development rule in Pennsylvania

2012Thus, appellants state that, after Thompson , the first extension of the doctrine was to an HMO, which was like a hospital because the HMO “actually provided health care to its subscribers.” Appellants’ Brief at 23 (citing Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa.Super.1998) (HMO may be held liable for corporate negligence)).

2006The development of the doctrine has been described as follows: The Champlin [38] test has its origins in Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw's 1854 opinion for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Warren v. Mayor & Aldermen of Charlestown, [ 68 Mass. 84 , 2 Gray 84 (1854),] the first case holding that an unconstitutional statutory provision rendered an entire statute invalid.

2006The development of the doctrine has been described as follows: The Champlin [38] test has its origins in Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw’s 1854 opinion for the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Warren v. Mayor & Aldermen of Charlestown, [ 68 Mass. 84 , 2 Gray 84 (1854),] the first case holding that an unconstitutional statutory provision. rendered an entire statute invalid.

2004We recently opined: Since deciding Grant , our supreme court has held that notwithstanding the new general rule, an appellate court may “review ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal for which there is an evidentiary record developing the claims and a trial court opinion addressing those claims.” Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1254 n. 6 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003).

2004We recently opined: Since deciding Grant , our supreme court has held that notwithstanding the new general rule, an appellate court may “review ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal for which there is an evidentiary record developing the claims and a trial court opinion addressing those claims.” Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1254 n. 6 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003).

2004We recently opined: Since deciding Grant , our supreme court has held that notwithstanding the new general rule, an appellate court may “review ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal for which there is an evidentiary record developing the claims and a trial court opinion addressing those claims.” Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1254 n. 6 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003).

2004We recently opined: Since deciding Grant , our supreme court has held that notwithstanding the new general rule, an appellate court may “review ineffectiveness claims on direct appeal for which there is an evidentiary record developing the claims and a trial court opinion addressing those claims.” Commonwealth v. Belak, 573 Pa. 414 , 825 A.2d 1252 , 1254 n. 6 (2003) (citing Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003).

2002Commonwealth v. Scher, 732 A.2d 1278 (Pa.Super.1999).

2002Commonwealth v. Scher, 732 A.2d 1278 (Pa.Super.1999).

1986In Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. 85 , 67 A. 991 (1907), this Court analyzed and reviewed at great length the authorities in this field, and, in a *218 comprehensive fashion, set forth a history of the development of the privilege.

1986In Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. 85 , 67 A. 991 (1907), this Court analyzed and reviewed at great length the authorities in this field, and, in a *218 comprehensive fashion, set forth a history of the development of the privilege.

1985In the development of that doctrine, the courts have consistently refused to extend this variance-by-estoppel principle to cases where the municipality has merely failed to act over a period of years, e.g., Hasage v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 415 Pa. 31 , 202 A.2d 61 (1964). 2 As this court has noted, the maintenance of ¡an .illegal use for many years “itself is not enough to justify a variance based upon a vested right, absent some evidence that the municipality involved knew or should have know of the il-. legal use.

1985In the development of that doctrine, the courts have consistently refused to extend this variance-by-estoppel principle to cases where the municipality has merely failed to act over a period of years, e.g., Hasage v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 415 Pa. 31 , 202 A.2d 61 (1964). 2 As this court has noted, the maintenance of ¡an .illegal use for many years “itself is not enough to justify a variance based upon a vested right, absent some evidence that the municipality involved knew or should have know of the il-. legal use.

1982Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D.

1981And see Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383 , 221 A.2d 320 (1966) (concurring and dissenting opinions, discussing with a full collection of authority the development of the rule of strict liability; these opinions were cited with approval in Webb v. Zern, supra, 422 Pa. at 427, 220 A.2d at 854 ); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa.Superior Ct. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981).

1981And see Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383 , 221 A.2d 320 (1966) (concurring and dissenting opinions, discussing with a full collection of authority the development of the rule of strict liability; these opinions were cited with approval in Webb v. Zern, supra, 422 Pa. at 427, 220 A.2d at 854 ); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa.Superior Ct. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981).

1981And see Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383 , 221 A.2d 320 (1966) (concurring and dissenting opinions, discussing with a full collection of authority the development of the rule of strict liability; these opinions were cited with approval in Webb v. Zern, supra, 422 Pa. at 427, 220 A.2d at 854 ); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa.Superior Ct. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981).

1981And see Miller v. Preitz, 422 Pa. 383 , 221 A.2d 320 (1966) (concurring and dissenting opinions, discussing with a full collection of authority the development of the rule of strict liability; these opinions were cited with approval in Webb v. Zern, supra, 422 Pa. at 427, 220 A.2d at 854 ); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290 Pa.Superior Ct. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1981).

1975See also, as contributing to the development of the doctrine in the Commonwealth, Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841) (act of employee far outside’scope pf authority); Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860) (liability not imposed on tortious performance of discretionary function); Alcorn v. City of Philadelphia, 44 Pa. 348 (1863) (doctrine of respondeat superior held not to apply to appointed officers of municipal corporations); Elliott v. City of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874) (intentional torts); School Dist. v. Fuess, 98 Pa. 600 (1881) (negligence of independent cont

1975See also, as contributing to the development of the doctrine in the Commonwealth, Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841) (act of employee far outside’scope pf authority); Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860) (liability not imposed on tortious performance of discretionary function); Alcorn v. City of Philadelphia, 44 Pa. 348 (1863) (doctrine of respondeat superior held not to apply to appointed officers of municipal corporations); Elliott v. City of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874) (intentional torts); School Dist. v. Fuess, 98 Pa. 600 (1881) (negligence of independent cont

1975See also, as contributing to the development of the doctrine in the Commonwealth, Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841) (act of employee far outside’scope pf authority); Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860) (liability not imposed on tortious performance of discretionary function); Alcorn v. City of Philadelphia, 44 Pa. 348 (1863) (doctrine of respondeat superior held not to apply to appointed officers of municipal corporations); Elliott v. City of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874) (intentional torts); School Dist. v. Fuess, 98 Pa. 600 (1881) (negligence of independent cont

1975See also, as contributing to the development of the doctrine in the Commonwealth, Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841) (act of employee far outside’scope pf authority); Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860) (liability not imposed on tortious performance of discretionary function); Alcorn v. City of Philadelphia, 44 Pa. 348 (1863) (doctrine of respondeat superior held not to apply to appointed officers of municipal corporations); Elliott v. City of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874) (intentional torts); School Dist. v. Fuess, 98 Pa. 600 (1881) (negligence of independent cont

1975See also, as contributing to the development of the doctrine in the Commonwealth, Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841) (act of employee far outside’scope pf authority); Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860) (liability not imposed on tortious performance of discretionary function); Alcorn v. City of Philadelphia, 44 Pa. 348 (1863) (doctrine of respondeat superior held not to apply to appointed officers of municipal corporations); Elliott v. City of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874) (intentional torts); School Dist. v. Fuess, 98 Pa. 600 (1881) (negligence of independent cont

1975See also, as contributing to the development of the doctrine in the Commonwealth, Fox v. Northern Liberties, 3 W. & S. 103 (Pa. 1841) (act of employee far outside’scope pf authority); Carr v. Northern Liberties, 35 Pa. 324 (1860) (liability not imposed on tortious performance of discretionary function); Alcorn v. City of Philadelphia, 44 Pa. 348 (1863) (doctrine of respondeat superior held not to apply to appointed officers of municipal corporations); Elliott v. City of Philadelphia, 75 Pa. 347 (1874) (intentional torts); School Dist. v. Fuess, 98 Pa. 600 (1881) (negligence of independent cont

1972This is no more than an enlargement of the principle of constructive attachment.” In the 131 years since Gibson’s famous pronouncement, the Industrial Plant Doctrine has been firmly woven into the texture of Pennsylvania real and personal property law. 2 It has been stated that what has happened in the development of the doctrine is that an inference originally based upon the supposed intention of the parties to a mortgage transaction has crystallized into a rule predicated upon the desirability of protecting the safety of investments. 3 We could serve no useful purpose in duplicating the anal

1972This is no more than an enlargement of the principle of constructive attachment.” In the 131 years since Gibson’s famous pronouncement, the Industrial Plant Doctrine has been firmly woven into the texture of Pennsylvania real and personal property law. 2 It has been stated that what has happened in the development of the doctrine is that an inference originally based upon the supposed intention of the parties to a mortgage transaction has crystallized into a rule predicated upon the desirability of protecting the safety of investments. 3 We could serve no useful purpose in duplicating the anal

1972Carmel v. Reichneder, 371 Pa. 463 , 91 A. 2d 277 (1952).

1972Carmel v. Reichneder, 371 Pa. 463 , 91 A. 2d 277 (1952).

1972This is no more than an enlargement of the principle of constructive attachment.” In the 131 years since Gibson’s famous pronouncement, the Industrial Plant Doctrine has been firmly woven into the texture of Pennsylvania real and personal property law. 2 It has been stated that what has happened in the development of the doctrine is that an inference originally based upon the supposed intention of the parties to a mortgage transaction has crystallized into a rule predicated upon the desirability of protecting the safety of investments. 3 We could serve no useful purpose in duplicating the anal

1972This is no more than an enlargement of the principle of constructive attachment.” In the 131 years since Gibson’s famous pronouncement, the Industrial Plant Doctrine has been firmly woven into the texture of Pennsylvania real and personal property law. 2 It has been stated that what has happened in the development of the doctrine is that an inference originally based upon the supposed intention of the parties to a mortgage transaction has crystallized into a rule predicated upon the desirability of protecting the safety of investments. 3 We could serve no useful purpose in duplicating the anal