covered claim in California

1994Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ]; Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Conversely, where there is no potential for the third party to recover on a covered claim, there is no duty to defend.

1994Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ]; Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 275 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) Conversely, where there is no potential for the third party to recover on a covered claim, there is no duty to defend.

2011Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ].) On the other hand, “the insured ' “may not speculate about unpled third party claims to manufacture coverage” ’ [citation], and the insurer has no duty to defend where the potential for liability is ‘ “tenuous and farfetched.” ’ [Citation.] The ultimate question is whether the facts alleged ‘fairly apprise’ the insurer that the suit is upon a covered claim. [Citation.]” (Michaelian v. State Comp.

2011Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1081 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210 , 846 P.2d 792 ].) On the other hand, “the insured ' “may not speculate about unpled third party claims to manufacture coverage” ’ [citation], and the insurer has no duty to defend where the potential for liability is ‘ “tenuous and farfetched.” ’ [Citation.] The ultimate question is whether the facts alleged ‘fairly apprise’ the insurer that the suit is upon a covered claim. [Citation.]” (Michaelian v. State Comp.

1999(See, e.g., Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 45 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 939 P.2d 766 ].) Under the terms of such a policy, the insurer has a duty to defend its insured against damages for a covered claim by a victim of the insured.

1999(See, e.g., Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 35, 45 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 , 939 P.2d 766 ].) Under the terms of such a policy, the insurer has a duty to defend its insured against damages for a covered claim by a victim of the insured.

2018Co. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 780 , 786, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 ( Shanahan ).) " '[T]he insurer has no duty to defend where the potential for liability is " 'tenuous and farfetched.' " ' " ( Ibid. ) The only extrinsic facts All Green has identified are its owner's statements to SNIC that All Green performed the work properly and passed two inspections.

2018Co. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 780 , 786, 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 572 ( Shanahan ).) " '[T]he insurer has no duty to defend where the potential for liability is " 'tenuous and farfetched.' " ' " ( Ibid. ) The only extrinsic facts All Green has identified are its owner's statements to SNIC that All Green performed the work properly and passed two inspections.

2014Guarantee Assn. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 256, 262 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 493 ].) The record does not contain any correspondence from CIGA to Western Trust or other documents to indicate that CIGA evaluated a claim, determined it did not constitute a covered claim, and denied coverage.

2014Guarantee Assn. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 256, 262 [ 224 Cal.Rptr. 493 ].) The record does not contain any correspondence from CIGA to Western Trust or other documents to indicate that CIGA evaluated a claim, determined it did not constitute a covered claim, and denied coverage.

2012(Risely v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 196, 207-208 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 343 ].) “From the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied by law in all contracts, and from [a] liability insurer’s duty to defend and indemnify covered claims, California courts have derived an implied duty on the part of [an] insurer to accept reasonable settlement demands on such claims within the policy limits.” (Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 718, 724 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 318 , 41 P.3d 128 ] (Hamilton).) Case law has established that an “insurer has a d

2012(Risely v. Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 196, 207-208 [ 107 Cal.Rptr.3d 343 ].) “From the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied by law in all contracts, and from [a] liability insurer’s duty to defend and indemnify covered claims, California courts have derived an implied duty on the part of [an] insurer to accept reasonable settlement demands on such claims within the policy limits.” (Hamilton v. Maryland Casualty Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 718, 724 [ 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 318 , 41 P.3d 128 ] (Hamilton).) Case law has established that an “insurer has a d

2007(Hooten, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 572.) The WCJ stated that Insurance Code section 1063.1, subdivision (c)(5) concerned contribution by a solvent insurance carrier in a single case arising out of a single incident, and section 1063.1, subdivision (c)(9) only concerns a person, not some other entity.

2007(Hooten, supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 572, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 205 .) The WCJ stated that Insurance Code section 1063.1, subdivision (c)(5) concerned contribution by a solvent insurance carrier in a single case arising out of a single incident, and section 1063.1, subdivision (c)(9) only concerns a person, not some other entity.

1994Assn. (1992) 6 Cal. App.4th 1149, 1157 [ 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 263 ].) An insurer may owe a duty to defend where no damages are ultimately awarded. ( Montrose Chemical Corp., supra, at p. 295.) The duty to defend is measured at the outset by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy, and also considering facts extrinsic to the complaint when they reveal a possibility that the claim may be covered by the policy. ( Ibid. ) Nevertheless, this duty, while broad, is not unlimited; where there is no potential for recovery on a covered claim, there is no duty to defend. ( Devin

1994Assn. (1992) 6 Cal. App.4th 1149, 1157 [ 8 Cal. Rptr.2d 263 ].) An insurer may owe a duty to defend where no damages are ultimately awarded. ( Montrose Chemical Corp., supra, at p. 295.) The duty to defend is measured at the outset by comparing the allegations of the complaint with the terms of the policy, and also considering facts extrinsic to the complaint when they reveal a possibility that the claim may be covered by the policy. ( Ibid. ) Nevertheless, this duty, while broad, is not unlimited; where there is no potential for recovery on a covered claim, there is no duty to defend. ( Devin

1993The Court of Appeal concluded the insurer had no duty to defend, reasoning that no potential for liability under the policy existed inasmuch as the uncontradicted evidence showed the accident occurred on the business premises; amendment of the third party complaint to state a covered claim was, therefore, impossible. ( Id. at p. 442.) The Court of Appeal in CNA Casualty of California v. Seaboard Surety Co., supra, 176 Cal. App.3d at page 606 ( CNA ), stated a contrary rule in dictum.

1992III ANALYSIS A. The Duty to Defend Exists Only When There Is Potential for the Third Party to Assert a Claim Covered by the Policy (4a) USAA argued below, and now urges on appeal, the nonsuit was proper because there is no evidence of any possibility McNairs' lawsuit could have encompassed a covered claim. *1157 (5) It is axiomatic that an insurer's duty to defend is separate from and broader than its duty to indemnify. ( State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Eddy (1990) 218 Cal. App.3d 958, 965 [ 267 Cal. Rptr. 379 ].) The duty to defend is not measured solely by how the third party denominates i

2025Cal. 2009) 636 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1040 .) 58 Chicago Title cites Gunderson for the proposition that when a lawsuit raises no potential for coverage, the insurer does not have a continuing burden to investigate whether extrinsic facts might bring the claim into coverage. ( Gunderson, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at. p. 1114.) However, Composti I not only presented facts creating the potential for coverage, but the insured requested reconsideration of the decision to reject tender by pointing out the very uncertainty (over location and identification of the unnamed roads) that created the possibility of a

2025Cal. 2009) 636 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1040 .) 58 Chicago Title cites Gunderson for the proposition that when a lawsuit raises no potential for coverage, the insurer does not have a continuing burden to investigate whether extrinsic facts might bring the claim into coverage. ( Gunderson, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at. p. 1114.) However, Composti I not only presented facts creating the potential for coverage, but the insured requested reconsideration of the decision to reject tender by pointing out the very uncertainty (over location and identification of the unnamed roads) that created the possibility of a

1999Co., supra, at p. 667.) “[Standard comprehensive or commercial general liability [CGL] insurance policies provide that the insurer has a duty to indemnify the insured for those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages for a covered claim.” (Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 38, 56 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 118 , 948 P.2d 909 ].) Such a policy is triggered if the “specified harm is caused by an included occurrence, so long as at least some such harm results within the policy period.” (Ibid., fn% omitted, citing Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral

1999Co., supra, at p. 667.) “[Standard comprehensive or commercial general liability [CGL] insurance policies provide that the insurer has a duty to indemnify the insured for those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages for a covered claim.” (Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Co. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 38, 56 [ 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 118 , 948 P.2d 909 ].) Such a policy is triggered if the “specified harm is caused by an included occurrence, so long as at least some such harm results within the policy period.” (Ibid., fn% omitted, citing Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Admiral

2025This is not a scenario in which the nature of Composti’s claim (to establish a legal right-of-way over the property) was outside the scope of coverage and “[n]o reasonable construction of the claim could potentially bring it within the coverage of the policy.” ( Montrose, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 302.) Furthermore, the record establishes (and Chicago Title does not dispute) that as of Bartel’s initial tender of Composti I, Chicago Title was aware of facts in the grant deed that, however unlikely, could give rise to the possibility of a covered claim.

2025This is not a scenario in which the nature of Composti’s claim (to establish a legal right-of-way over the property) was outside the scope of coverage and “[n]o reasonable construction of the claim could potentially bring it within the coverage of the policy.” (Montrose, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 302 .) Furthermore, the record establishes (and Chicago Title does not dispute) that as of Bartel’s initial tender of Composti I, Chicago Title was aware of facts in the grant deed that, however unlikely, could give rise to the possibility of a covered claim.

2022They rely on Scottsdale, supra, 36 Cal.4th at page 654 , which explains that a duty to defend arises if under the facts alleged, reasonably inferable, or known, the complaint could be amended to state a covered claim.

2022They rely on Scottsdale, supra, 36 Cal.4th at page 654 , which explains that a duty to defend arises if under the facts alleged, reasonably inferable, or known, the complaint could be amended to state a covered claim.

2015Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 23, 44 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 , 900 P.2d 619 ].) “Since pleadings are easily amended, the proper focus is on the facts alleged, rather than the theories for recovery. [Citation.] However, the insured ‘ “may not speculate about unpled third party claims to manufacture coverage” ’ [citation], and the insurer has no duty to defend where the potential for liability is ‘ “tenuous and farfetched.” ’ [Citation.] The ultimate question is whether the facts alleged ‘fairly apprise’ the insurer that the suit is upon a covered claim.” (Michaelian v. State Comp.

2015Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 23, 44 [ 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 370 , 900 P.2d 619 ].) “Since pleadings are easily amended, the proper focus is on the facts alleged, rather than the theories for recovery. [Citation.] However, the insured ‘ “may not speculate about unpled third party claims to manufacture coverage” ’ [citation], and the insurer has no duty to defend where the potential for liability is ‘ “tenuous and farfetched.” ’ [Citation.] The ultimate question is whether the facts alleged ‘fairly apprise’ the insurer that the suit is upon a covered claim.” (Michaelian v. State Comp.

2009Assignee CIGA also contends that Catholic Healthcare West is an assignee of an original insured and thus excluded from coverage by the language in section 1063.1, subdivision (c)(9) that states a covered claim “does not include any claim asserted by an assignee . ...” In Baxter , the court concluded that BHC was an assignee because substantially all of the assets of AHSC were transferred to a predecessor corporation pursuant to a document titled “Assignment and Assumption.” (Baxter, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th at p. 309 .) In this case, the record does not contain an assignment document.

2005Guarantee Assn. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 306, 312 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 87 ] [“Even if appellants come within the definition of a ‘claimant’ pursuant to section 1063.1, subdivision (g), they do not survive the legislative choice that they are not ‘original claimants’ pursuant to section 1063.1, subdivision (c)(9)”]; and see Black Diamond Asphalt, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 109, 120 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 466 ] [“Under the unambiguous language of the statutory scheme, an original claimant can be any person (other than the insurer) instituting a liability claim within the coverage of the po

2004Any amount payable on a covered claim shall be reduced by the amount of any recovery under the program." (Subd. (e).) We will give words their ordinary, everyday meaning. ( Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 983 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 , 987 P.2d 727 .) "We must harmonize `the various parts of a statutory enactment ... by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 .) The Insurance Code defines "covered claims" as "the obligations of an

2004Any amount payable on a covered claim shall be reduced by the amount of any recovery under the program." (Subd. (e).) We will give words their ordinary, everyday meaning. ( Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 983 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 , 987 P.2d 727 .) "We must harmonize `the various parts of a statutory enactment ... by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 .) The Insurance Code defines "covered claims" as "the obligations of an

2004Appeals Bd. (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1439 , 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 .) The statute expressly also states that "`[c]overed claims' does not include any obligations arising from ... disability insurance." (§ 1063.1, subd. (c)(3).) *807 Within the framework of definitions and exclusions, the words, "which is also a covered claim" in subdivision (e) can only modify the preceding phrase, "claim or legal right of recovery." "Covered claim" in this context limits the type of coverage for which offset is available to specific claims; subdivision (e) would be meaningless in context if read to require a

2004Appeals Bd. (2003) 104 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1439 , 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 .) The statute expressly also states that "`[c]overed claims' does not include any obligations arising from ... disability insurance." (§ 1063.1, subd. (c)(3).) *807 Within the framework of definitions and exclusions, the words, "which is also a covered claim" in subdivision (e) can only modify the preceding phrase, "claim or legal right of recovery." "Covered claim" in this context limits the type of coverage for which offset is available to specific claims; subdivision (e) would be meaningless in context if read to require a

2004Guarantee Assn. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 297, 308-309 , 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 .) Coverage is limited to workers' compensation claims, homeowners claims, and automobile claims, which include automobile material damage, automobile liability (both personal injury/death and property damage), medical payments and uninsured motorist claims. (§ 1063.5(a)-(b).) Disability insurance is not a covered claim. (§ 1063.1, subd. (c)(3)(i).) Except for workers' compensation, CIGA's obligations are limited to claims in which the claimant or insured was a California resident at the time of the insured occurrence or t

2004Guarantee Assn. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 297, 308-309 , 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 148 .) Coverage is limited to workers' compensation claims, homeowners claims, and automobile claims, which include automobile material damage, automobile liability (both personal injury/death and property damage), medical payments and uninsured motorist claims. (§ 1063.5(a)-(b).) Disability insurance is not a covered claim. (§ 1063.1, subd. (c)(3)(i).) Except for workers' compensation, CIGA's obligations are limited to claims in which the claimant or insured was a California resident at the time of the insured occurrence or t

2004Any amount payable on a covered claim shall be reduced by the amount of any recovery under the program." (Subd. (e).) We will give words their ordinary, everyday meaning. ( Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 983 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 , 987 P.2d 727 .) "We must harmonize `the various parts of a statutory enactment ... by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 .) The Insurance Code defines "covered claims" as "the obligations of an

2004Any amount payable on a covered claim shall be reduced by the amount of any recovery under the program." (Subd. (e).) We will give words their ordinary, everyday meaning. ( Wilcox v. Birtwhistle (1999) 21 Cal.4th 973, 983 , 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 260 , 987 P.2d 727 .) "We must harmonize `the various parts of a statutory enactment ... by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole.' [Citations.]" ( People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142 , 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387 , 19 P.3d 1129 .) The Insurance Code defines "covered claims" as "the obligations of an

2019Here, plaintiff has not challenged the Agreement on unconscionability grounds either in the trial court or on appeal. 4 Plaintiff does not argue that any claim in the complaint fails to qualify as a covered claim as defined in the Agreement. 10 to contract principles which govern arbitration agreements.’ [Citation.] ‘[A]n arbitration agreement may be applied retroactively to transactions which occurred prior to execution of the arbitration agreement.’ (Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. King (M.D.Fla. 1992) 804 F.Supp. 1512, 1514 ; see Shotto v. Laub (D.Md. 1986) 632 F.Supp. 516, 5