47 New York opinions name it 8 courts 1902–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sharp v. Kosmalskigreen2 sentences2024The development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy is available in courts of equity and requires the following four elements: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121 (1976); Hampton v. Hampton, 66 Misc 3d 1219(A) , 120 N.Y.S.3d 706 (Civ. 2024The development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy is available in courts of equity and requires the following four elements: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 NY2d 119, 121 (1976); Hampton v. Hampton, 66 Misc 3d 1219(A) , 120 N.Y.S.3d 706 (Civ. | 2 | 3 |
ASSN OF COUNTIES v. Axelrodgreen2 sentences2015The Health Care Rules also lack a rational foundation and are arbitrary and capricious (see New York State Assn. of Counties v Axelrod, 78 NY2d 158, 166 [1991]). 2015The Health Care Rules also lack a rational foundation and are arbitrary and capricious (see New York State Assn. of Counties v Axelrod, 78 NY2d 158, 166 [1991]). | 2 | 2 |
New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York City Department of Health & Mental Hygienegreen2 sentences2015Third, no expertise in the field of health care services or disability insurance was involved in the development of the rule (indeed, this is not TLC’s area of expertise), a fact highlighted by the lack of technical discussion at the hearings on the proposed rule amendments (see Boreali, 71 NY2d at 13-14 ; Matter of New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 NY3d 681, 701 [2014]). 2015Third, no expertise in the field of health care services or disability insurance was involved in the development of the rule (indeed, this is not TLC’s area of expertise), a fact highlighted by the lack of technical discussion at the hearings on the proposed rule amendments (see Boreali, 71 NY2d at 13-14 ; Matter of New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 NY3d 681, 701 [2014]). | 2 | 2 |
Auriemma v. Biltmore Theatre, LLCgreen2 sentences2013Its acts or omissions and those of the named insured, as to the defense of the additional insured, this insurance will act as coinsurance with any other insurance available to the additional insured, in proportion to the limits of liability of all involved policies.” The documents relied upon by Harleysville in support of its motion demonstrated that United had actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility that liability was sought to be imposed on 4815 Development because of its own acts or omissions and TLI’s acts or omissions, thereby triggering United’s duty to contribute 2013Its acts or omissions and those of the named insured, as to the defense of the additional insured, this insurance will act as coinsurance with any other insurance available to the additional insured, in proportion to the limits of liability of all involved policies.” The documents relied upon by Harleysville in support of its motion demonstrated that United had actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility that liability was sought to be imposed on 4815 Development because of its own acts or omissions and TLI’s acts or omissions, thereby triggering United’s duty to contribute | 2 | 2 |
Fitzpatrick v. American Honda Motor Co.green2 sentences2013Its acts or omissions and those of the named insured, as to the defense of the additional insured, this insurance will act as coinsurance with any other insurance available to the additional insured, in proportion to the limits of liability of all involved policies.” The documents relied upon by Harleysville in support of its motion demonstrated that United had actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility that liability was sought to be imposed on 4815 Development because of its own acts or omissions and TLI’s acts or omissions, thereby triggering United’s duty to contribute 2013Its acts or omissions and those of the named insured, as to the defense of the additional insured, this insurance will act as coinsurance with any other insurance available to the additional insured, in proportion to the limits of liability of all involved policies.” The documents relied upon by Harleysville in support of its motion demonstrated that United had actual knowledge of facts establishing a reasonable possibility that liability was sought to be imposed on 4815 Development because of its own acts or omissions and TLI’s acts or omissions, thereby triggering United’s duty to contribute | 2 | 2 |
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregongreen1 sentence2018The right to petition for review rests on the most fundamental assumption of the adversary system: that litigants vigorously pursuing their own, adverse interests will best illuminate the correct decision in a case and the development of the rule of law with it ( Strickland v Washington , 466 US 668, 685 [1984] ["The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution to which they are entitled"] [citations and in | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2018The right to petition for review rests on the most fundamental assumption of the adversary system: that litigants vigorously pursuing their own, adverse interests will best illuminate the correct decision in a case and the development of the rule of law with it ( Strickland v Washington , 466 US 668, 685 [1984] ["The right to counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel's skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution to which they are entitled"] [citations and in | 1 | 1 |
New York City Human Resources Administration v. Careygreen2 sentences2014(See United States v McFall, 2011 WL 465718 , *13, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 11283 , *37-38 [WD Pa, Feb. 4, 2011, No. 2:07-CR-00411-JFC].) In People v Francabandera ( 33 NY2d 429, 435-436 [1974]), the Court of Appeals stated that “ ‘the test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” (33 NY2d at 436, citing Dusky v United States, 362 US 402 [1960].) If the defendant does not fit this criterion, then “[t]he 2014(See United States v McFall, 2011 WL 465718 , *13, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 11283 , *37-38 [WD Pa, Feb. 4, 2011, No. 2:07-CR-00411-JFC].) In People v Francabandera ( 33 NY2d 429, 435-436 [1974]), the Court of Appeals stated that “ ‘the test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” (33 NY2d at 436, citing Dusky v United States, 362 US 402 [1960].) If the defendant does not fit this criterion, then “[t]he | 1 | 1 |
New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. New York City Department of Health & Mental Hygienegreen1 sentence2014This is a strong indication that the legislature remains unsure of how best to approach the issue of excessive sugary beverage consumption.” (Id. at 14-15 [footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted].) Finally, with respect to the fourth Boreali factor, whether the development of the rule required expertise in the field of health, the Appellate Division concluded that the Board had not “exercised any special expertise or technical competence in developing the Portion Cap Rule” (110 AD3d at 15). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Francabanderagreen1 sentence2014(See United States v McFall, 2011 WL 465718 , *13, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 11283 , *37-38 [WD Pa, Feb. 4, 2011, No. 2:07-CR-00411-JFC].) In People v Francabandera ( 33 NY2d 429, 435-436 [1974]), the Court of Appeals stated that “ ‘the test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” (33 NY2d at 436, citing Dusky v United States, 362 US 402 [1960].) If the defendant does not fit this criterion, then “[t]he | 1 | 1 |
Time, Inc. v. Hillgreen1 sentence1995"Any nation which counts the Scopes trial as part of its heritage,” he said, "cannot so readily expose ideas to sanctions on a jury finding of falsity.” (Time Inc. v Hill, 385 US 374, 406 [1967] [Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part].) The expedient strategy which Brennan used to protect the New York Times from the inherent flaw in Times (supra) has wreaked havoc with the subsequent development of the rule and should prove to be the basis of its undoing. | 1 | 1 |
| Rodgers v. . Clementgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Woerz v. . Schumachergreen | 1 | 1 |
| New York State Thruway Authority v. Hurdgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vassel v. Vassel
green
2 sentences1985In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ). 1977In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ).” In its most recent decision on the subject the Court of Appeals in an opinion by Chief Judge Breitel repeated | 3 | 1976–1985 |
Janke v. Janke
green
2 sentences1985In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ). 1977In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ).” In its most recent decision on the subject the Court of Appeals in an opinion by Chief Judge Breitel repeated | 3 | 1976–1985 |
Foreman v. Foreman
green
2 sentences1985In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ). 1977In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ).” In its most recent decision on the subject the Court of Appeals in an opinion by Chief Judge Breitel repeated | 3 | 1976–1985 |
Ahrens v. . Jones
green
2 sentences1985In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ). 1977In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ).” In its most recent decision on the subject the Court of Appeals in an opinion by Chief Judge Breitel repeated | 3 | 1976–1985 |
Sinclair v. . Purdy
green
2 sentences1985In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ). 1977In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ).” In its most recent decision on the subject the Court of Appeals in an opinion by Chief Judge Breitel repeated | 3 | 1976–1985 |
Matter of Will of O'Hara
green
2 sentences1985In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ). 1977In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ).” In its most recent decision on the subject the Court of Appeals in an opinion by Chief Judge Breitel repeated | 3 | 1976–1985 |
Vassel v. Vassel
green
2 sentences1985In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ). 1977In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ).” In its most recent decision on the subject the Court of Appeals in an opinion by Chief Judge Breitel repeated | 3 | 1976–1985 |
Janke v. Janke
green
2 sentences1985In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ). 1977In the development of the doctrine of constructive trust as a remedy available to courts of equity, the following four requirements were posited: (1) a confidential or fiduciary relation, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer in reliance thereon and (4) unjust enrichment (see Janke v Janke, 47 AD2d 445 , affd 39 NY2d 786 ; Vassel v Vassel, 40 AD2d 713 , affd 33 NY2d 533 ; Foreman v Foreman, 251 NY 237 ; Sinclair v Purdy, 235 NY 245 ; Ahrens v Jones, 169 NY 555 ; Matter of O’Hara, 95 NY 403 ).” In its most recent decision on the subject the Court of Appeals in an opinion by Chief Judge Breitel repeated | 3 | 1976–1985 |
Boreali v. Axelrod
green
2 sentences2015Third, no expertise in the field of health care services or disability insurance was involved in the development of the rule (indeed, this is not TLC’s area of expertise), a fact highlighted by the lack of technical discussion at the hearings on the proposed rule amendments (see Boreali, 71 NY2d at 13-14 ; Matter of New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 NY3d 681, 701 [2014]). 2015Third, no expertise in the field of health care services or disability insurance was involved in the development of the rule (indeed, this is not TLC’s area of expertise), a fact highlighted by the lack of technical discussion at the hearings on the proposed rule amendments (see Boreali, 71 NY2d at 13-14 ; Matter of New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 NY3d 681, 701 [2014]). | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Martin v. . Camp
green
2 sentences2003It follows, then, that an attorney cannot represent a client effectively and to the full extent of his or her professional capability unless the client maintains the utmost trust and confidence in the attorney.” This philosophy engendered the development of the rule, now well rooted in our jurisprudence, that a client may discharge an attorney from the further performance of services at any time, with or without cause (see, Matter of Cohen v Grainger, Tesoriero & Bell, 81 NY2d 655 [1993]; Martin v Camp, 219 NY 170 [1916]). 1981Moreover, we have held that since the client has the absolute right on public policy grounds to terminate the attorney-client relationship at any time without cause, it follows as a corollary that the client cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising a right which is an implied condition of the contract, and the attorney discharged without cause is limited to recovering in quantum meruit the reasonable value of services rendered (Matter of Montgomery, 272 NY 323 ; Martin v Camp, 219 NY 170 ). | 2 | 1981–2003 |
Far East Conference v. United States
green
2 sentences1996Conference v United States, 342 US 570 ; Texas & Pac. 1981The reasons for the development of the doctrine are essentially twofold: a need for the expertise and specialized knowledge of an administrative agency and a need for consistency and uniformity in an industry which is nationally regulated (Far East Conference v United States, 342 US 570 ; Texas & Pacific Ry. v Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 US 426 ). | 2 | 1981–1996 |
Skerrett v. LIC Site B2 Owner, LLC
green
2 sentences2025Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted 4102 Development's motion for summary judgment on the second third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification ( see Skerrett v LIC Site B2 Owner, LLC , 199 AD3d at 959 ; Bilska v Truszkowski , 171 AD3d at 687-688). 2025Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted 4102 Development's motion for summary judgment on the second third-party cause of action for contractual indemnification ( see Skerrett v LIC Site B2 Owner, LLC , 199 AD3d at 959 ; Bilska v Truszkowski , 171 AD3d at 687-688). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Dusky v. United States
green
1 sentence2014(See United States v McFall, 2011 WL 465718 , *13, 2011 US Dist LEXIS 11283 , *37-38 [WD Pa, Feb. 4, 2011, No. 2:07-CR-00411-JFC].) In People v Francabandera ( 33 NY2d 429, 435-436 [1974]), the Court of Appeals stated that “ ‘the test must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” (33 NY2d at 436, citing Dusky v United States, 362 US 402 [1960].) If the defendant does not fit this criterion, then “[t]he | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Cohen v. Grainger, Tesoriero & Bell
green
1 sentence2003It follows, then, that an attorney cannot represent a client effectively and to the full extent of his or her professional capability unless the client maintains the utmost trust and confidence in the attorney.” This philosophy engendered the development of the rule, now well rooted in our jurisprudence, that a client may discharge an attorney from the further performance of services at any time, with or without cause (see, Matter of Cohen v Grainger, Tesoriero & Bell, 81 NY2d 655 [1993]; Martin v Camp, 219 NY 170 [1916]). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Teichner v. W & J Holsteins, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003If the attorney is discharged without cause, he or she is entitled to recover the fair and reasonable value of the services rendered (see, Teichner v W & J Holsteins, 64 NY2d 977 [1985]; Dagny Mgt. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
United States v. Western Pacific Railroad
green
1 sentence2000Co., 352 US 59 .) The reasons for the development of the doctrine are essentially twofold: a need for the expertise and specialized knowledge of an administrative agency and a need for consistency and uniformity in an industry which is nationally regulated. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Lewis v. United States
green
1 sentence1996In a significant recent development and instruction to our jurisprudence, the Supreme Court in Lewis v United States (518 US —, 116 S Ct 2163 ) answered the question now posed to us from the perspective of the United States Constitution. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
green
1 sentence1995"Any nation which counts the Scopes trial as part of its heritage,” he said, "cannot so readily expose ideas to sanctions on a jury finding of falsity.” (Time Inc. v Hill, 385 US 374, 406 [1967] [Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part].) The expedient strategy which Brennan used to protect the New York Times from the inherent flaw in Times (supra) has wreaked havoc with the subsequent development of the rule and should prove to be the basis of its undoing. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.
green
1 sentence1993First, the defendant " 'unquestionably in tends and expects that the product will be purchased and used in reliance upon his express assurance of its quality * * * Having invited and solicited the use, the manufacturer should not be permitted to avoid responsibility * * * when the expected use leads to injury and loss’ ” (Codling v Paglia, supra, at 339, quoting Randy Knitwear v American Cyanamid Co., 11 NY2d 5, 13 ). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Miller v. Continental Insurance neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Loschiavo v. Port Authority green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Golden v. Horn Hardart Company, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Loschiavo v. Port Auth. of New York & New Jersey green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Golden v. Horn & Hardart Co. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Meyers v. Cowdin neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Pontillo v. Home Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n neutral | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Tenney v. . Berger green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Dunn v. Hudson River Electric Co. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| In Re the Estate of Montgomery green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Ingersoll v. Liberty Bank of Buffalo green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| People v. Goggins green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Schloendorff v. Society of the New York Hospital red | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Brewer v. Remmers green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| People v. Williams green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Harris v. Standard Accident and Insurance Company green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Olmstead v. United States red | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Lopez v. United States green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| The Osceola green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| The Edith Godden green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.