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40 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Executive Sq., Ltd. v. Delray Executive Sq., Ltd.green2 sentences2024“While a trial court may, without doubt, dismiss an action as a sanction for violation of a court order, it should do so ‘only in extreme circumstances.’” Hastings v. Est. of Hastings, 960 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (quoting Clay v. City of Margate, 546 So. 2d 434, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)). 2008As observed in Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla.1993), and many other cases as well, "a fine, public reprimand, or contempt order may often be the appropriate sanction to impose on an attorney in those situations where the attorney, and not the client, is responsible for the error." [2] See Hastings v. Estate of Hastings, 960 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("While a trial court may, without doubt, dismiss an action as a sanction for violation of a court order, it should do so `only in extreme circumstances.'" (quoting Clay v. City of Margate, 546 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989 | 3 | 3 |
Casseus v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Casseus v. State, 902 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Eaton, 868 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see also Tomengo v. State, 864 So.2d 525, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (stating that exclusion of a defense witness because of a defense disclosure violation is a severe sanction that should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances); Livigni v. State, 725 So.2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that the severe sanction of defense witness exclusion for witness list violation should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances). 2007Casseus v. State, 902 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Eaton, 868 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see also Tomengo v. State, 864 So.2d 525, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (stating that exclusion of a defense witness because of a defense disclosure violation is a severe sanction that should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances); Livigni v. State, 725 So.2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that the severe sanction of defense witness exclusion for witness list violation should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances). | 3 | 3 |
Grace v. Stategreen2 sentences2008The exclusion of evidence "as a sanction for a violation of the discovery rules . . . should only be imposed when there is no other adequate remedy." Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). 2008The exclusion of evidence “as a sanction for a violation of the discovery rules ... should only be imposed when there is no other adequate remedy.” Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). | 3 | 3 |
Hastings v. Estate of Hastingsgreen2 sentences2024“While a trial court may, without doubt, dismiss an action as a sanction for violation of a court order, it should do so ‘only in extreme circumstances.’” Hastings v. Est. of Hastings, 960 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (quoting Clay v. City of Margate, 546 So. 2d 434, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)). 2008As observed in Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla.1993), and many other cases as well, "a fine, public reprimand, or contempt order may often be the appropriate sanction to impose on an attorney in those situations where the attorney, and not the client, is responsible for the error." [2] See Hastings v. Estate of Hastings, 960 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("While a trial court may, without doubt, dismiss an action as a sanction for violation of a court order, it should do so `only in extreme circumstances.'" (quoting Clay v. City of Margate, 546 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989 | 2 | 2 |
State v. Eatongreen2 sentences2014Casseus v. State, 902 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Eaton, 868 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see also Tomengo v. State, 864 So.2d 525, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (stating that exclusion of a defense witness because of a defense disclosure violation is a severe sanction that should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances); Livigni v. State, 725 So.2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that the severe sanction of defense witness exclusion for witness list violation should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances). 2007Casseus v. State, 902 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Eaton, 868 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see also Tomengo v. State, 864 So.2d 525, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (stating that exclusion of a defense witness because of a defense disclosure violation is a severe sanction that should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances); Livigni v. State, 725 So.2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that the severe sanction of defense witness exclusion for witness list violation should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances). | 2 | 2 |
Tomengo v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Casseus v. State, 902 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Eaton, 868 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see also Tomengo v. State, 864 So.2d 525, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (stating that exclusion of a defense witness because of a defense disclosure violation is a severe sanction that should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances); Livigni v. State, 725 So.2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that the severe sanction of defense witness exclusion for witness list violation should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances). 2007Casseus v. State, 902 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Eaton, 868 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see also Tomengo v. State, 864 So.2d 525, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (stating that exclusion of a defense witness because of a defense disclosure violation is a severe sanction that should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances); Livigni v. State, 725 So.2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that the severe sanction of defense witness exclusion for witness list violation should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances). | 2 | 2 |
Livigni v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Casseus v. State, 902 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Eaton, 868 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see also Tomengo v. State, 864 So.2d 525, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (stating that exclusion of a defense witness because of a defense disclosure violation is a severe sanction that should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances); Livigni v. State, 725 So.2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that the severe sanction of defense witness exclusion for witness list violation should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances). 2007Casseus v. State, 902 So.2d 294, 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (quoting State v. Eaton, 868 So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); see also Tomengo v. State, 864 So.2d 525, 530 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (stating that exclusion of a defense witness because of a defense disclosure violation is a severe sanction that should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances); Livigni v. State, 725 So.2d 1150, 1151 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (stating that the severe sanction of defense witness exclusion for witness list violation should be a last resort reserved for extreme or aggravated circumstances). | 2 | 2 |
Kozel v. Ostendorfgreen2 sentences2024In its seminal case, Kozel, the Florida Supreme Court made clear that while a trial court has the discretionary power to dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with a court order, a dismissal with prejudice should not be imposed as a sanction where missed deadlines are concerned absent certain factors being met. 629 So. 2d at 818 ; see also Hastings, 960 So. 2d at 801 . 2008As observed in Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla.1993), and many other cases as well, "a fine, public reprimand, or contempt order may often be the appropriate sanction to impose on an attorney in those situations where the attorney, and not the client, is responsible for the error." [2] See Hastings v. Estate of Hastings, 960 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("While a trial court may, without doubt, dismiss an action as a sanction for violation of a court order, it should do so `only in extreme circumstances.'" (quoting Clay v. City of Margate, 546 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989 | 1 | 3 |
Clare v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc.green2 sentences2019"Florida has consistently required notice and an opportunity to be heard before sanctions are imposed upon counsel." *210 Clare v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. , 928 So.2d 1246 , 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). 2019"Florida has consistently required notice and an opportunity to be heard before sanctions are imposed upon counsel." *210 Clare v. Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. , 928 So.2d 1246 , 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). | 1 | 3 |
Ham v. Dunmiregreen2 sentences2014In fact, no transcript of the sanction hearing was available in Ham [v. Dunmire, 891 So.2d 492 (Fla.2004)], and the order contained language finding willful conduct. 2008As observed in Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla.1993), and many other cases as well, "a fine, public reprimand, or contempt order may often be the appropriate sanction to impose on an attorney in those situations where the attorney, and not the client, is responsible for the error." [2] See Hastings v. Estate of Hastings, 960 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("While a trial court may, without doubt, dismiss an action as a sanction for violation of a court order, it should do so `only in extreme circumstances.'" (quoting Clay v. City of Margate, 546 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989 | 1 | 2 |
Beauchamp v. Collinsgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Collins, *1368 500 So.2d 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (dismissal is inappropriate as a sanction for violation of a discovery order when defendants are unable to demonstrate meaningful prejudice), review denied, 511 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1987). 1989De Trujillo v. Dominguez, 532 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988); Beauchamp v. Collins, 500 So.2d 294 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), rev. denied, 511 So.2d 297 (Fla.1987). | 1 | 2 |
The Florida Bar v. Cruzgreen1 sentence2025However, the referee did not conduct a sanction hearing in this matter, and “due process requires that [an] attorney be permitted to ‘explain the circumstances of the alleged offense and to offer testimony in mitigation of any penalty to be imposed.’ ” Fla. Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975, 979 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Cruz, 490 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 1986)). | 1 | 1 |
The Florida Bar v. Carricartegreen1 sentence2025However, the referee did not conduct a sanction hearing in this matter, and “due process requires that [an] attorney be permitted to ‘explain the circumstances of the alleged offense and to offer testimony in mitigation of any penalty to be imposed.’ ” Fla. Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So. 2d 975, 979 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Cruz, 490 So. 2d 48, 49 (Fla. 1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Stategreen1 sentence2024Without the benefit of a response to our show cause order, and based our “inherent authority and duty to strike a balance between a pro se litigant’s right to participate in the judicial process and protecting the judicial process from abuse,” Roberts v. State, 224 So. 3d 289, 290 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017), we dismiss these consolidated appeals as a sanction and bar Gutierrez from further appellate pro se filings in this probate action. | 1 | 1 |
Sukonik v. Wallackgreen1 sentence2016While dismissing a complaint as a sanction for a violation of a discovery order is the most severe remedy, see Sukonik v. Wallack, 178 So.3d 455, 457 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), reh’g denied, (Nov. 18, 2015), such a remedy is available to trial courts, and we reiterate the adage that “[a] party may not ignore a valid order of court except at its peril.” Johnson v. Allstate Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Carlton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green1 sentence2016When leave to amend is not specified in the order, “without prejudice” can indicate the trial court’s intention to “bring an end to the judicial labor in the action.” In such cases,. like Carlton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 So.2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), “it is clear that it is ‘without prejudice’ to file another, separate, action, rather than “without prejudice’ to file an amended complaint in the first action.” The trial court’s inclusion of the phrase “without prejudice” is further explained by rule 1.420(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that unless otherwise stat | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Allstate Ins. Co.green1 sentence2016Co., 410 So.2d 978, 980 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Beznergreen1 sentence2013Johnson v. Bezner, 910 So.2d 398, 401 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). | 1 | 1 |
McDuffie v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See McDuffie v. State, 970 So.2d 312, 321 (Fla.2007) (“Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(n)(l) authorizes a trial court to exclude evidence as a sanction for a violation of the discovery rules, but this sanction should only be imposed when there is no other remedy.”). | 1 | 1 |
King v. MacAleergreen1 sentence2008As observed in Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla.1993), and many other cases as well, "a fine, public reprimand, or contempt order may often be the appropriate sanction to impose on an attorney in those situations where the attorney, and not the client, is responsible for the error." [2] See Hastings v. Estate of Hastings, 960 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("While a trial court may, without doubt, dismiss an action as a sanction for violation of a court order, it should do so `only in extreme circumstances.'" (quoting Clay v. City of Margate, 546 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989 | 1 | 1 |
Walicki v. Waste Management, Inc.green1 sentence2008As observed in Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla.1993), and many other cases as well, "a fine, public reprimand, or contempt order may often be the appropriate sanction to impose on an attorney in those situations where the attorney, and not the client, is responsible for the error." [2] See Hastings v. Estate of Hastings, 960 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("While a trial court may, without doubt, dismiss an action as a sanction for violation of a court order, it should do so `only in extreme circumstances.'" (quoting Clay v. City of Margate, 546 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989 | 1 | 1 |
Cruz v. Caribbean Spring Villagegreen1 sentence2008As observed in Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So.2d 817, 818 (Fla.1993), and many other cases as well, "a fine, public reprimand, or contempt order may often be the appropriate sanction to impose on an attorney in those situations where the attorney, and not the client, is responsible for the error." [2] See Hastings v. Estate of Hastings, 960 So.2d 798, 801 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) ("While a trial court may, without doubt, dismiss an action as a sanction for violation of a court order, it should do so `only in extreme circumstances.'" (quoting Clay v. City of Margate, 546 So.2d 434, 435 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989 | 1 | 1 |
| Lee v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
The Florida Bar v. Millergreen1 sentence2006Fla. Bar v. Miller, 863 So.2d 231, 235 (Fla.2003); see also art. | 1 | 1 |
| Carbino v. Wardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Spencer v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| The United States v. Hudson and Goodwingreen | 1 | 1 |
| The Florida Bar v. Wassermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whiteside v. Whitesidegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Duarte v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Austin v. State
green
2 sentences2006The cases cited by Armstrong, Pelham v. State, 567 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1990), Austin v. State, 461 So.2d 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) and Bell v. State, 287 So.2d 717 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1974), do not involve the violation of a court order to produce a witness. 1988Wilkerson v. State, 461 So.2d 1376 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Austin v. State, 461 So.2d 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). | 2 | 1988–2006 |
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mazzorana
green
2 sentences2001Co. v. Mazzorana, 731 So.2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (same); cf. Hernandez v. State, 572 So.2d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (reversing conviction where the trial court improperly excluded a witness as a sanction for the defense's discovery violation). 2001Co. v. Mazzorana, 731 So.2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (same); cf. Hernandez v. State, 572 So.2d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (reversing conviction where the trial court improperly excluded a witness as a sanction for the defense’s discovery violation). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Hernandez v. State
green
2 sentences2001Co. v. Mazzorana, 731 So.2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (same); cf. Hernandez v. State, 572 So.2d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (reversing conviction where the trial court improperly excluded a witness as a sanction for the defense's discovery violation). 2001Co. v. Mazzorana, 731 So.2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (same); cf. Hernandez v. State, 572 So.2d 969 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (reversing conviction where the trial court improperly excluded a witness as a sanction for the defense’s discovery violation). | 2 | 2001–2001 |
BP v. State
green
2 sentences1992B.P., 588 So.2d 39 . 1992B.P., 588 So.2d 39 . | 2 | 1992–1992 |
Taylor v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2007Furthermore, where as here the violation has not been found to be willful or blatant, this sanction is generally too severe "when the only prejudice to the State is its inability to obtain evidence for impeachment of the witness." Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (holding that if the failure to disclose a defense witness was "willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence, 2007Furthermore, where as here the violation has not been found to be willful or blatant, this sanction is generally too severe "when the only prejudice to the State is its inability to obtain evidence for impeachment of the witness." Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (holding that if the failure to disclose a defense witness was "willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence, | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Alaska Steamship Co. v. Petterson
green
1 sentence2007Furthermore, where as here the violation has not been found to be willful or blatant, this sanction is generally too severe "when the only prejudice to the State is its inability to obtain evidence for impeachment of the witness." Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415 , 108 S.Ct. 646 , 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (holding that if the failure to disclose a defense witness was "willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of cross-examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence, | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Bell v. State neutral | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Pelham v. State
green
1 sentence2006The cases cited by Armstrong, Pelham v. State, 567 So.2d 537 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1990), Austin v. State, 461 So.2d 1380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) and Bell v. State, 287 So.2d 717 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1974), do not involve the violation of a court order to produce a witness. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Miller v. State green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Bay Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Carroll green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Schreier v. Parker green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Walker v. Bentley green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Billy Ray Hall v. O. M. Bostic, Monroe Prison Unit and the Attorney General of the State of North Carolina green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Mauch v. Flemming green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Berry v. Louisiana green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Tubero green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| DHRS v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Del Prado v. Robert K. Estes, P.A. neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Wilkerson v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Sparks v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.