covered claim in Connecticut

2014Guaranty Assn. v. Fontaine, supra, 278 Conn. 779 , is not controlling because that decision involved only whether the contra proferentem rule of construction applied in determining the association’s obligations under a policy issued by an insolvent insurer, and did not concern the effect of the insurer’s conduct on the association’s obligations.

2014The association then relies on the guaranty act’s definition of ‘‘ ‘[c]overed claim’ ’’ in § 38a-838 (5), and this court’s decision in Potvin v. Lincoln Service & Equipment Co., 298 Conn. 620, 640 , 6 A.3d 60 (2010), to support its argument that it is not a ‘‘full service insurer’’; accordingly, an insolvent insurer’s ‘‘conduct in handling or mishandling a claim does not give rise to a covered claim’’ insofar as, under its statutory mandate, the association ‘‘can only be lia- ble for a claim which arises out of and is within the coverage of the insolvent insurer’s policy.’’ The associa- tion t

2014The association then relies on the guaranty act’s definition of ‘‘ ‘[c]overed claim’ ’’ in § 38a-838 (5), and this court’s decision in Potvin v. Lincoln Service & Equipment Co., 298 Conn. 620, 640 , 6 A.3d 60 (2010), to support its argument that it is not a ‘‘full service insurer’’; accordingly, an insolvent insurer’s ‘‘conduct in handling or mishandling a claim does not give rise to a covered claim’’ insofar as, under its statutory mandate, the association ‘‘can only be lia- ble for a claim which arises out of and is within the coverage of the insolvent insurer’s policy.’’ The associa- tion t

2014Guaranty Assn., 990 S.W.2d 504 , 506 (Tex. App. 1999) (‘‘Because [the] appel- lants’ claim is for a loss outside policy coverage, [the] appellants’ claim for recovery of the judgment against [the insured] is not a covered claim under the terms and conditions of the policy.

2010In the absence of any evidence that the sanctions imposed in this case were covered under the insolvent insurer’s policy, we conclude that the sanctions are not part of a covered claim and that the association, therefore, is not obligated to pay them. 28 II In addition to its statutory arguments, the defendant claims that the board improperly concluded that it was bound by the Appellate Court’s decision in Pantanella v. Enfield Ford, Inc., supra, 65 Conn. App. 46 , because Pantanella did not address the issue of whether the association is immune from sanctions or whether a sanction is part of

2010Id., 745-47 .

2008Co., supra, 243 Conn. 454 (“[w]e express no opinion ... as to whether the last insurer may seek reapportiorunent among the remaining solvent insurers by the commission when a prior insurer has been adjudicated insolvent, because that decision is not necessary to the resolution of this appeal”). 15 General Statutes § 38a-845 (1) provides: “Any person having a claim against an insurer under any provision in an insurance policy, other than a policy of an insolvent insurer, which is also a covered claim under sections 38a-836 to 38a-853, inclusive, shall exhaust first his rights under such policy.

2006If a court can by any fair interpretation find a reasonable field of operation for two allegedly inconsistent statutes, without destroying or preventing their evident meaning and intent, it is the duty of the court to do so.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131, 157 , 788 A.2d 1158 (2002).

2006If a court can by any fair interpretation find a reasonable field of operation for two allegedly inconsistent statutes, without destroying or preventing their evident meaning and intent, it is the duty of the court to do so.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131, 157 , 788 A.2d 1158 (2002).

2005Any amount payable on a covered claim under said sections shall be reduced by the amount recoverable under the claimant’s insurance policy or chapter 568.” (Emphasis added.) We begin with the common usage and ordinary meaning of the words of the statute that are at issue, namely, “exhaust” and “rights,” which are “determined appropriately by review of [their] dictionary definition[s] . . . .” (Citations omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410 , 421 n.12, 862 A.2d 292 (2004).

2005Any amount payable on a covered claim under said sections shall be reduced by the amount recoverable under the claimant’s insurance policy or chapter 568.” (Emphasis added.) We begin with the common usage and ordinary meaning of the words of the statute that are at issue, namely, “exhaust” and “rights,” which are “determined appropriately by review of [their] dictionary definition[s] . . . .” (Citations omitted.) Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410 , 421 n.12, 862 A.2d 292 (2004).

2005Id., 437-38 , 437 n.2 (Larsen, J., concurring and dissenting). 16 The Illinois nonduplication of recovery statute at issue in Hasemann v. White, supra, 177 Ill. 2d 418 , provided: “Any insured or claimant having a covered claim against the Fund shall be required first to exhaust his rights under any provision in any other insurance policy which may be applicable to the claim.

1999Co., supra, 243 Conn. 438 , is instructive in resolving this question. 3 In Hunnihan , we concluded that the commissioner had subject matter jurisdiction to order reimbursement by the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association (association), although that would require a determination by the commissioner that the claim to be reimbursed was a covered claim within the meaning of General Statutes § 38a-838 (6) 4 of the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association Act (guaranty act), and therefore, required the commissioner to interpret statutory provisions outside of the act.

1997It is a self-insurer as was the town of Manchester in Ficara v. O'Connor, supra. It is not an "insurer" for purposes of General Statutes § 38a-838 (6) and is therefore not subject to the special defense filed by the defendants. — III — Defendants further claim that because the claimant Doucette failed to exhaust the policy limits of his uninsured motorist policy MDC cannot press its claim under the statute because General Statutes § 38a-845 provides in pertinent part: (1) Any person having a claim against an insurer under any provision in an insurance policy, other than a policy of an insolven

1997The language of the Minnesota act provided that “ ‘a covered claim does not include . . . claims due a reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as subrogation recoveries or otherwise.’ ” Id., 832 , quoting Minn. Stat. § 60c.09 (2) (2).

1995CT Page 11825 Allstate Insurance Co. v. Conde, 595 So.2d 1005 , 1009 (Fla. Dist.