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14 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1915–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Prudential Insurance Co. of Americagreen2 sentences2020Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (meaning of adequate in this context has “no comprehensive definition” and encompasses private interests in delay and costs as well as public interests in the development of the rule of law). /David J. 2020Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (meaning of adequate review in this context has “no comprehensive definition” and encompasses private interests in delay and costs as well as public interests in the development of the rule of law); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (requiring relator establish “the effective denial of a reasonable opportunity to 11 The mandamus record includes a Rule 11 Agreement between the parties in which they agree the ruling contained in the challenged order “will have a significant impact on the presentation of evidence at tr | 2 | 2 |
In Re TLSgreen2 sentences2007See In re Epperson , 213 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) ; In re T.L.S. , 170 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.) ; In re M.G.M. , 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied); In re K.A.S. , 131 S.W.3d 215, 223-25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) ; Ulmer v. Ulmer , 130 S.W.3d 294, 300-01 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 2007See In re Epperson, 213 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.); In re T.L.S., 170 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.); In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, pet. denied); In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 223-25 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Ulmer v. Ulmer, 130 S.W.3d 294, 300-01 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Ulmer v. Ulmergreen2 sentences2007See In re Epperson , 213 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) ; In re T.L.S. , 170 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.) ; In re M.G.M. , 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied); In re K.A.S. , 131 S.W.3d 215, 223-25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) ; Ulmer v. Ulmer , 130 S.W.3d 294, 300-01 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 2007See In re Epperson, 213 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.); In re T.L.S., 170 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.); In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, pet. denied); In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 223-25 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Ulmer v. Ulmer, 130 S.W.3d 294, 300-01 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
In Re KASgreen2 sentences2007See In re Epperson , 213 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) ; In re T.L.S. , 170 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.) ; In re M.G.M. , 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied); In re K.A.S. , 131 S.W.3d 215, 223-25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) ; Ulmer v. Ulmer , 130 S.W.3d 294, 300-01 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 2007See In re Epperson, 213 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.); In re T.L.S., 170 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.); In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, pet. denied); In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 223-25 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Ulmer v. Ulmer, 130 S.W.3d 294, 300-01 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
In Re Eppersongreen2 sentences2007See In re Epperson , 213 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) ; In re T.L.S. , 170 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.) ; In re M.G.M. , 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied); In re K.A.S. , 131 S.W.3d 215, 223-25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) ; Ulmer v. Ulmer , 130 S.W.3d 294, 300-01 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 2007See In re Epperson, 213 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.); In re T.L.S., 170 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.); In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, pet. denied); In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 223-25 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Ulmer v. Ulmer, 130 S.W.3d 294, 300-01 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
In Re MGMgreen2 sentences2007See In re Epperson , 213 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) ; In re T.L.S. , 170 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.) ; In re M.G.M. , 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, pet. denied); In re K.A.S. , 131 S.W.3d 215, 223-25 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) ; Ulmer v. Ulmer , 130 S.W.3d 294, 300-01 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). 2007See In re Epperson, 213 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.); In re T.L.S., 170 S.W.3d 164, 166 (Tex.App.-Waco 2005, no pet.); In re M.G.M., 163 S.W.3d 191, 202 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, pet. denied); In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215, 223-25 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet.); Ulmer v. Ulmer, 130 S.W.3d 294, 300-01 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.). | 2 | 2 |
Tooke v. City of Mexiagreen1 sentence2023First, “an important purpose” of immunity is “to shield the public from the costs and consequences of improvident actions of their governments.” Tooke v. City of Mexia, 197 S.W.3d 325, 332 (Tex. 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Walker v. Packergreen1 sentence2020Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (meaning of adequate review in this context has “no comprehensive definition” and encompasses private interests in delay and costs as well as public interests in the development of the rule of law); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992) (requiring relator establish “the effective denial of a reasonable opportunity to 11 The mandamus record includes a Rule 11 Agreement between the parties in which they agree the ruling contained in the challenged order “will have a significant impact on the presentation of evidence at tr | 1 | 1 |
Almanza v. Stategreen2 sentences1997The fundamental error doctrine arose to address jury charge error, to which no objection was made, that "affected the *151 foundation of a conviction's validity." Id. at 176 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 1997The fundamental error doctrine arose to address jury charge error, to which no objection was made, that “affected the foundation of a conviction’s validity.” Id. at 176 (Onion, P.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). | 1 | 1 |
Cain, Brogden & Cain, Inc. v. Local Union No. 47, International Brotherhood of Teamsters Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpersgreen2 sentences1971While we have doubt as to the jurisdiction of the district court under the preemption doctrine, it not having been raised by the defendant, we do not do so, sua sponte. 2 Plaintiff places primary reliance upon Cain, Brogden & Cain, Inc. v. Local Union No. 47, Etc., 155 Tex. 304 , 285 S.W.2d 942, 946 (1956), wherein the court said: “It is now wéll settled that peaceful picketing loses its protection under the constitutional guaranty of free speech if one of its purposes is contrary to public policy.” [emphasis in original] It then calls to our attention this language from Ex parte Tucker, 110 T 1971While we have doubt as to the jurisdiction of the district court under the preemption doctrine, it not having been raised by the defendant, we do not do so, sua sponte. 2 Plaintiff places primary reliance upon Cain, Brogden & Cain, Inc. v. Local Union No. 47, Etc., 155 Tex. 304 , 285 S.W.2d 942, 946 (1956), wherein the court said: “It is now wéll settled that peaceful picketing loses its protection under the constitutional guaranty of free speech if one of its purposes is contrary to public policy.” [emphasis in original] It then calls to our attention this language from Ex parte Tucker, 110 T | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte George Tuckergreen2 sentences1971While we have doubt as to the jurisdiction of the district court under the preemption doctrine, it not having been raised by the defendant, we do not do so, sua sponte. 2 Plaintiff places primary reliance upon Cain, Brogden & Cain, Inc. v. Local Union No. 47, Etc., 155 Tex. 304 , 285 S.W.2d 942, 946 (1956), wherein the court said: “It is now wéll settled that peaceful picketing loses its protection under the constitutional guaranty of free speech if one of its purposes is contrary to public policy.” [emphasis in original] It then calls to our attention this language from Ex parte Tucker, 110 T 1971While we have doubt as to the jurisdiction of the district court under the preemption doctrine, it not having been raised by the defendant, we do not do so, sua sponte. 2 Plaintiff places primary reliance upon Cain, Brogden & Cain, Inc. v. Local Union No. 47, Etc., 155 Tex. 304 , 285 S.W.2d 942, 946 (1956), wherein the court said: “It is now wéll settled that peaceful picketing loses its protection under the constitutional guaranty of free speech if one of its purposes is contrary to public policy.” [emphasis in original] It then calls to our attention this language from Ex parte Tucker, 110 T | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., LC
green
2 sentences2021The record establishes, and HJSA does not dispute, that Sundown drilled fourteen wells and spent $40 million on drilling operations under the lease. 24 348 S.W.3d 194 (Tex. 2011). 8 “plugged-in whenever the term [‘drilling operations’] was used” in the lease. 25 In Emerald Oil, the definition of the term “diligently” in Article 4 of the lease was introduced with the statement that it would apply in each instance the word was used throughout the lease. 26 Nevertheless, we held that the definition did not apply to impose a greater duty than the specifically defined duty provided in the developme 2019Id., at 210 . | 2 | 2019–2021 |
Exxon Corp. v. Miesch
green
1 sentence2011The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the testimony of the royalty owners’ expert, George Hite, was some evidence that the Field was capable of further production in paying quantities, until 1999 and that Exxon did not drill and complete wells in two productive zones, H12 and FS75. 11 180 S.W.3d at 334-35 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Heredia v. State
green
1 sentence1976This rule was repudiated in Heredia, supra, 3 where the development of the rule was explained in this language: “Demolli v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 478 S.W.2d 554 (1972), added to the Jones requirement: not only must there be a misstatement of the law, but the speaker must profess to know the law. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Demolli v. State
green
1 sentence1976This rule was repudiated in Heredia, supra, 3 where the development of the rule was explained in this language: “Demolli v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 478 S.W.2d 554 (1972), added to the Jones requirement: not only must there be a misstatement of the law, but the speaker must profess to know the law. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Pittsburg v. Ponder
green
2 sentences1970In the more recent case of Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W. 2d 546 (Tex.Sup.1969), involving the alleged explosion of a defective coca-cola bottle, the Supreme Court in discussing the development of the rule in Texas said: “This court has not heretofore applied the rule of strict liability in exploding bottle cases. 1970In the more recent case of Pittsburg Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Ponder, 443 S.W. 2d 546 (Tex.Sup.1969), involving the alleged explosion of a defective coca-cola bottle, the Supreme Court in discussing the development of the rule in Texas said: "This court has not heretofore applied the rule of strict liability in exploding bottle cases. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital
green
1 sentence1933An interesting history of the development of the rule of exemption under consideration! from its English origin to its adoption by the majority of the American courts is given by Judge Hamersley in the case of Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, reported in 66 Conn. 93 , 33 A. 595, 604 , 31 L. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
State ex rel. Kansas City v. Renick
green
2 sentences1915App. 547 , 102 S. W. 1159 ; 26 Cyc. 161; State v. Renick, 157 Mo. 292 , 57 S. W. 713 ; Bell v. Thomas, 49 Colo. 76 , 111 Pac. 76 , 31 L. 1915App. 547 , 102 S. W. 1159 ; 26 Cyc. 161; State v. Renick, 157 Mo. 292 , 57 S. W. 713 ; Bell v. Thomas, 49 Colo. 76 , 111 Pac. 76 , 31 L. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Bell v. Thomas
neutral
1 sentence1915App. 547 , 102 S. W. 1159 ; 26 Cyc. 161; State v. Renick, 157 Mo. 292 , 57 S. W. 713 ; Bell v. Thomas, 49 Colo. 76 , 111 Pac. 76 , 31 L. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Bailey v. Aransas County and Baldwin
neutral
1 sentence1915And, as a development of this rule, it is held by the weight of authority that mandamus will lie, although the party may have also a remedy upon the official bond of a ministerial officer.” 26 Cyc. 172; Bailey v. Aransas County, 46 Tex. Civ. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.