12 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1931–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Servicesgreen2 sentences2011Our supreme court has recognized that the state has a "significant interest in protecting the welfare of children, and the central register is one mechanism the state uses to protect children from abuse and neglect." Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill.2d 264, 278 , 282 Ill.Dec. 799 , 807 N.E.2d 423 (2004). ¶ 33 Pursuant to the Reporting Act, as soon as it receives a report of alleged child abuse or neglect, DCFS's regional child protective service unit (service unit) must transmit a copy of it to the central register. 325 ILCS 5/7.10 (West 2006). 2011Our supreme court has recognized that the state has a "significant interest in protecting the welfare of children, and the central register is one mechanism the state uses to protect children from abuse and neglect." Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill.2d 264, 278 , 282 Ill.Dec. 799 , 807 N.E.2d 423 (2004). ¶ 33 Pursuant to the Reporting Act, as soon as it receives a report of alleged child abuse or neglect, DCFS's regional child protective service unit (service unit) must transmit a copy of it to the central register. 325 ILCS 5/7.10 (West 2006). | 1 | 2 |
Myers v. Brantleygreen1 sentence1996See Myers v. Brantley, 204 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Wenninger v. Muesinggreen2 sentences1986Accord, Wenninger v. Muesing (1976), 307 Minn. 405 , 240 N.W.2d 333 . 1986Accord, Wenninger v. Muesing (1976), 307 Minn. 405 , 240 N.W.2d 333 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Krankel
green
1 sentence2022ANALYSIS ¶ 31 In Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 187-89 , our supreme court established the principle that, when a defendant makes a posttrial pro se claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant may be entitled to new appointed counsel to assist with the development of that claim. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Moore
green
1 sentence2022The court further developed that principle in Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 77-78 , holding that, when a defendant puts forward an ineffectiveness claim, Krankel requires the trial court to make a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the appointment of new counsel is required. ¶ 32 On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court failed to satisfy Moore’s inquiry requirement because it “never fleshed out the specifics” of his complaint that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to develop his claim of “a pattern of abuse by police officers.” Specifically, he complains “that [defense] couns | 1 | 2022–2022 |
MacHe v. MacHe
green
1 sentence1993App. 3d 1069 , 578 N.E.2d 1253 (where decedent’s children sought injunctive relief against decedent’s second and legally separated wife, requesting the court to prohibit the wife from using funds transferred to her shortly before decedent’s death); Meeker v. Meeker (1874), 75 Ill. 260 (where testator’s children from a prior marriage raise the issue of undue influence by testator’s third wife, but said case was prior to the development of a presumption of undue influence in will contests that appears to have first been pronounced by the supreme court in Weston v. Teufel (1904), 213 Ill. 291 , 7 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
In Re Estate of Henke
green
2 sentences1993App. 3d 1069 , 578 N.E.2d 1253 (where decedent’s children sought injunctive relief against decedent’s second and legally separated wife, requesting the court to prohibit the wife from using funds transferred to her shortly before decedent’s death); Meeker v. Meeker (1874), 75 Ill. 260 (where testator’s children from a prior marriage raise the issue of undue influence by testator’s third wife, but said case was prior to the development of a presumption of undue influence in will contests that appears to have first been pronounced by the supreme court in Weston v. Teufel (1904), 213 Ill. 291 , 7 1993App. 3d 975 , 561 N.E.2d 314 , applies to spousal relationships. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Meeker v. Meeker
neutral
1 sentence1993App. 3d 1069 , 578 N.E.2d 1253 (where decedent’s children sought injunctive relief against decedent’s second and legally separated wife, requesting the court to prohibit the wife from using funds transferred to her shortly before decedent’s death); Meeker v. Meeker (1874), 75 Ill. 260 (where testator’s children from a prior marriage raise the issue of undue influence by testator’s third wife, but said case was prior to the development of a presumption of undue influence in will contests that appears to have first been pronounced by the supreme court in Weston v. Teufel (1904), 213 Ill. 291 , 7 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Weston v. Teufel
green
2 sentences1993App. 3d 1069 , 578 N.E.2d 1253 (where decedent’s children sought injunctive relief against decedent’s second and legally separated wife, requesting the court to prohibit the wife from using funds transferred to her shortly before decedent’s death); Meeker v. Meeker (1874), 75 Ill. 260 (where testator’s children from a prior marriage raise the issue of undue influence by testator’s third wife, but said case was prior to the development of a presumption of undue influence in will contests that appears to have first been pronounced by the supreme court in Weston v. Teufel (1904), 213 Ill. 291 , 7 1993App. 3d 1069 , 578 N.E.2d 1253 (where decedent’s children sought injunctive relief against decedent’s second and legally separated wife, requesting the court to prohibit the wife from using funds transferred to her shortly before decedent’s death); Meeker v. Meeker (1874), 75 Ill. 260 (where testator’s children from a prior marriage raise the issue of undue influence by testator’s third wife, but said case was prior to the development of a presumption of undue influence in will contests that appears to have first been pronounced by the supreme court in Weston v. Teufel (1904), 213 Ill. 291 , 7 | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Walker
green
2 sentences1981Earlier cases, notably People v. Walker (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 158 , 130 N.E.2d 182 , held that a failure of proof was so fatal to a judgment of conviction that it could be raised for the first time on appeal. 1981Earlier cases, notably People v. Walker (1955), 7 Ill. 2d 158 , 130 N.E.2d 182 , held that a failure of proof was so fatal to a judgment of conviction that it could be raised for the first time on appeal. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Seipp v. Chicago Transit Authority
green
1 sentence1979App. 3d 852 , 299 N.E.2d 330 .) Two grounds have been offered for the development of this rule — policy and relevance. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp.
green
1 sentence1979Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp. (1972), 5 Ill. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Wong Sun v. United States
green
2 sentences1972(Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ; Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347 ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 .) The rule further provides, “When the right of privacy must yield to right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agency”. 1972(Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ; Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347 ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 .) The rule further provides, “When the right of privacy must yield to right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agency”. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
green
2 sentences1972(Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ; Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347 ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 .) The rule further provides, “When the right of privacy must yield to right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agency”. 1972(Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 ; Katz v. United States, 398 U.S. 347 ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 83 S.Ct. 407 .) The rule further provides, “When the right of privacy must yield to right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agency”. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Fergus v. Russel
green
2 sentences1956The leading Illinois case on the subject is Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304 . 1956The leading Illinois case on the subject is Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304 . | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc.
green
1 sentence1943Hand in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.(2d) 139 . | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Steen v. Modern Woodmen of America
green
1 sentence1931The history of the development of the rule has been stated in Steen v. Modern Woodmen of America, 296 Ill. 104 . | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.