sanction violation in New York

1995Under these circumstances, the court’s failure to impose a sanction was not error (see, People v Aguirre, supra; People v Daly, supra; People v Winthrop, 171 AD2d 829 ).

1994Under these circumstances, the court’s failure to impose a sanction was not error (see, People v Daly, 186 AD2d 217 ; People v Winthrop, supra).

1995Under these circumstances, the court’s failure to impose a sanction was not error (see, People v Aguirre, supra; People v Daly, supra; People v Winthrop, 171 AD2d 829 ).

1994Under these circumstances, the court’s failure to impose a sanction was not error (see, People v Daly, 186 AD2d 217 ; People v Winthrop, supra).

2017Following a sanction hearing, the bankruptcy court found that respondent had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and that he had made a materially false statement to the court by making arguments against the production of the witness’s iPhone 4s and then agreeing to produce such when he knew it was lost, and that his conduct rose “to the level of a fraud on the Court” (In re Brown, 511 BR at 852 ).

2017Following a sanction hearing, the bankruptcy court found that respondent had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and that he had made a materially false statement to the court by making arguments against the production of the witness’s iPhone 4s and then agreeing to produce such when he knew it was lost, and that his conduct rose “to the level of a fraud on the Court” (In re Brown, 511 BR at 852 ).

2016Inasmuch as the court determined that there was no bad faith on the part of the police in returning the coats to the store owner and defense counsel argued that there was no forensic evidence connecting defendant to the crime, the court’s determination to instruct the jury to infer that there was no fingerprint or DNA evidence on the coats or the hangers was appropriate (see People v Perkins, 56 AD3d 944 , 945-946 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 786 [2009]; see generally People v McCall, 289 AD2d 1074 , 1074 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 757 [2002]).

2016Inasmuch as the court determined that there was no bad faith on the part of the police in returning the coats to the store owner and defense counsel argued that there was no forensic evidence connecting defendant to the crime, the court’s determination to instruct the jury to infer that there was no fingerprint or DNA evidence on the coats or the hangers was appropriate (see People v Perkins, 56 AD3d 944 , 945-946 [2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 786 [2009]; see generally People v McCall, 289 AD2d 1074 , 1074 [2001], lv denied 97 NY2d 757 [2002]).

2016It is well established that the determination of a sanction for a violation of section 450.10 is left to the sound discretion of the court (see People v Riley, 19 NY3d 944, 946 [2012], adhered to on rearg 20 NY3d 980 [2012]; People v Kelly, 62 NY2d 516, 520-521 [1984]), and that those sanctions are not to be used "if less severe measures can rectify the harm done” by the failure of the police to retain the evidence (Kelly, 62 NY2d at 521 ; see People v Jenkins, 98 NY2d 280, 284 [2002]).

2016It is well established that the determination of a sanction for a violation of section 450.10 is left to the sound discretion of the court (see People v Riley, 19 NY3d 944, 946 [2012], adhered to on rearg 20 NY3d 980 [2012]; People v Kelly, 62 NY2d 516, 520-521 [1984]), and that those sanctions are not to be used "if less severe measures can rectify the harm done” by the failure of the police to retain the evidence (Kelly, 62 NY2d at 521 ; see People v Jenkins, 98 NY2d 280, 284 [2002]).

1992Subsequently, in Kolb v Strogh ( 158 AD2d 15, 16 ), the Second Department, applying the rule of Tewari (supra) to a failure to file the certificate of merit required by CPLR 3012-a, held that "[a] procedural default may be punished only by means which are specifically authorized by statute or by rule * * * and it is clear that neither statute nor rule authorizes dismissal of the action as a sanction for a violation of CPLR 3012-a.” As a consequence, the court stated that it would no longer follow the rationale of its decision in Santangelo v Raskin ( 137 AD2d 74 ), a case which this court has

1991In Kolb v Strogh ( 158 AD2d 15 ), this court abandoned the position originally adopted in the case of Santangelo v Raskin ( 137 AD2d 74 ) and held "that neither statute nor rule authorizes dismissal of the action as a sanction for a violation of CPLR 3012-a” (see, Kolb v Strogh, supra, at 16).

2023In response, [*3]Bristol tendered his resignation, and the AGC requested that it be accepted if the Court determined that his offense was a "serious crime." The Court determined Bristol's offense to be a "serious crime," which would ordinarily require a sanction hearing upon issuance of a final judgment of conviction after sentencing ( 94 AD3d at 88 ; see Judiciary Law § 90[4][g]).

2023In response, [*3]Bristol tendered his resignation, and the AGC requested that it be accepted if the Court determined that his offense was a "serious crime." The Court determined Bristol's offense to be a "serious crime," which would ordinarily require a sanction hearing upon issuance of a final judgment of conviction after sentencing ( 94 AD3d at 88 ; see Judiciary Law § 90[4][g]).

2015Prior to his sentencing, this Court, by order entered July 9, 2013, had granted the petition of the Departmental Disciplinary Committee (Committee), deeming the offenses of which respondent was convicted as “serious crimes,” and immediately suspended him, on consent and until further order of the Court, and directed that upon his release from prison, he was to appear for a sanction hearing before the Committee (see 109 AD3d 151 [1st Dept 2013]).

2015Prior to his sentencing, this Court, by order entered July 9, 2013, had granted the petition of the Departmental Disciplinary Committee (Committee), deeming the offenses of which respondent was convicted as “serious crimes,” and immediately suspended him, on consent and until further order of the Court, and directed that upon his release from prison, he was to appear for a sanction hearing before the Committee (see 109 AD3d 151 [1st Dept 2013]).

2015We have also granted such requests (see Matter of Bertel, 268 AD2d 112 [1st Dept 2000] [following a sanction hearing, attorney convicted of federal conspiracy to defraud and filing fraudulent income tax returns was suspended for three years retroactive to date of serious crime interim suspension order]; Matter of Rakov, 250 AD2d 27 [1st Dept 1998] [same]).

2015We have also granted such requests (see Matter of Bertel, 268 AD2d 112 [1st Dept 2000] [following a sanction hearing, attorney convicted of federal conspiracy to defraud and filing fraudulent income tax returns was suspended for three years retroactive to date of serious crime interim suspension order]; Matter of Rakov, 250 AD2d 27 [1st Dept 1998] [same]).

2015We have also granted such requests (see Matter of Bertel, 268 AD2d 112 [1st Dept 2000] [following a sanction hearing, attorney convicted of federal conspiracy to defraud and filing fraudulent income tax returns was suspended for three years retroactive to date of serious crime interim suspension order]; Matter of Rakov, 250 AD2d 27 [1st Dept 1998] [same]).

2015We have also granted such requests (see Matter of Bertel, 268 AD2d 112 [1st Dept 2000] [following a sanction hearing, attorney convicted of federal conspiracy to defraud and filing fraudulent income tax returns was suspended for three years retroactive to date of serious crime interim suspension order]; Matter of Rakov, 250 AD2d 27 [1st Dept 1998] [same]).

2013Based on a 1985 federal conviction on two counts of filing a false income tax return (see United States v Diamond, 788 F2d 1025 [4th Cir 1986]), we immediately suspended him from the practice of law and directed that a sanction hearing be held (Matter of Diamond, 117 AD2d 114 [1st Dept 1986]).

2013Based on a 1985 federal conviction on two counts of filing a false income tax return (see United States v Diamond, 788 F2d 1025 [4th Cir 1986]), we immediately suspended him from the practice of law and directed that a sanction hearing be held (Matter of Diamond, 117 AD2d 114 [1st Dept 1986]).

2013The movant failed to appear at the hearing, and we subsequently suspended him from the practice of law for one year commencing May 13, 1986 (the date of the initial suspension) or until the completion of his probation, whichever was later, and until further order of this Court (Matter of Diamond, 150 AD2d 115 [1989]).

2013The movant failed to appear at the hearing, and we subsequently suspended him from the practice of law for one year commencing May 13, 1986 (the date of the initial suspension) or until the completion of his probation, whichever was later, and until further order of this Court (Matter of Diamond, 150 AD2d 115 [1989]).

2009Respondent, in answer, does not concede whether respondent’s conviction constitutes a “serious crime” for disciplinary purposes and avers that he “has been actively exploring corrective action with the United States Attorney’s Office including, but not limited, to moving to withdraw the previously entered guilty plea.” However, he has “no objection to the opening of an appropriate proceeding where these issues can be appropriately addressed.” In reply, the Committee maintains that “unless and until [respondent’s] guilty plea is withdrawn, his guilty plea to a federal felony constitutes a ‘seri

2009Nonetheless, in other matters involving convicted felons awaiting sentencing, this Court has suspended the respondents on an interim basis pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (f) and directed that a sanction hearing be held upon sentencing (see Matter of Fasciana, supra; Matter of Percy, supra; Matter of Woodward, 218 AD2d 65 [1996]).

2009Respondent, in answer, does not concede whether respondent’s conviction constitutes a “serious crime” for disciplinary purposes and avers that he “has been actively exploring corrective action with the United States Attorney’s Office including, but not limited, to moving to withdraw the previously entered guilty plea.” However, he has “no objection to the opening of an appropriate proceeding where these issues can be appropriately addressed.” In reply, the Committee maintains that “unless and until [respondent’s] guilty plea is withdrawn, his guilty plea to a federal felony constitutes a ‘seri

2009Nonetheless, in other matters involving convicted felons awaiting sentencing, this Court has suspended the respondents on an interim basis pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (f) and directed that a sanction hearing be held upon sentencing (see Matter of Fasciana, supra; Matter of Percy, supra; Matter of Woodward, 218 AD2d 65 [1996]).

1995Under these circumstances, the court’s failure to impose a sanction was not error (see, People v Aguirre, supra; People v Daly, supra; People v Winthrop, 171 AD2d 829 ).

1994Since the testimony of Detective Nash established that the information written on the envelope was the duplicative equivalent of the statements contained in his official report, the court’s failure to impose a sanction was not error (see, People v Aguirre, 201 AD2d 485 , supra; People v Daly, 186 AD2d 217 ; cf., People v Gamble, 172 AD2d 687 ; People v Diaz, 169 AD2d 776 ).

1994In any event, we note that the defendant was hot prejudiced by the destruction of Munson’s notes (cf., People v Wallace, 76 NY2d 953 ).

1992In any event, we note that the defendant was not prejudiced by the destruction of the arresting officer’s handwritten notes (cf., People v Wallace, 76 NY2d 953 ).

1992Subsequently, in Kolb v Strogh ( 158 AD2d 15, 16 ), the Second Department, applying the rule of Tewari (supra) to a failure to file the certificate of merit required by CPLR 3012-a, held that "[a] procedural default may be punished only by means which are specifically authorized by statute or by rule * * * and it is clear that neither statute nor rule authorizes dismissal of the action as a sanction for a violation of CPLR 3012-a.” As a consequence, the court stated that it would no longer follow the rationale of its decision in Santangelo v Raskin ( 137 AD2d 74 ), a case which this court has

1990A procedural default may be punished only by means which are specifically authorized by statute or by rule (Tewari v Tsoutsouras, 75 NY2d 1 , revg 140 AD2d 104 ) and it is clear that neither statute nor rule authorizes dismissal of the action as a sanction for a violation of CPLR 3012-a.

2026By an order dated March 12, 2026, this Court granted the motion and immediately suspended respondent from the practice of law until further order of the Court ( 2026 NY Slip Op 01407 [1st Dept 2026]).

2026By an order dated March 12, 2026, this Court granted the motion and immediately suspended respondent from the practice of law until further order of the Court (2026 NY Slip Op 01407 [1st Dept 2026]).

2022Respondent's false advertising and failure to appear at the sanction hearing only add to the case for his disbarment ( see Matter of McClain-Sewer , 77 AD3d 204 [1st Dept 2010]).

2021On June 25, 2020, this Court determined that respondent was convicted of a "serious crime," immediately suspended him from the practice of law, and directed a sanction hearing be held ( 184 AD3d 263 [1st Dept 2020]).

2019The motion court providently exercised its discretion in finding that Katzman was sufficiently aware of the restraining notices to be held, along with his firm, in civil contempt for wilful neglect of the notices ( see Kanbar v Quad Cinema Corp. , 151 Misc 2d 439, 441 [App Term, 1st Dept 1991], affd as modified 195 AD2d 412 [1st Dept 1993]; see also Security Trust Co. of Rochester v Magar Homes , 92 AD2d 714, 715 [4th Dept 1983]["In order to satisfy due process requirements, a sanction for violation of CPLR 5222 may be imposed only after proof of knowledge, actual or constructive, of the restr