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38 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1932–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powellgreen2 sentences2024In Powell we held that a sanction under rule 215 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, now rule 215.2, must relate directly to the abuse found and "be no more severe than necessary to satisfy its legitimate purpose." Powell, 811 S.W.2d at 917 . 2008A sanction under rule 215.2 must relate directly to the abuse found and "be no more severe than necessary to satisfy its legitimate purpose." TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 917 (Tex. 1991). | 3 | 5 |
Koslow's v. MacKiegreen2 sentences2008Koslow’s v. Mackie , 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. 1990) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion by striking pleadings and rendering default judgment as sanction for violation of pretrial order and collecting similar cases). 1992Significantly, in Mackie v. Koslow’s, 774 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1989) reversed Koslow’s v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.1990), the appellate court held the trial court did not have authority under Rule 215 or any other rule to impose a sanction for violation of a pre-trial order. | 3 | 3 |
Gillie v. Boulasgreen2 sentences2006See Gillie v. Boulas, 65 S.W.3d 219, 225 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet. denied); see also Bryson v. Reid, No. 05- 03-01152-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6139 , at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 12, 2004, no pet.) (exclusion of expert due to failure to complete threshold admissibility requirements); Kernan v. 10 Cratty, No. 14-00-00865-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 27, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (trial court had no choice but to exclude testimony of untimely designated expert when good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice not shown and 2006See Gillie v. Boulas , 65 S.W.3d 219, 225 (Tex. App.--Dallas 2001, pet. denied); see also Bryson v. Reid , No. 05-03-01152-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 6139 , at *4 (Tex. App.--Dallas July 12, 2004, no pet.) (exclusion of expert due to failure to complete threshold admissibility requirements); Kernan v. Cratty , No. 14-00-00865-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *5-6 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 27, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (trial court had no choice but to exclude testimony of untimely designated expert when good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice not shown a | 2 | 2 |
Miller v. Armogidagreen2 sentences2004We held, in Miller v. Armogida , 877 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied), that, under the “just sanctions” provision, the court could impose sanctions on a party to prevent him from filing the same claims in another court. 2002We held, in Miller v. Armogida , 877 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied), that, under the "just sanctions" provision, the court could impose sanctions on Miller to prevent him from filing the same claims in another court. | 2 | 2 |
Lassiter v. Shavorgreen2 sentences2001See also Lassiter v. Shavor, 824 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1992, no writ) (holding in civil case trial court may strike a party's pleadings as a sanction for violation of an order in limine if the circumstances warrant); Weidner v. Sanchez, 14 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, n.w.h.). 2001See also Lassiter v. Shavor, 824 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, no writ) (holding in civil case trial court may strike a party's pleadings as a sanction for violation of an order in limine if the circumstances warrant); Weidner v. Sanchez, 14 S.W.3d 353 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, n.w.h.). | 2 | 2 |
Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guineegreen2 sentences2015Even assuming Discovery sanctions cannot be used to adjudicate the that Downer was correctly decided, the instant case does merits of a party's claims or defenses unless a party's not show the same pattern of abuse present in Downer. hindrance of the discovery process justifies a Furthermore, Downer 's approval of the sanction of presumption that its claims or defenses lack merit. default judgment was specifically based upon the facts of Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. 694, 705-06 , 102 that case, and the holding in that case is limited to those S.Ct. 2099, 2105-06; Rogers, 357 U.S. at 20 1991Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 706 , 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2106 , 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982). | 1 | 3 |
McCain v. NME Hospitals, Inc.green2 sentences2018"Motions and arguments of counsel are not evidence in a sanction hearing context." Click , 2016 WL 4239473 , at *2 (citing McCain , 856 S.W.2d at 757 ). 2016McCain v. NME Hosps., Inc., 856 S.W.2d 751, 757 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ). | 1 | 2 |
Weidner v. Sanchezgreen2 sentences2001See also Lassiter v. Shavor, 824 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1992, no writ) (holding in civil case trial court may strike a party's pleadings as a sanction for violation of an order in limine if the circumstances warrant); Weidner v. Sanchez, 14 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, n.w.h.). 2001See also Lassiter v. Shavor, 824 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, no writ) (holding in civil case trial court may strike a party's pleadings as a sanction for violation of an order in limine if the circumstances warrant); Weidner v. Sanchez, 14 S.W.3d 353 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, n.w.h.). | 1 | 2 |
Cadle Co. v. Lobingiergreen1 sentence2024See id. | 1 | 1 |
Texas Department of Public Safety v. Pettagreen2 sentences2015Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tex. 2001). 2015Safety v. Petta, 44 S.W.3d 575, 579 (Tex. 2001). | 1 | 1 |
Harnett v. Stategreen1 sentence2001Heidelberg v. State, 36 S.W.3d 668 , 673 n. *806 3 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.); see Harnett v. State, 38 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex.App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd) (citing Brazzell v. State, 481 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex.Crim.App.1972)); see also Weidner, 14 S.W.3d 353 ; Lassiter v. Shavor, 824 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no writ) (holding in civil case trial court may strike a party’s pleadings as a sanction for violation of an order in limine if the circumstances warrant). | 1 | 1 |
Brazzell v. Stategreen1 sentence2001Heidelberg v. State, 36 S.W.3d 668 , 673 n. *806 3 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.); see Harnett v. State, 38 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex.App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd) (citing Brazzell v. State, 481 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex.Crim.App.1972)); see also Weidner, 14 S.W.3d 353 ; Lassiter v. Shavor, 824 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no writ) (holding in civil case trial court may strike a party’s pleadings as a sanction for violation of an order in limine if the circumstances warrant). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Thomasgreen1 sentence2000Thomas v. Thomas, 917 S.W.2d 425, 432 (Tex.App.—Waco 1996, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Hanley v. Hanleygreen1 sentence1998Rule 215 was written to permit flexibility in imposing any sanction that is “just.” Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 930 (Tex.1991); Hanley v. Hanley, 813 S.W.2d 511, 521 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Braden v. Downeygreen1 sentence1998Rule 215 was written to permit flexibility in imposing any sanction that is “just.” Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 930 (Tex.1991); Hanley v. Hanley, 813 S.W.2d 511, 521 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1991, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Casteel-Diebolt v. Dieboltgreen1 sentence1997Casteel-Diebolt v. Diebolt, 912 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ). | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen1 sentence1995Mitchell v. State, 608 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Jennings, 748 S.W.2d at 609 . | 1 | 1 |
Dupree v. Stategreen1 sentence1994Article 3196a 4 , in effect at the time this cause arose and now codified in essentially the same language under Tex.Health & Safety Code Ann. § 552.019(a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(1) (Vernon 1992), specifically provided for the admission into evidence of the verified account as to the amount due, sworn to by the hospital superintendent, which “shall be sufficient evidence to authorize the Court to render judgment therein.” See Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Crawford, 771 S.W.2d 624, 627 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied); Dupree v. State, 275 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex.Civ.Ap | 1 | 1 |
| State ex rel. Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Crawfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mackie v. Koslow'sgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Manoogian v. Lake Forest Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Salley v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Kocman v. Kocmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bakergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Berry v. Berrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McFarland v. Szakalun
green
1 sentence2020McFarland, 809 S.W.2d at 765 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas
green
1 sentence2015Rendition of default judgment as a discovery S.Ct. at 1094; Hammond Packing, 212 U.S. at 350-51 , 29 sanction ought to be the exception rather than the rule. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cire v. Cummings
green
1 sentence2015The supreme court then held that the trial court did not err in ordering that the party pay “a $250 sanction for filing frivolous objections to discovery without an oral hearing.” Id. 15 This is the extent of appellant’s argument. 22 The supreme court analyzed the issue under rule 215.3; however, we find the reasoning analogous to a sanction under rule 13. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S. A. v. Rogers
green
1 sentence2015Even assuming Discovery sanctions cannot be used to adjudicate the that Downer was correctly decided, the instant case does merits of a party's claims or defenses unless a party's not show the same pattern of abuse present in Downer. hindrance of the discovery process justifies a Furthermore, Downer 's approval of the sanction of presumption that its claims or defenses lack merit. default judgment was specifically based upon the facts of Insurance Corp. of Ireland, 456 U.S. 694, 705-06 , 102 that case, and the holding in that case is limited to those S.Ct. 2099, 2105-06; Rogers, 357 U.S. at 20 | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa
green
1 sentence2015The Bank ignores cases such as Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) and Crites v. Collins, 284 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) in concluding that somehow the trial court had some very limited amount of time to consider a sanctions motion even though the trial court never signed a final judgment disposing of all parties prior to the Final Order on June 3, 2014....................... 16 1. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Crites v. Collins
green
1 sentence2015The Bank ignores cases such as Unifund CCR Partners v. Villa, 299 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) and Crites v. Collins, 284 S.W.3d 839 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) in concluding that somehow the trial court had some very limited amount of time to consider a sanctions motion even though the trial court never signed a final judgment disposing of all parties prior to the Final Order on June 3, 2014....................... 16 1. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
green
2 sentences2015That latter provision allowed a tribe to sue for violations of the duty to negotiate 180 days after requesting such negotiations, but specifically limited the remedy that a court could grant to “an order directing the State and the Indian tribe to conclude a compact within 60 days,” and provided that the only sanction for the violation of such an order would be to require the parties to “submit a proposed compact to a mediator.” Id., at 74 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 ; §§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(i), (iii), (iv). 2015That latter provision allowed a tribe to sue for violations of the duty to negotiate 180 days after requesting such negotiations, but specifically limited the remedy that a court could grant to “an order directing the State and the Indian tribe to conclude a compact within 60 days,” and provided that the only sanction for the violation of such an order would be to require the parties to “submit a proposed compact to a mediator.” Id., at 74 , 116 S.Ct. 1114 ; §§ 2710(d)(7)(B)(i), (iii), (iv). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Heidelberg v. State
green
1 sentence2001Heidelberg v. State, 36 S.W.3d 668 , 673 n. *806 3 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.); see Harnett v. State, 38 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex.App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref'd) (citing Brazzell v. State, 481 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex.Crim.App.1972)); see also Weidner, 14 S.W.3d 353 ; Lassiter v. Shavor, 824 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1992, no writ) (holding in civil case trial court may strike a party’s pleadings as a sanction for violation of an order in limine if the circumstances warrant). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Chrysler Corp. v. Honorable Robert Blackmon
green
1 sentence1997Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Rossa
green
1 sentence1995Downer , 701 S.W.2d at 241 ; Rossa , 830 S.W.2d at 672 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Jennings v. State
green
1 sentence1995Mitchell v. State, 608 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Jennings, 748 S.W.2d at 609 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Griggs v. Capitol MacHine Works, Inc.
green
1 sentence1995Downer , 701 S.W.2d at 241 ; Rossa , 830 S.W.2d at 672 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Weaver v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Hallmark v. State green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Fox v. State neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.