7 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1967–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Georgia Department of Transportation v. Millergreen2 sentences2012See Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Miller, 300 Ga. App. 857, 865 (4) (b) ( 686 SE2d 455 ) (2009). (d) The trial court did not err in charging the jury on accepted risk. 2012See Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Miller, 300 Ga. App. 857, 865 (4) (b) ( 686 SE2d 455 ) (2009). (d) The trial court did not err in charging the jury on accepted risk. | 2 | 2 |
G & MSS TRUCKING, INC. v. Richgreen2 sentences2021See Norman Enterprises Interior Design v. DeKalb County, 245 Ga. App. 538, 541-542 (1) ( 538 SE2d 130 ) (2000); Grigsby v. White, 228 Ga. App. 682, 682 ( 492 SE2d 603 ) (1997) (Third-party tort-claimants’ “compliance or non-compliance with OCGA 33-36-14 (a) will only become a relevant inquiry if and when they obtain a judgment” against the insured of the insolvent insurer.) (citation and punctuation omitted); G & MSS Trucking v. Rich, 224 Ga. App. 130, 132-133 (2) ( 479 SE2d 761 ) (1996) (holding that OCGA § 33-36-14 (a) requires that a final judgment be reduced by amounts the injured party re 2021See Norman Enterprises Interior Design v. DeKalb County, 245 Ga. App. 538, 541-542 (1) ( 538 SE2d 130 ) (2000); Grigsby v. White, 228 Ga. App. 682, 682 ( 492 SE2d 603 ) (1997) (Third-party tort-claimants’ “compliance or non-compliance with OCGA 33-36-14 (a) will only become a relevant inquiry if and when they obtain a judgment” against the insured of the insolvent insurer.) (citation and punctuation omitted); G & MSS Trucking v. Rich, 224 Ga. App. 130, 132-133 (2) ( 479 SE2d 761 ) (1996) (holding that OCGA § 33-36-14 (a) requires that a final judgment be reduced by amounts the injured party re | 1 | 1 |
Norman Enterprises Interior Design, Inc. v. Dekalb Countygreen2 sentences2021See Norman Enterprises Interior Design v. DeKalb County, 245 Ga. App. 538, 541-542 (1) ( 538 SE2d 130 ) (2000); Grigsby v. White, 228 Ga. App. 682, 682 ( 492 SE2d 603 ) (1997) (Third-party tort-claimants’ “compliance or non-compliance with OCGA 33-36-14 (a) will only become a relevant inquiry if and when they obtain a judgment” against the insured of the insolvent insurer.) (citation and punctuation omitted); G & MSS Trucking v. Rich, 224 Ga. App. 130, 132-133 (2) ( 479 SE2d 761 ) (1996) (holding that OCGA § 33-36-14 (a) requires that a final judgment be reduced by amounts the injured party re 2021See Norman Enterprises Interior Design v. DeKalb County, 245 Ga. App. 538, 541-542 (1) ( 538 SE2d 130 ) (2000); Grigsby v. White, 228 Ga. App. 682, 682 ( 492 SE2d 603 ) (1997) (Third-party tort-claimants’ “compliance or non-compliance with OCGA 33-36-14 (a) will only become a relevant inquiry if and when they obtain a judgment” against the insured of the insolvent insurer.) (citation and punctuation omitted); G & MSS Trucking v. Rich, 224 Ga. App. 130, 132-133 (2) ( 479 SE2d 761 ) (1996) (holding that OCGA § 33-36-14 (a) requires that a final judgment be reduced by amounts the injured party re | 1 | 1 |
Grigsby v. Whitegreen2 sentences2021See Norman Enterprises Interior Design v. DeKalb County, 245 Ga. App. 538, 541-542 (1) ( 538 SE2d 130 ) (2000); Grigsby v. White, 228 Ga. App. 682, 682 ( 492 SE2d 603 ) (1997) (Third-party tort-claimants’ “compliance or non-compliance with OCGA 33-36-14 (a) will only become a relevant inquiry if and when they obtain a judgment” against the insured of the insolvent insurer.) (citation and punctuation omitted); G & MSS Trucking v. Rich, 224 Ga. App. 130, 132-133 (2) ( 479 SE2d 761 ) (1996) (holding that OCGA § 33-36-14 (a) requires that a final judgment be reduced by amounts the injured party re 2021See Norman Enterprises Interior Design v. DeKalb County, 245 Ga. App. 538, 541-542 (1) ( 538 SE2d 130 ) (2000); Grigsby v. White, 228 Ga. App. 682, 682 ( 492 SE2d 603 ) (1997) (Third-party tort-claimants’ “compliance or non-compliance with OCGA 33-36-14 (a) will only become a relevant inquiry if and when they obtain a judgment” against the insured of the insolvent insurer.) (citation and punctuation omitted); G & MSS Trucking v. Rich, 224 Ga. App. 130, 132-133 (2) ( 479 SE2d 761 ) (1996) (holding that OCGA § 33-36-14 (a) requires that a final judgment be reduced by amounts the injured party re | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Stategreen2 sentences1997The true effect of an alibi defense is to traverse the state’s proof that the accused committed the crime, therefore, “when a trial court does charge the jury, as it did here, completely and correctly on defendant’s presumption of innocence, on the State’s burden of proof and on credibility of witnesses, and the State produces evidence sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a specific charge on alibi is not mandated absent a request.” Green v. State, 219 Ga. App. 24, 27 ( 464 SE2d 21 ) (1995); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 299-300 ( 298 SE2d 10 ) (1982). 1997The true effect of an alibi defense is to traverse the state’s proof that the accused committed the crime, therefore, “when a trial court does charge the jury, as it did here, completely and correctly on defendant’s presumption of innocence, on the State’s burden of proof and on credibility of witnesses, and the State produces evidence sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a specific charge on alibi is not mandated absent a request.” Green v. State, 219 Ga. App. 24, 27 ( 464 SE2d 21 ) (1995); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 299-300 ( 298 SE2d 10 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Rivers v. Stategreen2 sentences1997The true effect of an alibi defense is to traverse the state’s proof that the accused committed the crime, therefore, “when a trial court does charge the jury, as it did here, completely and correctly on defendant’s presumption of innocence, on the State’s burden of proof and on credibility of witnesses, and the State produces evidence sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a specific charge on alibi is not mandated absent a request.” Green v. State, 219 Ga. App. 24, 27 ( 464 SE2d 21 ) (1995); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 299-300 ( 298 SE2d 10 ) (1982). 1997The true effect of an alibi defense is to traverse the state’s proof that the accused committed the crime, therefore, “when a trial court does charge the jury, as it did here, completely and correctly on defendant’s presumption of innocence, on the State’s burden of proof and on credibility of witnesses, and the State produces evidence sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a specific charge on alibi is not mandated absent a request.” Green v. State, 219 Ga. App. 24, 27 ( 464 SE2d 21 ) (1995); Rivers v. State, 250 Ga. 288, 299-300 ( 298 SE2d 10 ) (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
City of Atlanta v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
green
1 sentence2000Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Francis v. Newton
green
1 sentence1999This court held that an insured may make a claim against his insurer for negligence, fraud, or bad faith in failing to compromise a covered claim, but it does not follow that a person injured by the insured and who is not a party to the insurance contract may complain of the negligence or bad faith of the insurer towards its policyholder in failing to adjust or compromise a claim against such policyholder, for the duty of the insurance company to use ordinary care and good faith in the handling of a claim against its insured arises out of the relationship between the insurer and the insured cr | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Atlanta Metallic Casket Co. v. Hollingsworth
green
2 sentences1967“Where the court gives in charge an entire Code section, a part of which is inapplicable to the issues, this is not a ground for reversal unless it appears that the inapplicable portion was calculated to mislead or erroneously affect the jury in its rendition of the verdict.” Atlanta Metallic Casket Co. v. Hollingsworth, 104 Ga. App. 154 (2) ( 121 SE2d 388 ). 1967“Where the court gives in charge an entire Code section, a part of which is inapplicable to the issues, this is not a ground for reversal unless it appears that the inapplicable portion was calculated to mislead or erroneously affect the jury in its rendition of the verdict.” Atlanta Metallic Casket Co. v. Hollingsworth, 104 Ga. App. 154 (2) ( 121 SE2d 388 ). | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.