sanction violation in Pennsylvania

2011That, to [the dissent], is a serious mitigating factor which does indeed militate in favor of an altered sanction in this case.” Id. at 960 (Streib, J., dissenting).

2011That, to [the dissent], is a serious mitigating factor which does indeed militate in favor of an altered sanction in this case." Id. at 960 (Streib, J., dissenting).

2006As this Court noted in Ardolino v. Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 40 , 602 A.2d 438, 440-41 (1992), the sections of the Act defining prohibited practices do not indicate the standard by which the violator’s conduct should be measured.

2006As this Court noted in Ardolino v. Pennsylvania Securities Commission, 145 Pa.Cmwlth. 40 , 602 A.2d 438, 440-41 (1992), the sections of the Act defining prohibited practices do not indicate the standard by which the violator’s conduct should be measured.

2005See id.

2003The Superior Court, in Treu v. Harleysville Insurance Company, 443 Pa. Super. 567, 572 , 662 A.2d 1106, 1109 (1995), reversed the order of the trial court which entered sanctions against the plaintiffs in the amount of $17,500, relying upon Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Local Rule 212.2, which permits a trial judge in certain circumstances to order a non-settling party to pay the costs of conducting a trial. 1 On appeal, the Treus argued that the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion when it entered the sanction in violation of the express provisions of Rule 212.2, failed to cons

2003The Superior Court, in Treu v. Harleysville Insurance Company, 443 Pa. Super. 567, 572 , 662 A.2d 1106, 1109 (1995), reversed the order of the trial court which entered sanctions against the plaintiffs in the amount of $17,500, relying upon Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas Local Rule 212.2, which permits a trial judge in certain circumstances to order a non-settling party to pay the costs of conducting a trial. 1 On appeal, the Treus argued that the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion when it entered the sanction in violation of the express provisions of Rule 212.2, failed to cons

1988In reversing the trial court, the Superior Court stated in its opinion that “[t]he trial court, acting sua sponte, interpreted the rule [Philadelphia Local Rule 240(c)(4)] to require dismissal of post-trial motions where counsel failed to forward to the court reporter a monetary deposit required for transcription of the notes of testimony.” Defazio v. Labe, 352 Pa.Superior Ct. 120, 126, 507 A.2d 410, 413 (1986).

1985In Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396 , 490 A.2d 421 (1985), our Supreme Court prescribed the following test to enable a court to determine when suppression of evidence is an appropriate sanction for a violation of law: It is only where the violation ... implicates fundamental constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad-faith, or has substantially prejudiced the defendant....” Commonwealth v. Mason, supra, 507 Pa. at 406 , 490 A.2d at 426 .

1985In Commonwealth v. Mason, 507 Pa. 396 , 490 A.2d 421 (1985), our Supreme Court prescribed the following test to enable a court to determine when suppression of evidence is an appropriate sanction for a violation of law: It is only where the violation ... implicates fundamental constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad-faith, or has substantially prejudiced the defendant....” Commonwealth v. Mason, supra, 507 Pa. at 406 , 490 A.2d at 426 .