9 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1933–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Cartellonegreen1 sentence1972See also In the Matter of Adolfe Cartellone, 148 F.Supp. 676 (N.D.Ohio) 1957. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Hodges
green
2 sentences2011An excellent and scholarly discussion of the development of the privilege to its present state in Kentucky law is set forth by Court of Appeals Judge Guidugli in Smith v. Hodges, 199 S.W.3d 185 (Ky.App.2005), and thus will not be discussed at length here. 2011An excellent and scholarly discussion of the development of the privilege to its present state in Kentucky law is set forth by Court of Appeals Judge Guidugli in Smith v. Hodges, 199 S.W.3d 185 (Ky.App.2005), and thus will not be discussed at length here. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Ratliff v. Epling
green
1 sentence1985Id. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
AW SCHAFFER v. United States
green
1 sentence1972The Court, in limiting the scope of its review of a ruling of the department, said: “In the development of the doctrine and rule of administrative finality, courts have uniformly held that it is the exclusive province and function of administrative agencies to draw legitimate inferences of fact and make findings and conclusions of fact, to appraise conflicting testimony or other evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses and the evidence adduced by the parties, and to determine the weight of the evidence (see cases cited in Schaffer v. United States, 139 F.Supp. 444 (S.D.1956)). | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Sharp v. United States
green
2 sentences1965See Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., Vol. 4, section 14.31(1), page 728; Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341 , 24 S.Ct. 114 , 48 L.Ed. 211 ; United States ex rel. 1965See Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd Ed., Vol. 4, section 14.31(1), page 728; Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341 , 24 S.Ct. 114 , 48 L.Ed. 211 ; United States ex rel. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Kentucky Home Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wise
green
1 sentence1964We have recently reconsidered the doctrine from the standpoint of procedural effect in Kentucky Home Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wise, Ky., 364 S.W.2d 338 , and Lee v. Tucker, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 849 , and have substantially accepted the views of Prosser. 2 The doctrine does no more than recognize the persuasive force of a particular kind of circumstantial evidence. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Lee v. Tucker
green
1 sentence1964We have recently reconsidered the doctrine from the standpoint of procedural effect in Kentucky Home Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Wise, Ky., 364 S.W.2d 338 , and Lee v. Tucker, Ky., 365 S.W.2d 849 , and have substantially accepted the views of Prosser. 2 The doctrine does no more than recognize the persuasive force of a particular kind of circumstantial evidence. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Freeland v. Edwards
green
2 sentences1961The period is not to be extended by ‘indirect, ambiguous and negative language in the development clause,’ for oil and gas leases in case of ambiguity with respect *545 to development are construed to be for the benefit of the lessor and against the lessee.” In Freeland v. Edwards, 1957, 11 Ill.2d 395 , 142 N.E.2d 701, 702 , a Producers 88 form was used in making a lease for a 60-day primary term. 1961The period is not to be extended by ‘indirect, ambiguous and negative language in the development clause,’ for oil and gas leases in case of ambiguity with respect *545 to development are construed to be for the benefit of the lessor and against the lessee.” In Freeland v. Edwards, 1957, 11 Ill.2d 395 , 142 N.E.2d 701, 702 , a Producers 88 form was used in making a lease for a 60-day primary term. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Kelley v. Hardwick
green
2 sentences1957Fagan Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674 , 226 N.W. 653 , 67 A.L.R. 522 ; Kelley v. Hardwick, 228 Ky. 349 , 14 S.W.2d 1098 . 1957Fagan Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674 , 226 N.W. 653 , 67 A.L.R. 522 ; Kelley v. Hardwick, 228 Ky. 349 , 14 S.W.2d 1098 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
J. J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns
green
2 sentences1957Fagan Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674 , 226 N.W. 653 , 67 A.L.R. 522 ; Kelley v. Hardwick, 228 Ky. 349 , 14 S.W.2d 1098 . 1957Fagan Co. v. Burns, 247 Mich. 674 , 226 N.W. 653 , 67 A.L.R. 522 ; Kelley v. Hardwick, 228 Ky. 349 , 14 S.W.2d 1098 . | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Commonwealth v. Manuel
neutral
2 sentences1946An exhaustive history of the development of this principle is contained in this Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Manuel, 183 Ky. 48 , 208 S. W. 327 . 1946An exhaustive history of the development of this principle is contained in this Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Manuel, 183 Ky. 48 , 208 S. W. 327 . | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Guffey v. Smith
green
2 sentences1933Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 116 , 35 S. Ct. 526 , 59 L. 1933Guffey v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101, 116 , 35 S. Ct. 526 , 59 L. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.