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94 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1991–2026 17 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Farm Lloyds v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2025A. Applicable Law Insurance appraisal clauses “provide a means to resolve disputes about the amount of loss for a covered claim.” In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins., 345 S.W.3d at 406–07; see State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 888 (Tex. 2009). 2025A. Applicable Law Insurance appraisal clauses “provide a means to resolve disputes about the amount of loss for a covered claim.” In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins., 345 S.W.3d at 407 ; see State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 888 (Tex. 2009). | 17 | 24 |
In Re Universal Underwriters of Texas Insurance Co.green2 sentences2025A. Applicable Law Insurance appraisal clauses “provide a means to resolve disputes about the amount of loss for a covered claim.” In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins., 345 S.W.3d at 406–07; see State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 888 (Tex. 2009). 2025A. Applicable Law Insurance appraisal clauses “provide a means to resolve disputes about the amount of loss for a covered claim.” In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins., 345 S.W.3d at 407 ; see State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 888 (Tex. 2009). | 9 | 26 |
Guideone Elite Insurance Co. v. Fielder Road Baptist Churchgreen2 sentences2022We have held that a “plaintiff’s factual allegations that potentially support a covered claim [are] all that is needed to invoke the insurer’s duty to defend[]; whereas, the facts actually established in the underlying suit control the duty to indemnify.” Id. 2022Trinity Universal, 945 S.W.2d at 821 . 9 the duty,” id., and by recognizing the duty if the petition alleges facts that “potentially support a covered claim,” GuideOne, 197 S.W.3d at 310 (emphasis added). | 7 | 13 |
Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Cowangreen2 sentences2022Trinity Universal, 945 S.W.2d at 821 . 9 the duty,” id., and by recognizing the duty if the petition alleges facts that “potentially support a covered claim,” GuideOne, 197 S.W.3d at 310 (emphasis added). 2022Trinity Universal, 945 S.W.2d at 821 . 9 the duty,” id., and by recognizing the duty if the petition alleges facts that “potentially support a covered claim,” GuideOne, 197 S.W.3d at 310 (emphasis added). | 4 | 5 |
Zurich American Insurance Co. v. Nokia, Inc.green2 sentences2025First, courts may consider 14 “An insurer must defend its insured if a plaintiff’s factual allegations potentially support a covered claim, while the facts actually established in the underlying suit determine whether the insurer must indemnify its insured.” Zurich, 268 S.W.3d at 490 (citing GuideOne Elite Ins. v. Fielder Rd. 2021Further, “[i]f a complaint potentially includes a covered claim, the insurer must defend the entire suit.” Zurich, 268 S.W.3d at 491 . | 2 | 8 |
Ard v. Gemini Exploration Co.green2 sentences2009The court held that the “failure to specifically list personal injury as a covered claim preclude[d] indemnity for the personal injury claim.” Id. at 15 . 2009The court held that the “failure to specifically list personal injury as a covered claim preclude[d] indemnity for the personal injury claim.” Id. at 15. | 2 | 4 |
Coastal Refining & Marketing, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.green2 sentences2011The court explained that a substantive change in po *729 sition for an insurer caused by a default judgment generally renders a default judgment prejudicial because “[bjefore default judgment, an insurer can escape liability for a covered claim if the plaintiff fails to meet its burden of proof,” but, “[ajfter a default judgment, ... an insurer can no longer defend against the underlying claim unless it first meets a new burden of proof on new issues.” Id. at 288 . 2011Co., 218 S.W.3d 279, 287-88 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (explaining that substantive change in position for an insurer caused by a default judgment generally renders a default judgment prejudicial because "[bjefore default judgment, an insurer can escape liability for a covered claim if the plaintiff fails to meet its burden of proof,” but, ‘‘[ajfter a default judgment, ... an insurer can no longer defend against the underlying claim unless it first meets a new burden of proof on new issues”). 10 . | 2 | 3 |
Lundstrom v. United Services Automobile Ass'n-CICgreen2 sentences2018In the Causation Motion, the District asserted the following grounds: (1) Appraisal clauses in Texas property-insurance policies provide a method to resolve disputes regarding a covered claim, and, if invoked, these clauses bind the parties to have the extent or amount of loss determined by appraisal. 2 See Zhu, 543 S.W.3d at 433 ; Lundstrom v. USAA, 192 S.W.3d 78, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). 3 See Zhu, 543 S.W.3d at 433 . 4 (2) The Award determined that the “‘amount of loss’ — what was caused by windstorm and the cost to repair or replace such loss” — was $10,815,96 2018Ass’n, 154 S.W.3d 777, 786 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th] 2004, no pet.). 3 See Zhu, 543 S.W.3d at 433 ; Lundstrom v. USAA, 192 S.W.3d 78, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). 4 See Zhu, 543 S.W.3d at 433 . 4 (1) Appraisal clauses in Texas property-insurance policies provide a method to resolve disputes regarding a covered claim, and, if invoked, these clauses bind the parties to have the extent or amount of loss determined by appraisal. (2) The Award determined that the “‘amount of loss’ — what was caused by windstorm and the cost to repair or replace such loss” — was $10,815,96 | 2 | 2 |
Nunez v. Autrygreen2 sentences1995See Nunez v. Autry, 884 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex.App.—Austin 1994, no writ) (distinguishing recovery from corporate assets of insurance company in receivership from recovery from Fund). 1995See Nunez v. Autry , 884 S.W.2d 199, 202 (Tex. App.--Austin 1994, no writ) (distinguishing recovery from corporate assets of insurance company in receivership from recovery from Fund). | 2 | 2 |
Global Santa Fe Corp. v. Texas Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Ass'ngreen2 sentences2005Ass’n, 153 S.W.3d 150 , 152- 53 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied) (Association claims examiner determined that injured third-party’s claims “qualified as a covered claim under the Act and recommended that the Association” pay $300,000 towards settlement); Lopez v. Texas Prop. & Cas. 2005Ass'n , 153 S.W.3d 150, 152-53 (Tex. App.--Austin 2004, pet. denied) (Association claims examiner determined that injured third-party's claims "qualified as a covered claim under the Act and recommended that the Association" pay $300,000 towards settlement); Lopez v. Texas Prop. & Cas. | 1 | 2 |
Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. City of Abilenegreen1 sentence2020See City of Abilene, 551 S.W.3d at 344 (“In the context of an insurance contract, appraisal is not sought in equity as a substitute for inadequate monetary damages, but rather it is a procedural vehicle provided by the contract to determine the amount of loss.”); Vanguard Underwriters Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Franco v. Slavonic Mutual Fire Insurance Ass'ngreen1 sentence2018Ass’n, 154 S.W.3d 777, 786 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th] 2004, no pet.). 3 See Zhu, 543 S.W.3d at 433 ; Lundstrom v. USAA, 192 S.W.3d 78, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). 4 See Zhu, 543 S.W.3d at 433 . 4 (1) Appraisal clauses in Texas property-insurance policies provide a method to resolve disputes regarding a covered claim, and, if invoked, these clauses bind the parties to have the extent or amount of loss determined by appraisal. (2) The Award determined that the “‘amount of loss’ — what was caused by windstorm and the cost to repair or replace such loss” — was $10,815,96 | 1 | 1 |
In Re Imperial Ins. Co.green1 sentence2015Co., 157 Cal. App. 3d 290, 296 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“CIGA is given the ‘same rights as the insolvent insurer would have had if not in liquidation, including . . . the right to . . . adjust, compromise, settle, and pay a covered claim. . . .” (Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corporation v. Auldgreen1 sentence2015A judicial admission “occurs when an assertion of fact is conclusively established in live pleadings.” Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 905 (Tex. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Lexington Insurance Co. v. National Oilwell Nov, Inc.green2 sentences2014Co. v. Nat’l Oilwell NOV., Inc., 355 S.W.3d 205, 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). 2014Id. at 211 . | 1 | 1 |
Varner v. Cardenasgreen1 sentence2014Unless otherwise nonrecoverable claims are necessary to obtain all relief on a covered claim, which is not the case here, a prevailing party must segregate recoverable from unrecoverable attorney’s fees “in all cases.” Varner, 218 S.W.3d at 69 (affirming denial of attorney fees incurred to pursue related claims against third party, but concluding that attorney’s fees for defending counterclaim need not be segregated because plaintiffs were required to successfully defend that claim to fully recover on claim for which attorney’s fees were authorized). | 1 | 1 |
Gehan Homes, Ltd. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.green1 sentence2009Co. v. Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d 487, 491 (Tex.2008) (“If a complaint potentially includes a covered claim, the insurer must defend the entire suit.”); Gehan Homes, Ltd., 146 S.W.3d at 838 (“A duty to defend any of the claims against an insured requires the insurer to defend the entire suit.”). | 1 | 1 |
Zurich-American Insurance v. Audiovox Corp.green2 sentences2008Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 294 A.D.2d 194 , 741 N.Y.S.2d 692, 692 (N.Y.App.Div.2002) (no duty to defend), with Ericsson, Inc. v. St. 2008Co. v. Audiovox Corp., 294 A.D.2d 194 , 741 N.Y.S.2d 692, 692 (N.Y.App.Div.2002) (no duty to defend), with Ericsson, Inc. v. St. | 1 | 1 |
Standard Fire Insurance Company v. Fraimangreen1 sentence2006Standard Fire Ins. v. Fraiman, 514 S.W.2d 343, 344-46 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
| Central Bank v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zhu v. First Cmty. Ins. Co.
green
2 sentences2018In the Causation Motion, the District asserted the following grounds: (1) Appraisal clauses in Texas property-insurance policies provide a method to resolve disputes regarding a covered claim, and, if invoked, these clauses bind the parties to have the extent or amount of loss determined by appraisal. 2 See Zhu, 543 S.W.3d at 433 ; Lundstrom v. USAA, 192 S.W.3d 78, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). 3 See Zhu, 543 S.W.3d at 433 . 4 (2) The Award determined that the “‘amount of loss’ — what was caused by windstorm and the cost to repair or replace such loss” — was $10,815,96 2018In the Causation Motion, the District asserted the following grounds: (1) Appraisal clauses in Texas property-insurance policies provide a method to resolve disputes regarding a covered claim, and, if invoked, these clauses bind the parties to have the extent or amount of loss determined by appraisal. 2 See Zhu, 543 S.W.3d at 433 ; Lundstrom v. USAA, 192 S.W.3d 78, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). 3 See Zhu, 543 S.W.3d at 433 . 4 (2) The Award determined that the “‘amount of loss’ — what was caused by windstorm and the cost to repair or replace such loss” — was $10,815,96 | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Heyden Newport Chemical Corp. v. Southern General Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2017A plaintiff’s factual allegations that potentially support a covered claim is all that is needed to invoke the insurer’s duty to defend, Heyden Newport Chemical Corp., 387 S.W.2d at 26 . 2006A plaintiffs factual allegations that potentially support a covered claim is all that is needed to invoke the insurer’s duty to defend, Heyden Newport Chemical Corp., 387 S.W.2d at 26 ; whereas, the facts actually established in the underlying suit control the duty to indemnify. | 2 | 2006–2017 |
Building Specialties, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences2011Coverage under the insuring clause Lexington contends that the products liability insuring clause does not cover Al-bemarle’s claims because, according to Lexington, “all of [Albemarle’s] allegations and damages arose from or flowed from its need to repair or replace [National’s] damaged product — the defective DHT.” Lexington cites Building Specialties, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 712 F.Supp.2d 628 (S.D.Tex.2010), for the proposition that allegations of a defective product are not allegations of “property damage,” and thus do not give rise to the duty to defend. 2011Coverage under the insuring clause Lexington contends that the products liability insuring clause does not cover Albemarle’s claims because, according to Lexington, “all of [Albemarle’s] allegations and damages arose from or flowed from its need to repair or replace [National’s] damaged product—the defective DHT.” Lexington cites Building Specialties, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. , 712 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great American Lloyds Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2009The duty to defend turns on the “factual allegations that potentially support a covered claim,” while the duty to indemnify turns on “the facts actually es *41 tablished in the underlying suit.” Pine Oak, 279 S.W.3d at 656 . 2009The duty to defend turns on the “factual allegations that potentially support a covered claim,” while the duty to indemnify turns on “the facts actually established in the underlying suit.” Pine Oak, 279 S.W.3d at 656 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Durish v. Channelview Bank
green
2 sentences1992This Court has stated in Durish v. Channelview Bank, 809 S.W.2d 273 (Tex.App.1991, writ denied), that the controlling date for a covered claim, as that term is defined in the Guaranty Fund Act, is the date of the inception of the delinquency proceeding. 1991This Court has stated in Durish v. Channelview Bank, 809 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. App. 1991, writ denied), that the controlling date for a covered claim, as that term is defined in the Guaranty Fund Act, is the date of the inception of the delinquency proceeding. | 2 | 1991–1992 |
SLW Aviation, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal District
green
1 sentence2025“Our review is de novo in an agreed case because the issue before us is purely a question of law.” Id. “[A] ‘plaintiff’s factual allegations that potentially support a covered claim [are] all that is needed to invoke the insurer’s duty to defend[]; whereas, the facts actually established in the underlying suit control the duty to indemnify.’” Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Indep. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Brainard v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2021To reach the remarkable conclusion that a plaintiff has no cause of action for breach of contract until he proves damages, the Court misreads its decision in Brainard v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co. 6 Chapter 38 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows a person to “recover reasonable attorney’s fees” on a claim for “an oral or written contract”, 7 but only if the opposing party does not tender “payment for the just amount owed” within 30 days “after the claim is 6 216 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2006). 7 TEX. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Geico General Insurance Co. v. Austin Power Inc.
green
2 sentences2016See Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d at 490 ; Austin Power, Inc., 357 S.W.3d at 823-24 . 2016See Nokia, Inc., 268 S.W.3d at 491 ; Austin Power, Inc., 357 S.W.3d at 823-24 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
WMC v. Wiga
green
2 sentences2015Ass’n, 225 P.3d 1061 (2010) 2010 WY 21 .... (c) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the association: .... (iv) Is not obligated to pay a claimant an amount in excess of the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy or coverage from which the claim arises. [¶ 22] Section 26–31–103(a)(ii) defines a “covered claim” for purposes of the Act as follows: (ii) “Covered claim” means an unpaid claim which arises out of and is within the coverage and does not exceed the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this chapter applies issued by an insurer, if the insurer is an 2015Ass’n, 225 P.3d 1061 (2010) 2010 WY 21 .... (c) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the association: .... (iv) Is not obligated to pay a claimant an amount in excess of the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy or coverage from which the claim arises. [¶ 22] Section 26–31–103(a)(ii) defines a “covered claim” for purposes of the Act as follows: (ii) “Covered claim” means an unpaid claim which arises out of and is within the coverage and does not exceed the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which this chapter applies issued by an insurer, if the insurer is an | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Welch v. Union Mutual Insurance Co. of Providence
green
1 sentence2015Welch v. Armer, Okla., 776 P.2d 847 (1989). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel
red
1 sentence2011Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Freeman v. Cherokee Water Co. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Don Dean v. Jimmy Dean green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Boyles v. Kerr green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard red | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Stephen S. Durish, Permanent Ancillary Receiver for Transit Casualty Company v. Mayo Dancer green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.