development doctrine in Oregon

2021Ward Co., 228 Or App 424, 438 , 209 P3d 347 (2009), we described the elements of an equitable servitude: “(1) [E]ither an express or implied representation made under circumstance where (2) it is reasonably foreseeable that the person to whom the representation is made will rely on it, (3) that person does so rely, (4) such reliance is reasonable, and (5) the establishment of a servitude is nec- essary to avoid injustice.” Mountain High also involved a golf course in a development and a claim that the developer had promised to maintain the golf course indefinitely.

2021Ward Co., 228 Or App 424, 438 , 209 P3d 347 (2009), we described the elements of an equitable servitude: “(1) [E]ither an express or implied representation made under circumstance where (2) it is reasonably foreseeable that the person to whom the representation is made will rely on it, (3) that person does so rely, (4) such reliance is reasonable, and (5) the establishment of a servitude is nec- essary to avoid injustice.” Mountain High also involved a golf course in a development and a claim that the developer had promised to maintain the golf course indefinitely.

2017Relying on the rationale from Hicks as well as Section 323(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 3 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court described the loss-of-chance theory as allowing “the issue to go to the jury upon a less than normal threshold of proof.” Hamil , 481 Pa at 271, 392 A2d at 1287-88 .

2010Because section 5(3) requires that the “use of the property” comply with the waivers, we concluded that the “construction of infrastructure that is consistent with the amount and degree of the development allowed by the waiver and sought through the vesting decision is a ‘use of the property [that] complies with the waiver.’ ” Id. at 168 .

2008Id.

1996In Wheeler v. Huston, 288 Or 467, 479 , 605 P2d 1339 (1980), the court examined the development of the rule governing the validity of verdicts awarding only economic damages 1 and restated the rule: “If there is a question of whether any general [noneconomic] damages were sustained, the jury may conclude that the plaintiff suffered no general damages but did reasonably incur wage loss and/or medical expense.

1996In Wheeler v. Huston, 288 Or 467, 479 , 605 P2d 1339 (1980), the court examined the development of the rule governing the validity of verdicts awarding only economic damages 1 and restated the rule: “If there is a question of whether any general [noneconomic] damages were sustained, the jury may conclude that the plaintiff suffered no general damages but did reasonably incur wage loss and/or medical expense.

1978"Fairness" is superimposed as a standard only after the development of the doctrine that only a fair procedure could be "due process." It finds expression in the phrase from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945), on which this court's past opinions have relied, that a state's assumption of jurisdiction must not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." [1] Perhaps even without a Civil War and a fourteenth amendment, the law of state jurisdiction within a multistate system like ours would have evolved to a search for "c

1978"Fairness" is superimposed as a standard only after the development of the doctrine that only a fair procedure could be "due process." It finds expression in the phrase from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945), on which this court's past opinions have relied, that a state's assumption of jurisdiction must not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." [1] Perhaps even without a Civil War and a fourteenth amendment, the law of state jurisdiction within a multistate system like ours would have evolved to a search for "c

1978"Fairness" is superimposed as a standard only after the development of the doctrine that only a fair procedure could be "due process." It finds expression in the phrase from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945), on which this court's past opinions have relied, that a state's assumption of jurisdiction must not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." [1] Perhaps even without a Civil War and a fourteenth amendment, the law of state jurisdiction within a multistate system like ours would have evolved to a search for "c

1978"Fairness” is superimposed as a standard only after the development of the doctrine that only a fair procedure could be "due process.” It finds expression in the phrase from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310 (1945), on which this court’s past opinions have relied, that a state’s assumption of jurisdiction must not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 1 Perhaps even without a Civil War and a fourteenth amendment, the law of state jurisdiction within a multistate system like ours would have evolved to a search for "contacts” sufficient to justify the "

1978"Fairness" is superimposed as a standard only after the development of the doctrine that only a fair procedure could be "due process." It finds expression in the phrase from International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed.2d 95 (1945), on which this court's past opinions have relied, that a state's assumption of jurisdiction must not "offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." [1] Perhaps even without a Civil War and a fourteenth amendment, the law of state jurisdiction within a multistate system like ours would have evolved to a search for "c

1976As this *564 court explained in Dean v. Exotic Veneers, Inc., 271 Or 188, 192 , 531 P2d 266 (1975): "The principal purposes of res judicata are prevention of harassment of defendants by successive legal proceedings as well as economy of judicial resources.

1976As this *564 court explained in Dean v. Exotic Veneers, Inc., 271 Or 188, 192 , 531 P2d 266 (1975): "The principal purposes of res judicata are prevention of harassment of defendants by successive legal proceedings as well as economy of judicial resources.

1949“But upon the second and third grounds, the motion to dismiss must be sustained. ■ “The appeal is dismissed.” *166 Herbert v. Dufur, 23 Or. 462 , 32 P. 302 , traces the development of the rule which requires an appellant to set forth with clarity the purported errors upon which he depends.

1949“But upon the second and third grounds, the motion to dismiss must be sustained. ■ “The appeal is dismissed.” *166 Herbert v. Dufur, 23 Or. 462 , 32 P. 302 , traces the development of the rule which requires an appellant to set forth with clarity the purported errors upon which he depends.

1915There is an extended note to the case of Salliotte v. King Bridge Co. , 58 C.C.A. 466 ( 122 Fed. 378 , 65 L.R.A. 620 ), on this subject, tracing down for more than a century the history of the development of the rule that the employer is not liable.

1915There is an extended note to the case of Salliotte v. King Bridge Co. , 58 C.C.A. 466 ( 122 Fed. 378 , 65 L.R.A. 620 ), on this subject, tracing down for more than a century the history of the development of the rule that the employer is not liable.

1895As to the nature of the labor or improvements, the statute would seem to require that the labor be performed or the improvements made for the development of the claim; that is, to facilitate the extraction of the metals it may contain: Smelting Company v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636 ; Remington v. Baudit, 6 Mont. 141 ( 9 Pac. 819 ).

1895But it is insisted that whatever labor is performed for the purpose of prospecting a mine, fills the requirements of the statute, and in support of this position counsel cites United States v. Iron Silver Mining Company, 24 Fed. 568 , and Book v. Justice Mining Company, 58 Fed. 107 .