Builders, 219 Ariz. at 302, ¶ 12 , 197 P.3d at 763 (citation omitted); INA, 150 Ariz. at 253 , 722 P.2d at 980 . ¶ 17 In this case, the District agreed to indemnify the Dam Owners against “all liability.” As the eases cited above state, “all liability” means just that: all sums covered by any judgment arising from a covered claim against the Dam Owners, regardless of whether the Dam Owners have paid the judgment or any part of it pursuant to a covenant not to execute. ¶ 18 The District asserts that the Dam Owners are not liable for any damages that are subject to the covenant not to execute 2012MT Builders, 219 Ariz. at 302, ¶ 12 , 197 P.3d at 763 (citation omitted); INA, 150 Ariz. at 253 , 722 P.2d at 980 . ¶ 17 In this case, the District agreed to indemnify the Dam Owners against “all liability.” As the eases cited above state, “all liability” means just that: all sums covered by any judgment arising from a covered claim against the Dam Owners, regardless of whether the Dam Owners have paid the judgment or any part of it pursuant to a covenant not to execute. ¶ 18 The District asserts that the Dam Owners are not liable for any damages that are subject to the covenant not to execute | 1 | 1 |
Manny v. Estate of Andersongreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Certain Underwriters, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 16 P.3d at 103-04 ; cf. Man-ny v. Anderson’s Estate, 117 Ariz. 548, 550 , 574 P.2d 36, 38 (App.1977) (discussing whether insurer could have breached its duty to defend wrongful death action prior to filing of complaint). *202 ¶ 23 But the first principle underlying Liberty Mutual’s argument means only that an insurer may have a duty to defend even when the existence of a covered claim is not certain. 2010See, e.g., Certain Underwriters, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 16 P.3d at 103-04 ; cf. Man-ny v. Anderson’s Estate, 117 Ariz. 548, 550 , 574 P.2d 36, 38 (App.1977) (discussing whether insurer could have breached its duty to defend wrongful death action prior to filing of complaint). *202 ¶ 23 But the first principle underlying Liberty Mutual’s argument means only that an insurer may have a duty to defend even when the existence of a covered claim is not certain. | 1 | 1 |
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Superior Court of Los Angeles Countygreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., Certain Underwriters, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 16 P.3d at 103-04 ; cf. Man-ny v. Anderson’s Estate, 117 Ariz. 548, 550 , 574 P.2d 36, 38 (App.1977) (discussing whether insurer could have breached its duty to defend wrongful death action prior to filing of complaint). *202 ¶ 23 But the first principle underlying Liberty Mutual’s argument means only that an insurer may have a duty to defend even when the existence of a covered claim is not certain. 2010See, e.g., Certain Underwriters, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 672 , 16 P.3d at 103-04 ; cf. Man-ny v. Anderson’s Estate, 117 Ariz. 548, 550 , 574 P.2d 36, 38 (App.1977) (discussing whether insurer could have breached its duty to defend wrongful death action prior to filing of complaint). *202 ¶ 23 But the first principle underlying Liberty Mutual’s argument means only that an insurer may have a duty to defend even when the existence of a covered claim is not certain. | 1 | 1 |
Lake Havasu City v. Mohave Countygreen2 sentences2004The legislature has now added the requirement that “any recovery” by the claimant under the article creating the Fund and defining its obligations “shall be reduced” by any amount the claimant recovers from her insurance policy. ¶ 16 Our conclusion that the 1998 amendment has changed the meaning of § 20-673(C) is strongly supported, if not mandated, by the interpretive principle that when the legislature has amended a statute, “we must presume they intended to change existing law rather than perform a futile act.” Rotter v. Coconino County, 169 Ariz. 269, 274 , 818 P.2d 704, 709 (1991) (quotin 2004The legislature has now added the requirement that “any recovery” by the claimant under the article creating the Fund and defining its obligations “shall be reduced” by any amount the claimant recovers from her insurance policy. ¶ 16 Our conclusion that the 1998 amendment has changed the meaning of § 20-673(C) is strongly supported, if not mandated, by the interpretive principle that when the legislature has amended a statute, “we must presume they intended to change existing law rather than perform a futile act.” Rotter v. Coconino County, 169 Ariz. 269, 274 , 818 P.2d 704, 709 (1991) (quotin | 1 | 1 |
Rotter v. Coconino Countygreen2 sentences2004The legislature has now added the requirement that “any recovery” by the claimant under the article creating the Fund and defining its obligations “shall be reduced” by any amount the claimant recovers from her insurance policy. ¶ 16 Our conclusion that the 1998 amendment has changed the meaning of § 20-673(C) is strongly supported, if not mandated, by the interpretive principle that when the legislature has amended a statute, “we must presume they intended to change existing law rather than perform a futile act.” Rotter v. Coconino County, 169 Ariz. 269, 274 , 818 P.2d 704, 709 (1991) (quotin 2004The legislature has now added the requirement that “any recovery” by the claimant under the article creating the Fund and defining its obligations “shall be reduced” by any amount the claimant recovers from her insurance policy. ¶ 16 Our conclusion that the 1998 amendment has changed the meaning of § 20-673(C) is strongly supported, if not mandated, by the interpretive principle that when the legislature has amended a statute, “we must presume they intended to change existing law rather than perform a futile act.” Rotter v. Coconino County, 169 Ariz. 269, 274 , 818 P.2d 704, 709 (1991) (quotin | 1 | 1 |
Fernandez v. Florida Ins. Guaranty Ass'ngreen1 sentence1999Ass’n, 383 So.2d 974, 975 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980), quoting Fla. Stat. Ann. § 631.66 (1979) (no bad faith action against fund because its refusal to accept settlement offer “was an ‘action’ it took ‘in the performance of (its) powers and duties’ under the statute to dispose of the covered claim in question”); cf. Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, 191 Ariz. 565, 575 , 959 P.2d 1256, 1266 (1998) (act authorized by statute or undertaken within general parameters of statutory authority does “not become unauthorized simply because the act was performed erroneously”). ¶ 15 Aside from i | 1 | 1 |
Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences1999Ass’n, 383 So.2d 974, 975 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980), quoting Fla. Stat. Ann. § 631.66 (1979) (no bad faith action against fund because its refusal to accept settlement offer “was an ‘action’ it took ‘in the performance of (its) powers and duties’ under the statute to dispose of the covered claim in question”); cf. Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, 191 Ariz. 565, 575 , 959 P.2d 1256, 1266 (1998) (act authorized by statute or undertaken within general parameters of statutory authority does “not become unauthorized simply because the act was performed erroneously”). ¶ 15 Aside from i 1999Ass’n, 383 So.2d 974, 975 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980), quoting Fla. Stat. Ann. § 631.66 (1979) (no bad faith action against fund because its refusal to accept settlement offer “was an ‘action’ it took ‘in the performance of (its) powers and duties’ under the statute to dispose of the covered claim in question”); cf. Valencia Energy Co. v. Arizona Dep’t of Revenue, 191 Ariz. 565, 575 , 959 P.2d 1256, 1266 (1998) (act authorized by statute or undertaken within general parameters of statutory authority does “not become unauthorized simply because the act was performed erroneously”). ¶ 15 Aside from i | 1 | 1 |
Arizona Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Humphreygreen2 sentences1975It is the contention of the Arizona Insurance Guaranty Association, however, that since it is required to pay to the insureds the unearned premiums that it is entitled to the unearned commissions on said unearned premiums." ( 109 Ariz. at 285, 286 , 508 P.2d at 1147, 1148 ) The Supreme Court recognized that Chapter 78, Laws of 1970, imposed liability *466 on the association, but the fact that it also imposes liability on the "member insurer", by assessment, in the proportion that the net direct written premiums of the member insurer for the past year bears to the net direct written premiums of 1975It is the contention of the Arizona Insurance Guaranty Association, however, that since it is required to pay to the insureds the unearned premiums that it is entitled to the unearned commissions on said unearned premiums." ( 109 Ariz. at 285, 286 , 508 P.2d at 1147, 1148 ) The Supreme Court recognized that Chapter 78, Laws of 1970, imposed liability *466 on the association, but the fact that it also imposes liability on the "member insurer", by assessment, in the proportion that the net direct written premiums of the member insurer for the past year bears to the net direct written premiums of | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund v. Herder
green
2 sentences2004The Fund is obligated, therefore, to pay her $84,900, and has done so. ¶ 15 Prior to the 1998 amendment, the supreme court in Herder held that the phrase “amount payable on a covered claim” in the last sentence of § 20-673(C) referred to “the total amount payable as damages for the claimant’s injuries caused by the covered occurrence,” not to the extent of the Fund’s obligation. 156 Ariz. at 207 , 751 P.2d at 523 . 2004The Fund is obligated, therefore, to pay her $84,900, and has done so. ¶ 15 Prior to the 1998 amendment, the supreme court in Herder held that the phrase “amount payable on a covered claim” in the last sentence of § 20-673(C) referred to “the total amount payable as damages for the claimant’s injuries caused by the covered occurrence,” not to the extent of the Fund’s obligation. 156 Ariz. at 207 , 751 P.2d at 523 . | 2 | 1991–2004 |
Arizona Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund v. Ueki
green
2 sentences2004Id. at 454-55 , 724 P.2d at 73-74 . 2004Id. at 454-55 , 724 P.2d at 73-74 . | 2 | 1988–2004 |
State Ex Rel. Udall v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1997Id. 1997Id. | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Ventana Medical Systems, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
neutral
1 sentence2021Ariz. 2010) ("Where an insured has not made some factual showing, and an insurer has not investigated, it is simply not reasonable to consider additional information at a later time to determine whether there has been a breach."), aff'd, 454 F. App'x 596 (9th Cir. 2011).2 We need not decide this issue here because Patisserie failed to produce admissible evidence at summary judgment to confirm that the Underlying Litigation contained a covered claim. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Walker v. Pacific Indemnity Co.
green
1 sentence2020Id. at 925 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Ina Insurance Co. of North America v. Valley Forge Insurance
green
2 sentences2012MT Builders, 219 Ariz. at 302, ¶ 12 , 197 P.3d at 763 (citation omitted); INA, 150 Ariz. at 253 , 722 P.2d at 980 . ¶ 17 In this case, the District agreed to indemnify the Dam Owners against “all liability.” As the eases cited above state, “all liability” means just that: all sums covered by any judgment arising from a covered claim against the Dam Owners, regardless of whether the Dam Owners have paid the judgment or any part of it pursuant to a covenant not to execute. ¶ 18 The District asserts that the Dam Owners are not liable for any damages that are subject to the covenant not to execute 2012MT Builders, 219 Ariz. at 302, ¶ 12 , 197 P.3d at 763 (citation omitted); INA, 150 Ariz. at 253 , 722 P.2d at 980 . ¶ 17 In this case, the District agreed to indemnify the Dam Owners against “all liability.” As the eases cited above state, “all liability” means just that: all sums covered by any judgment arising from a covered claim against the Dam Owners, regardless of whether the Dam Owners have paid the judgment or any part of it pursuant to a covenant not to execute. ¶ 18 The District asserts that the Dam Owners are not liable for any damages that are subject to the covenant not to execute | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Holt v. Utica Mutual Insurance
green
1 sentence1997Id. at 483 , 759 P.2d at 629 . [11] A.R.S. section 20-673(A) provides, in pertinent part: Any person having a claim against an insurer under any provision in an insurance policy which is also a covered claim shall be required to exhaust first all rights under such policy. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
McKinney v. Aldrich
neutral
2 sentences1986Appellant’s reliance on McKinney v. Aldrich, 123 Ariz. 488 , 600 P.2d 1120 (App. 1979), is misplaced. 1986Appellant’s reliance on McKinney v. Aldrich, 123 Ariz. 488 , 600 P.2d 1120 (App. 1979), is misplaced. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.