reasonable time requirement in New York

1962(Brown v. Curtis, 2 N. Y. 225 .) ” The plaintiffs, under all the circumstances, have failed to sustain the burden of proof which is theirs.

1906(Brown v. Curtis, 2 N. Y. 225 .) Therefore, I *219 think it would be incorrect to hold of this defense that it is of an affirmative nature and, like the defense of usury, or any other defense which avoids an obligation, that it must be pleaded to be available.

1994Given that the petitioner failed to adequately establish a reasonable excuse for her approximately four-year delay in filing the notice of claim (see, Matter of Perry v City of New York, 133 AD2d 692 ; Fox v City of New York, 91 AD2d 624 ), that the Clarkstown Central School District did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim within a reasonable time of the claim’s accrual (see, Matter of Bloom v Herrick Union Free School Dist., 174 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Katz v Rockville Centre Union Free School Dist., 131 AD2d 574 ), and that the Clarkstown Central School Dist

1994Given that the petitioner failed to adequately establish a reasonable excuse for her approximately four-year delay in filing the notice of claim (see, Matter of Perry v City of New York, 133 AD2d 692 ; Fox v City of New York, 91 AD2d 624 ), that the Clarkstown Central School District did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim within a reasonable time of the claim’s accrual (see, Matter of Bloom v Herrick Union Free School Dist., 174 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Katz v Rockville Centre Union Free School Dist., 131 AD2d 574 ), and that the Clarkstown Central School Dist

1994Given that the petitioner failed to adequately establish a reasonable excuse for her approximately four-year delay in filing the notice of claim (see, Matter of Perry v City of New York, 133 AD2d 692 ; Fox v City of New York, 91 AD2d 624 ), that the Clarkstown Central School District did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim within a reasonable time of the claim’s accrual (see, Matter of Bloom v Herrick Union Free School Dist., 174 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Katz v Rockville Centre Union Free School Dist., 131 AD2d 574 ), and that the Clarkstown Central School Dist

1994Given that the petitioner failed to adequately establish a reasonable excuse for her approximately four-year delay in filing the notice of claim (see, Matter of Perry v City of New York, 133 AD2d 692 ; Fox v City of New York, 91 AD2d 624 ), that the Clarkstown Central School District did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim within a reasonable time of the claim’s accrual (see, Matter of Bloom v Herrick Union Free School Dist., 174 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Katz v Rockville Centre Union Free School Dist., 131 AD2d 574 ), and that the Clarkstown Central School Dist

1994Given that the petitioner failed to adequately establish a reasonable excuse for her approximately four-year delay in filing the notice of claim (see, Matter of Perry v City of New York, 133 AD2d 692 ; Fox v City of New York, 91 AD2d 624 ), that the Clarkstown Central School District did not acquire actual knowledge of the essential facts underlying the claim within a reasonable time of the claim’s accrual (see, Matter of Bloom v Herrick Union Free School Dist., 174 AD2d 665 ; Matter of Katz v Rockville Centre Union Free School Dist., 131 AD2d 574 ), and that the Clarkstown Central School Dist

1987See also, Matter of Blum v O’Connor, 6 Misc 2d 641 (Sup Ct, Nassau County 1957); Lindner v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 61 Misc 2d 667 (Sup Ct, Nassau County 1969); Barnathan v Garden City Park Water Dist., 21 AD2d 832 (2d Dept 1964); 1985 Atty Gen (Inf Opns) 148. .

1987See also, Matter of Blum v O’Connor, 6 Misc 2d 641 (Sup Ct, Nassau County 1957); Lindner v Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 61 Misc 2d 667 (Sup Ct, Nassau County 1969); Barnathan v Garden City Park Water Dist., 21 AD2d 832 (2d Dept 1964); 1985 Atty Gen (Inf Opns) 148. .

1986"In an adjudicatory proceeding, all parties shall be afforded an opportunity for hearing within reasonable time” (State Administrative Procedure Act § 301 [1]), and this right would be illusory if the reasonable time requirement did not extend to the final determination as well as the hearing itself. * In determining whether a period of delay is reasonable within the meaning of the statute, certain factors must be weighed (Matter of Cortlandt Nursing Home v Axelrod, 66 NY2d 169, 178 ).

1984(Matter of Horan v Board of Appeals, 6 Misc 2d 571 .) Subdivision 2 of section 7-712 of the Village Law also contains a paragraph dealing with the required notice for Board of Zoning Appeals hearings; “(c) The board of appeals shall fix a reasonable time for the hearing of the appeal and give due notice thereof to the parties, and not less than ten days prior to the hearing date publish such notice at least once in the official newspaper of the village or, if there is no official newspaper designated, the newspaper designated by the village board of trustees for such purposes”.

1962The purpose of the rule, giving the plaintiff the benefit of the highest price reached within a reasonable time after he learns of the unauthorized sale, is stated by Mr. Justice Laugi-ilik, writing for the Appellate Divi sion of this Department, in Burhorn v. Lockwood ( 71 App. Div. 301, 304 ), to be to give the plaintiff “ reasonable opportunity to consult counsel, to employ other brokers and to watch the market for the purpose of determining whether it is advisable to purchase on a particular day or when the stock reaches a particular quotation, and to raise funds if he decides to repurchas

1962In Mayer v. Monzo (supra, pp. 446-447 ) the Court of Appeals said: “It has been held under varying circumstances that thirty days or fifteen days or sixty days would be such reasonable period.” In Keller v. Halsey ( 130 App. Div. 598 ) nine days was held to be a reasonable time.

1961Petitioners cite Matter of Gerling v. Board of Zoning Appeals 11 Misc 2d 84 ).