sanction violation in Oregon

2026State v. Moss, 147 Or App 658, 663 , 938 P2d 215 , rev den, 325 Or 491 (1997).

2026State v. Moss, 147 Or App 658, 663 , 938 P2d 215 , rev den, 325 Or 491 (1997).

2023In Kidney Association of Oregon v. Ferguson, 315 Or 135 , 843 P2d 442 (1992), the Oregon Supreme Court noted that trial courts, while lacking the authority to determine disciplinary rule violations, as such, or to impose a sanction for the violation thereof, did have the authority to consider, in determining appropriate attorney fees, whether an attor- ney had breached a fiduciary duty owed to a client, such as a violation of the conflict-of-interest rules.

2023In Kidney Association of Oregon v. Ferguson, 315 Or 135 , 843 P2d 442 (1992), the Oregon Supreme Court noted that trial courts, while lacking the authority to determine disciplinary rule violations, as such, or to impose a sanction for the violation thereof, did have the authority to consider, in determining appropriate attorney fees, whether an attor- ney had breached a fiduciary duty owed to a client, such as a violation of the conflict-of-interest rules.

2021We recently summarized our method for determin- ing the appropriate sanction for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct in In re Nisley, 365 Or 793 , 453 P3d 529 (2019): “In determining the appropriate sanction, we refer to the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards), for guidance.

2021We recently summarized our method for determin- ing the appropriate sanction for a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct in In re Nisley, 365 Or 793 , 453 P3d 529 (2019): “In determining the appropriate sanction, we refer to the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards), for guidance.

2020To dismiss E’s claim for intentional emotional dis- tress under ORCP 46 as a sanction for a violation of a court order,1 the court was required to find that his failure to comply with the court order was “willful, in bad faith, or reflect[ed] a similar degree of fault.” Lang v. Rogue Valley Medical Center, 361 Or 487, 501 , 395 P3d 563 (2017).

2020To dismiss E’s claim for intentional emotional dis- tress under ORCP 46 as a sanction for a violation of a court order,1 the court was required to find that his failure to comply with the court order was “willful, in bad faith, or reflect[ed] a similar degree of fault.” Lang v. Rogue Valley Medical Center, 361 Or 487, 501 , 395 P3d 563 (2017).

2014In a memorandum filed before the second hearing, defendant argued that the trial court lacked the authority to impose consecutive prison terms for a single probation violation, citing ORS 137.123, OAR 213-012-0040, and State v. Stokes, 133 Or App 355 , 891 P2d 13 (1995).

2014In a memorandum filed before the second hearing, defendant argued that the trial court lacked the authority to impose consecutive prison terms for a single probation violation, citing ORS 137.123, OAR 213-012-0040, and State v. Stokes, 133 Or App 355 , 891 P2d 13 (1995).

2012Smith, 348 Or at 558 .

2006The bankruptcy judge is not required to have evidence of debtor illwill directed at creditors, or that the debtor was affirmatively attempting to violate the law — malfeasance is not a prerequisite to bad faith.’ ” Id. at 1224-25 (quoting In re Powers, 135 BR 980, 994 (Bankr CD Cal 1991)). 2 The counterclaim was subsequently dismissed by stipulation of the parties. 3 Although four judgments are attached to plaintiffs Notice of Appeal, the notice indicates that she appeals from only three judgments: the “General Judgment entered in this case on February 22, 2005, the Limited Judgment for attorn

2006In Matter of Howe, 913 F2d 1138,1147 (5th Cir 1990); In re Louden, 106 BR 109, 112 (Bkrtcy ED Ky 1989); Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F2d 414 (3rd Cir), cert den, 488 US 967 (1988).

2002As this court recently explained in In re Flannery, 334 Or 224, 231 , 47 P3d 891 (2002), a determination that an accused lawyer acted “knowingly” for purposes of a particular rule violation does not preclude the conclusion that the lawyer acted “intentionally” for purposes of the sanction analysis.

2002As this court recently explained in In re Flannery, 334 Or 224, 231 , 47 P3d 891 (2002), a determination that an accused lawyer acted “knowingly” for purposes of a particular rule violation does not preclude the conclusion that the lawyer acted “intentionally” for purposes of the sanction analysis.

2001Id.

2000State v. Wyatt, 155 Or App 192 , 962 P2d 780 (1998).

2000State v. Wyatt, 155 Or App 192 , 962 P2d 780 (1998).

1996Those findings show that the reason for the sanction was a violation of ORCP 17 A. 2 Toney v. Armenakis, 139 Or App 464 , 912 P2d 911 (1996).

1996Westfall, 314 Or at 558 .

1996Those findings show that the reason for the sanction was a violation of ORCP 17 A. 2 Toney v. Armenakis, 139 Or App 464 , 912 P2d 911 (1996).

1996Those findings show that the reason for the sanction was a violation of ORCP 17 A. 2 Toney v. Armenakis, 139 Or App 464 , 912 P2d 911 (1996).

1993This court reasoned that (1) “exclusion of a [defense] witness [in a criminal case] is too grave a sanction where the violation was not intentional and not procured by the connivance of counsel or for some improper motive, ” 295 Or at 14 (adopting reasoning in United States v. Schaefer, 299 F2d 625 (7th Cir), cert den 370 US 917 (1962)), and (2) “[r]efusal to allow defense witnesses to testify for violation of an exclusion order should be imposed only when necessary to preserve the integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the competing interests be closely examined,” id. (citing

1993This court reasoned that (1) “exclusion of a [defense] witness [in a criminal case] is too grave a sanction where the violation was not intentional and not procured by the connivance of counsel or for some improper motive, ” 295 Or at 14 (adopting reasoning in United States v. Schaefer, 299 F2d 625 (7th Cir), cert den 370 US 917 (1962)), and (2) “[r]efusal to allow defense witnesses to testify for violation of an exclusion order should be imposed only when necessary to preserve the integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the competing interests be closely examined,” id. (citing

1993This court reasoned that (1) "exclusion of a [defense] witness [in a criminal case] is too grave a sanction where the violation was not intentional and not procured by the connivance of counsel or for some improper motive," 295 Or. at 14 , 664 P.2d 1076 (adopting reasoning in United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. den. 370 U.S. 917 , 82 S.Ct. 1553 , 8 L.Ed.2d 497 (1962)), and (2) "[r]efusal to allow defense witnesses to testify for violation of an exclusion order should be imposed only when necessary to preserve the integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the

1993This court reasoned that (1) “exclusion of a [defense] witness [in a criminal case] is too grave a sanction where the violation was not intentional and not procured by the connivance of counsel or for some improper motive, ” 295 Or at 14 (adopting reasoning in United States v. Schaefer, 299 F2d 625 (7th Cir), cert den 370 US 917 (1962)), and (2) “[r]efusal to allow defense witnesses to testify for violation of an exclusion order should be imposed only when necessary to preserve the integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the competing interests be closely examined,” id. (citing

1993This court reasoned that (1) “exclusion of a [defense] witness [in a criminal case] is too grave a sanction where the violation was not intentional and not procured by the connivance of counsel or for some improper motive, ” 295 Or at 14 (adopting reasoning in United States v. Schaefer, 299 F2d 625 (7th Cir), cert den 370 US 917 (1962)), and (2) “[r]efusal to allow defense witnesses to testify for violation of an exclusion order should be imposed only when necessary to preserve the integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the competing interests be closely examined,” id. (citing

1993This court reasoned that (1) "exclusion of a [defense] witness [in a criminal case] is too grave a sanction where the violation was not intentional and not procured by the connivance of counsel or for some improper motive," 295 Or. at 14 , 664 P.2d 1076 (adopting reasoning in United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. den. 370 U.S. 917 , 82 S.Ct. 1553 , 8 L.Ed.2d 497 (1962)), and (2) "[r]efusal to allow defense witnesses to testify for violation of an exclusion order should be imposed only when necessary to preserve the integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the

1993This court reasoned that (1) "exclusion of a [defense] witness [in a criminal case] is too grave a sanction where the violation was not intentional and not procured by the connivance of counsel or for some improper motive," 295 Or. at 14 , 664 P.2d 1076 (adopting reasoning in United States v. Schaefer, 299 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. den. 370 U.S. 917 , 82 S.Ct. 1553 , 8 L.Ed.2d 497 (1962)), and (2) "[r]efusal to allow defense witnesses to testify for violation of an exclusion order should be imposed only when necessary to preserve the integrity of the fact-finding process and requires that the

1993At an earlier point in the Mai opinion, the court stated its holding in a more general manner, as follows: "In short, although we hold that the sanction procedures under the discovery statutes are permissible under Article I, section 11, we also hold that the statute must be applied in a reasonable manner by imposing the sanction which will infringe least upon the defendant's rights and which will achieve the goal of the statute. " Id. at 277 , 656 P.2d 315 (emphasis supplied).

1993At an earlier point in the Mai opinion, the court stated its holding in a more general manner, as follows: "In short, although we hold that the sanction procedures under the discovery statutes are permissible under Article I, section 11, we also hold that the statute must be applied in a reasonable manner by imposing the sanction which will infringe least upon the defendant's rights and which will achieve the goal of the statute. " Id. at 277 , 656 P.2d 315 (emphasis supplied).

1993In re Busby, 317 Or 213, 217 , 855 P2d 156 (1993).

1993In re Busby, 317 Or 213, 217 , 855 P2d 156 (1993).

1983Richards v. United States, 380 U.S. 909 , 85 S.Ct.894, 13 L.Ed.2d 797 (1965). * * *” Disqualification of a witness for violating an exclusion order, while not the preferred remedy, has been held in some circumstances to be permissible.

1983Richards v. United States, 380 U.S. 909 , 85 S.Ct.894, 13 L.Ed.2d 797 (1965). * * *” Disqualification of a witness for violating an exclusion order, while not the preferred remedy, has been held in some circumstances to be permissible.

1983In the leading Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Avila-Macias, 577 F2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir 1978), the court held: “The appropriate sanction for a violation of a witness exclusionary rule is a matter which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 324 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Torbert, 496 F.2d 154, 157-8 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 857 , 95 S.Ct.105, 42 L.Ed.2d 91 (1974); Spindler v. United States, 336 F.2d 678, 682 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.