covered claim in Florida

2012Ass’n v. Gustinger, 390 So.2d 420, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (stating that a section 440.34 attorney’s fee award was a covered claim ”[s]ince the workmen’s compensation policy issued by [the carrier] to [the employer] obviously insured against the employer’s responsibility to pay the claimant’s attorney’s fees”); Dilme v. SBP Service, Inc., 649 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding a section 440.34 fee award to be within the coverage of the employer’s workers' compensation insurance policy); What An Idea, Inc. v. Sitko, 505 So.2d 497, 504-05 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (same).

2011Ass’n v. Gustinger, 390 So.2d 420, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (FIGA’s affirmative defense contending that the insured’s claim for attorney’s fees “does not come within the definition of ‘covered claim’” constituted the “deni(al) by affirmative action, other than delay, (of) a covered claim” within the meaning of section 631.70) (other internal quotations omitted).

2012Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321, 330 (Fla.2004) ("the power of the judiciary is `not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them ....'") (emphasis in original; citation omitted).

2012Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321, 330 (Fla.2004) (“the power of the judiciary is ‘not merely to rule on eases, but to decide them ....’”) (emphasis in original; citation omitted).

2026Weekly D2520b, 2025 WL 3289830 , at *3 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 26, 2025) (holding that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Petty v. Florida Insurance Guarantee Association, 80 So. 3d 313 (Fla. 2012), “makes it clear that covered claims which [the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association] pays must come from coverage within the policy, and not merely from a post-loss settlement agreement”); § 631.54(4), Fla. Stat. (2023) (“‘Covered claim’ means an unpaid claim, including one of unearned premiums, which arises out of, and is within the coverage, and not in excess of, the applicable limits of an ins

2026In Petty, our supreme court held a statutory fee award under section 627.428 was not “a covered claim,” and FIGA was not required to pay those fees. 80 So. 3d at 315 .

2016The court explained that prior to an insurer’s insolvency, an insured has only an “expectancy that if the insurer became impaired, then it might have a covered claim against the [Guaranty] Fund at that time.” Durish, 809 S.W.2d at 277 *405 (first emphasis added).

2014See Durish, 809 S.W.2d at 277 (explaining that, prior to insolvency, an insured only has an “expectancy that ... it might have a covered claim” against the guaranty association if the insurer becomes insolvent, but that expectancy can be “cut off’ by statutory amendments that take effect prior to the insurer being adjudicated insolvent).

2023See also Nicon, 249 So. 3d at 682–83 (holding that a homeowner who retained two contractors—one for water/debris removal and one for asbestos remediation—did not exclusively assign his policy rights to either contractor: “it is evident that Mr. Prager was assigning all his rights under the policy to payment for the services performed by B & M Clean—not all his rights to payment for the entire covered claim”).

2020See, e.g., Fisher v. Certain Interested Underwriters at Lloyds Subscribing to Contract No. 242/99, 930 So. 2d 756, 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (disagreeing that payment was a confession of judgment where the insurer indicated in its cover letter forwarding the payment "that payment was made because of a recent decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida"). -8- award is not a covered claim as defined, FIGA did not affirmatively deny a covered claim and thus is not responsible for the attorney's fees and costs Vernay incurred in prosecuting the declaratory judgmen

2015See id.

2014“The plain language of § 5(2) ... limits ‘covered claims’ for unearned premiums to persons who were residents of Texas when the policy of insurance was issued or who are residents at the time the insurance company is found to be an ‘impaired insurer.’” Central Bank v. Harris, 623 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tex.App.1981, no writ) (emphasis added).

2014See Ulloa v. CMI, Inc., 133 So.3d 914 (Fla.2013) (‘'[I]n interpreting a statute modeled after a uniform law, it is pertinent to resort to the holdings in other jurisdictions where the act is in force.'') (internal quotations omitted) .

2012We review the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass’n v. Petty, 44 So.3d 1191 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010), which certified conflict with the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Florida Insurance Guaranty Ass’n v. Soto, 979 So.2d 964 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). 1 Because Petty’s attorney’s fee award pursuant to section 627.428(1), Florida Statutes (2008), is not within the coverage of her insurance policy, it is not a covered claim under section 631.54(3), Florida Statutes (2008), that the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association (FIGA) must pay.

2012Petty, 44 So.3d at 1192-93.

2012Ass’n v. Gustinger, 390 So.2d 420, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (stating that a section 440.34 attorney’s fee award was a covered claim ”[s]ince the workmen’s compensation policy issued by [the carrier] to [the employer] obviously insured against the employer’s responsibility to pay the claimant’s attorney’s fees”); Dilme v. SBP Service, Inc., 649 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding a section 440.34 fee award to be within the coverage of the employer’s workers' compensation insurance policy); What An Idea, Inc. v. Sitko, 505 So.2d 497, 504-05 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (same).

2012Ass’n v. Gustinger, 390 So.2d 420, 421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (stating that a section 440.34 attorney’s fee award was a covered claim ”[s]ince the workmen’s compensation policy issued by [the carrier] to [the employer] obviously insured against the employer’s responsibility to pay the claimant’s attorney’s fees”); Dilme v. SBP Service, Inc., 649 So.2d 934, 935 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding a section 440.34 fee award to be within the coverage of the employer’s workers' compensation insurance policy); What An Idea, Inc. v. Sitko, 505 So.2d 497, 504-05 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (same).

2010See Keen, 962 So.2d at 1024 .

2009Here, as in Citizens Property Insurance Corp. v. Mallett, 7 So.3d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), the policy provides that the insurer is not obligated to pay a covered claim until twenty days after the insurer has reached a written agreement with the insured, or sixty days after entry of a final judgment on a claim or after the filing of an appraisal award or mediation settlement with the insurer.

2009As the court in Mallett makes plain, the provisions governing appraisal deal with “covered” claims and “determine the date from which the coverage payment is due, as well as when interest is due on the amounts payable.” Id. at 555 (holding that prejudgment interest accrues from the date of a judgment or appraisal fixing the amount of coverage not from the date the insured property is damaged); Am.

2007In addition to our holding in Rogers, Shuster makes it clear that higher insurance premiums and damages to the insured's reputation are not examples of bad faith by the carrier in settlement of the covered claim within policy limits. 591 So.2d at 177 (concluding " in contrast to the right to settle a claim within the policy *1155 limits without considering the impact of higher premiums or damage to the insured's reputation, we do not believe the language of the contract would indicate nor do we believe it would have been the intent of the parties, that the insured give up his or her right to a

2005The Third District determined that the immunity provision barred the bad faith action because FIGA's refusal of the $10,000 settlement offer was an "action it took in the performance of [its] powers and duties under the statute to dispose of the covered claim in question." Id. at 975 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2005See id. at 308.

1991The trial court did not, at the time it entered judgment, have the benefit of Florida Insurance Guaranty Association v. Cole, 573 So.2d 868, 870-871 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), wherein the court held that multiple survivors under the Wrongful Death Act, suing for the death of one person caused by the act of a single insured, had only a single covered claim under the FIGA Act.