sanction violation in Maryland

2021“The sanction for a violation of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct depends on the facts and circumstances of each case[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209, 223 (2006) (citing 54 Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 375 ).

2012The appropriate sanction for a violation of the MLRPC generally “depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including consideration of any mitigating factors,” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 375 , 872 A.2d at 693, 713 (2005), in furtherance of the purposes of attorney discipline: “to protect the public, to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and to maintain the integrity of the legal profession.” Id.

2008We recognize the appropriate sanction for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct generally "depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including consideration of any mitigating factors," Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 375, 872 A.2d at 713, in furtherance of the purposes of attorney discipline: "`to protect the public, to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and to maintain the integrity of the legal profession.'" Id., quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 526 , 823 A.2d 651, 663 (2003).

2008We recognize the appropriate sanction for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct generally "depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including consideration of any mitigating factors," Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 375, 872 A.2d at 713, in furtherance of the purposes of attorney discipline: "`to protect the public, to deter other lawyers from engaging in violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, and to maintain the integrity of the legal profession.'" Id., quoting Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 526 , 823 A.2d 651, 663 (2003).

2015The rule’s deadline for commencing trial is sometimes referred to colloquially as the “Hicks date” — a reference to State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318 , 403 A.2d 356 (1979), in which this Court held that the sanction for a violation of the predecessor version of Rule 4-271 was dismissal of the charges.

2015The rule’s deadline for commencing trial is sometimes referred to colloquially as the “Hicks date” — a reference to State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318 , 403 A.2d 356 (1979), in which this Court held that the sanction for a violation of the predecessor version of Rule 4-271 was dismissal of the charges.

2005Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 526 , 823 A.2d 651, 663 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McClain, 373 Md. 196, 211 , 817 A.2d 218, 227 (2003).

2005Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 526 , 823 A.2d 651, 663 (2003); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. McClain, 373 Md. 196, 211 , 817 A.2d 218, 227 (2003).

2010Moreover, even were we to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 11-114(b), dismissal is not an appropriate sanction under the facts of this case. 4 The Court of Appeals has made clear that “ ‘only the most extraordinary and egregious circumstances should be allowed to dictate dismissal as the sanction for this violation of a procedural rule.’ ” In re Timothy C., 376 Md. 414, 434 , 829 A.2d 1024 (2003) (quoting In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 109 , 527 A.2d 35 (1987)).

2010Moreover, even were we to conclude that there was a violation of Rule 11-114(b), dismissal is not an appropriate sanction under the facts of this case. 4 The Court of Appeals has made clear that “ ‘only the most extraordinary and egregious circumstances should be allowed to dictate dismissal as the sanction for this violation of a procedural rule.’ ” In re Timothy C., 376 Md. 414, 434 , 829 A.2d 1024 (2003) (quoting In re Keith W., 310 Md. 99, 109 , 527 A.2d 35 (1987)).

2008In Attorney Grievance v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1 , 741 A.2d 1143 (1999), we said: Because "an attorney's character must remain beyond reproach " this Court has the duty, since attorneys are its officers, to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to prevent the transgressions of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute.

2008In Attorney Grievance v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1 , 741 A.2d 1143 (1999), we said: Because "an attorney's character must remain beyond reproach " this Court has the duty, since attorneys are its officers, to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of the bar and to prevent the transgressions of an individual lawyer from bringing its image into disrepute.

2021“The sanction for a violation of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct depends on the facts and circumstances of each case[.]” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209, 223 (2006) (citing 54 Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 375 ).

2008“The sanction for a violation of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including a consideration of any mitigating factors.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Reinhardt, 391 Md. 209, 223 , 892 A.2d 533, 541 (2006) (citing Zuckerman, 386 Md. at 375 , 872 A.2d at 713 ).

2013In Maddox v. Stone, 174 Md.App. 489, 497, 508-09 , 921 A.2d 912 (2007), this Court reversed the circuit court’s exclusion of an expert witness as a sanction for violation of a scheduling order. 10 We held: [Although] the governing principle [in imposing sanctions] is that the appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary[,] ... the more draconian sanctions, of dismissing a claim or precluding the evidence necessary to support a claim, are normally reserved for persistent and deliberate violations that actually cause some prejudice, either to a part

2013In Maddox v. Stone, 174 Md.App. 489, 497, 508-09 , 921 A.2d 912 (2007), this Court reversed the circuit court’s exclusion of an expert witness as a sanction for violation of a scheduling order. 10 We held: [Although] the governing principle [in imposing sanctions] is that the appropriate sanction for a discovery or scheduling order violation is largely discretionary[,] ... the more draconian sanctions, of dismissing a claim or precluding the evidence necessary to support a claim, are normally reserved for persistent and deliberate violations that actually cause some prejudice, either to a part

2008When we reviewed § 3 — 812(b) in James S., we were “struck by the similarity between the language used in [§ 3 — 812(b) ] and that [used] in the various limitations of actions found in Code (1974, 1979 Cum.Supp.) Title 6, Subtitle 1, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.” Id. at 711, 410 A.2d 586 .

1987See Keith W., 310 Md. at 104 , 527 A.2d at 37 ; Werkheiser, 299 Md. at 533 , 474 A.2d at 902-3 ; Dewayne H., 290 Md. at 405 , 430 A.2d at 79 ; In re: James S., 286 Md. 702, 710-13 , 410 A.2d 586, 590-91 (1980); Resetar v. State Board of Education, 284 Md. 537, 547 , 399 A.2d 225, 230 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 , 100 S.Ct. 74 , 62 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979); Maryland State Bar Association v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533 , 325 A.2d 718, 721 (1974); King v. State, 55 Md.App. 672, 679 , 466 A.2d 1292, 1296 (1983), aff'd, 300 Md. 218 , 477 A.2d 768 (1984); People’s Counsel, 52 Md.App. at 720 , 451 A.2d at 948

1985See, e.g., State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529, 538-39 , 474 A.2d 898, 903 (1984) (statute provided that a police officer shall give a chemical test for alcohol to an unconscious individual; dismissal held to be an inappropriate sanction for the State’s failure to comply because dismissal was contrary to legislative intent); Hicks, supra, 285 Md. at 335 , 403 A.2d at 369 (“While the 30 day requirement is mandatory for those persons involved in setting the trial date, we hold that dismissal of the criminal case is not an appropriate sanction for violation of the 30 day provision”); see also Harvey

1985See, e.g., State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529, 538-39 , 474 A.2d 898, 903 (1984) (statute provided that a police officer shall give a chemical test for alcohol to an unconscious individual; dismissal held to be an inappropriate sanction for the State’s failure to comply because dismissal was contrary to legislative intent); Hicks, supra, 285 Md. at 335 , 403 A.2d at 369 (“While the 30 day requirement is mandatory for those persons involved in setting the trial date, we hold that dismissal of the criminal case is not an appropriate sanction for violation of the 30 day provision”); see also Harvey

1987See Keith W., 310 Md. at 104 , 527 A.2d at 37 ; Werkheiser, 299 Md. at 533 , 474 A.2d at 902-3 ; Dewayne H., 290 Md. at 405 , 430 A.2d at 79 ; In re: James S., 286 Md. 702, 710-13 , 410 A.2d 586, 590-91 (1980); Resetar v. State Board of Education, 284 Md. 537, 547 , 399 A.2d 225, 230 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 , 100 S.Ct. 74 , 62 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979); Maryland State Bar Association v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533 , 325 A.2d 718, 721 (1974); King v. State, 55 Md.App. 672, 679 , 466 A.2d 1292, 1296 (1983), aff'd, 300 Md. 218 , 477 A.2d 768 (1984); People’s Counsel, 52 Md.App. at 720 , 451 A.2d at 948

1987See Keith W., 310 Md. at 104 , 527 A.2d at 37 ; Werkheiser, 299 Md. at 533 , 474 A.2d at 902-3 ; Dewayne H., 290 Md. at 405 , 430 A.2d at 79 ; In re: James S., 286 Md. 702, 710-13 , 410 A.2d 586, 590-91 (1980); Resetar v. State Board of Education, 284 Md. 537, 547 , 399 A.2d 225, 230 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 , 100 S.Ct. 74 , 62 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979); Maryland State Bar Association v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533 , 325 A.2d 718, 721 (1974); King v. State, 55 Md.App. 672, 679 , 466 A.2d 1292, 1296 (1983), aff'd, 300 Md. 218 , 477 A.2d 768 (1984); People’s Counsel, 52 Md.App. at 720 , 451 A.2d at 948

1987In In Re: Darryl D., 308 Md. 475 , 520 A.2d 712 (1987), aff'g 66 Md.App. 434 , 504 A.2d 676 (1986), relying upon cases holding that dismissal was an improper sanction for violation of a time provision contained in the rules, see e.g., In Re: Dewayne H., 290 Md. 401 , 430 A.2d 76 (1981); In Re: Trevor A., 55 Md.App. 491 , 462 A.2d 1245 (1983), cert. dismissed as improvidentially granted, 299 Md. 428 , 474 A.2d 207 (1984); In Re: Howard L., 50 Md.App. 498 , 438 A.2d 939 (1982), the Court held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to dismiss a delinquency petition for lack of pro

1987In In Re: Darryl D., 308 Md. 475 , 520 A.2d 712 (1987), aff'g 66 Md.App. 434 , 504 A.2d 676 (1986), relying upon cases holding that dismissal was an improper sanction for violation of a time provision contained in the rules, see e.g., In Re: Dewayne H., 290 Md. 401 , 430 A.2d 76 (1981); In Re: Trevor A., 55 Md.App. 491 , 462 A.2d 1245 (1983), cert. dismissed as improvidentially granted, 299 Md. 428 , 474 A.2d 207 (1984); In Re: Howard L., 50 Md.App. 498 , 438 A.2d 939 (1982), the Court held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to dismiss a delinquency petition for lack of pro

2005As to the latter, more specifically, the court found significant that *277 the county administrative judge’s discretion to determine whether good cause exists to extend the trial date “carries a heavy presumption of validity” and is “rarely subject to reversal upon review.” Id. at 364-65 , 700 A.2d at 286 , quoting Dalton v. State, 87 Md.App. 673, 682 , 591 A.2d 531 , cert, denied, 325 Md. 16 , 599 A.2d 89 (1991) and State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 451 , 470 A.2d 1269, 1284 (1984) (footnote omitted).

2005As to the latter, more specifically, the court found significant that *277 the county administrative judge’s discretion to determine whether good cause exists to extend the trial date “carries a heavy presumption of validity” and is “rarely subject to reversal upon review.” Id. at 364-65 , 700 A.2d at 286 , quoting Dalton v. State, 87 Md.App. 673, 682 , 591 A.2d 531 , cert, denied, 325 Md. 16 , 599 A.2d 89 (1991) and State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 451 , 470 A.2d 1269, 1284 (1984) (footnote omitted).

2000In State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651, 658 , 516 A.2d 965, 968 (1986), after noting the holding of Hides and its progeny, that when a Circuit Court criminal case is not tried within the 180-day time limit set forth by then § 591 and then Rule 746, and was not postponed beyond the 180-day deadline in accordance with § 591 and Rule 746, the sanction for such violation of the statute and rule is ordinarily dismissal of the criminal charges, this Court stated that "[t]he sanctions for other violations of § 591 and Rule 746 are ones of internal judicial administration.” (Citing Farinholt v. State, supra,

2000In State v. Brown, 307 Md. 651, 658 , 516 A.2d 965, 968 (1986), after noting the holding of Hides and its progeny, that when a Circuit Court criminal case is not tried within the 180-day time limit set forth by then § 591 and then Rule 746, and was not postponed beyond the 180-day deadline in accordance with § 591 and Rule 746, the sanction for such violation of the statute and rule is ordinarily dismissal of the criminal charges, this Court stated that "[t]he sanctions for other violations of § 591 and Rule 746 are ones of internal judicial administration.” (Citing Farinholt v. State, supra,

1985See, e.g., State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529, 538-39 , 474 A.2d 898, 903 (1984) (statute provided that a police officer shall give a chemical test for alcohol to an unconscious individual; dismissal held to be an inappropriate sanction for the State’s failure to comply because dismissal was contrary to legislative intent); Hicks, supra, 285 Md. at 335 , 403 A.2d at 369 (“While the 30 day requirement is mandatory for those persons involved in setting the trial date, we hold that dismissal of the criminal case is not an appropriate sanction for violation of the 30 day provision”); see also Harvey

1985See, e.g., State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529, 538-39 , 474 A.2d 898, 903 (1984) (statute provided that a police officer shall give a chemical test for alcohol to an unconscious individual; dismissal held to be an inappropriate sanction for the State’s failure to comply because dismissal was contrary to legislative intent); Hicks, supra, 285 Md. at 335 , 403 A.2d at 369 (“While the 30 day requirement is mandatory for those persons involved in setting the trial date, we hold that dismissal of the criminal case is not an appropriate sanction for violation of the 30 day provision”); see also Harvey

2012Rule B12] ... in light of the circumstances of [the] violation to determine the appropriate sanction for a violation of its provisions.” Id. at 125-26 , 527 A.2d 46 (citations omitted).

2012Rule B12] ... in light of the circumstances of [the] violation to determine the appropriate sanction for a violation of its provisions.” Id. at 125-26 , 527 A.2d 46 (citations omitted).

2012In Maddox v. Stone, this Court stated: “ ‘[W]hile absolute compliance with scheduling orders is not always feasible from a practical standpoint, we think it quite reasonable for Maryland courts to demand at least substantial compliance, or, at the barest minimum, a good faith and earnest effort toward compliance.’ ” 174 Md.App. 489, 499 [ 921 A.2d 912 ] (2007) (quoting Naughton, 114 Md.App. at 653 [ 691 A.2d 712 ]).

2012In Maddox v. Stone, this Court stated: “ ‘[W]hile absolute compliance with scheduling orders is not always feasible from a practical standpoint, we think it quite reasonable for Maryland courts to demand at least substantial compliance, or, at the barest minimum, a good faith and earnest effort toward compliance.’ ” 174 Md.App. 489, 499 [ 921 A.2d 912 ] (2007) (quoting Naughton, 114 Md.App. at 653 [ 691 A.2d 712 ]).

2006In Cherry-Mahoi we held that “the appropriate sanction for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including consideration of any mitigating factors.” 388 Md. at 160 , 879 A.2d at 80 (quoting Attorney Grievance Commission v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 375 , 872 A.2d 693, 713 (2005) (citations omitted).

2006In Cherry-Mahoi we held that “the appropriate sanction for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, including consideration of any mitigating factors.” 388 Md. at 160 , 879 A.2d at 80 (quoting Attorney Grievance Commission v. Zuckerman, 386 Md. 341, 375 , 872 A.2d 693, 713 (2005) (citations omitted).

1991At issue in Patrick A. was the propriety of a State’s Attorney filing delinquency petitions prior to the completion of the Intake procedures required by §§ 3-810 and 3-812. 1 Also at issue was “whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction for violation of a statute or rule” when filing a petition against a juvenile. 312 Md. at 487 , 540 A.2d 810 .

1991At issue in Patrick A. was the propriety of a State’s Attorney filing delinquency petitions prior to the completion of the Intake procedures required by §§ 3-810 and 3-812. 1 Also at issue was “whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction for violation of a statute or rule” when filing a petition against a juvenile. 312 Md. at 487 , 540 A.2d 810 .

1987See Keith W., 310 Md. at 104 , 527 A.2d at 37 ; Werkheiser, 299 Md. at 533 , 474 A.2d at 902-3 ; Dewayne H., 290 Md. at 405 , 430 A.2d at 79 ; In re: James S., 286 Md. 702, 710-13 , 410 A.2d 586, 590-91 (1980); Resetar v. State Board of Education, 284 Md. 537, 547 , 399 A.2d 225, 230 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 , 100 S.Ct. 74 , 62 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979); Maryland State Bar Association v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533 , 325 A.2d 718, 721 (1974); King v. State, 55 Md.App. 672, 679 , 466 A.2d 1292, 1296 (1983), aff'd, 300 Md. 218 , 477 A.2d 768 (1984); People’s Counsel, 52 Md.App. at 720 , 451 A.2d at 948

1987See Keith W., 310 Md. at 104 , 527 A.2d at 37 ; Werkheiser, 299 Md. at 533 , 474 A.2d at 902-3 ; Dewayne H., 290 Md. at 405 , 430 A.2d at 79 ; In re: James S., 286 Md. 702, 710-13 , 410 A.2d 586, 590-91 (1980); Resetar v. State Board of Education, 284 Md. 537, 547 , 399 A.2d 225, 230 , cert. denied, 444 U.S. 838 , 100 S.Ct. 74 , 62 L.Ed.2d 49 (1979); Maryland State Bar Association v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533 , 325 A.2d 718, 721 (1974); King v. State, 55 Md.App. 672, 679 , 466 A.2d 1292, 1296 (1983), aff'd, 300 Md. 218 , 477 A.2d 768 (1984); People’s Counsel, 52 Md.App. at 720 , 451 A.2d at 948