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9 California opinions name it 3 courts 1911–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schenkel v. Resnikgreen1 sentence2015(Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1420 [party seeking relief from default under section 473, subdivision (b) “‘“must show a satisfactory excuse for his default, and . . . diligence in making the motion after discovery of the default”’”]; Schenkel v. Resnik (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4 [reasonable time provision of section 473.5 requires “‘“diligence in making the motion after discovery of 18 the default”’”].) The undisputed evidence shows the Warners did not learn of the default, or the unlawful detainer action against them, until sometime between July 24, 2013 (when they recovered | 1 | 1 |
HUH v. Wanggreen1 sentence2015(Huh v. Wang (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 1406, 1420 [party seeking relief from default under section 473, subdivision (b) “‘“must show a satisfactory excuse for his default, and . . . diligence in making the motion after discovery of the default”’”]; Schenkel v. Resnik (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, 4 [reasonable time provision of section 473.5 requires “‘“diligence in making the motion after discovery of 18 the default”’”].) The undisputed evidence shows the Warners did not learn of the default, or the unlawful detainer action against them, until sometime between July 24, 2013 (when they recovered | 1 | 1 |
People v. Watkinsgreen1 sentence2014(Id. at p. 128, fn. 5.) The trial court noted that the case had already been continued to allow defense counsel to prepare an adequate defense, and that defense counsel was ready for trial while McCartney would “not be ready for trial for a substantial period of time.” The trial court also cited People v. Watkins (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 595, 600 (Watkins) for the proposition that McCartney’s inability to speak after his surgery and communicate with the judge and jury was another valid reason to be concerned about the delay caused by his self-representation. | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Saueressiggreen2 sentences2006There is, however, no requirement that the witnesses sign before the testator's death; in a given case, the reasonable-time requirement could be satisfied even if the witnesses sign after the testator's death." ( Id., com. to § 2-502, at p. 145.) The Arizona Court of Appeals relied upon the above quoted comment in Estate of Jung (App.2005) 210 Ariz. 202 , 109 P.3d 97 , to hold that an Arizona statute that codified this provision of the Uniform Probate Code did not require that a witness sign the will prior to the death of the testator, noting that the statute required only that the witness sig 2006There is, however, no requirement that the witnesses sign before the testator's death; in a given case, the reasonable-time requirement could be satisfied even if the witnesses sign after the testator's death." ( Id., com. to § 2-502, at p. 145.) The Arizona Court of Appeals relied upon the above quoted comment in Estate of Jung (App.2005) 210 Ariz. 202 , 109 P.3d 97 , to hold that an Arizona statute that codified this provision of the Uniform Probate Code did not require that a witness sign the will prior to the death of the testator, noting that the statute required only that the witness sig | 1 | 1 |
Kendall v. Barkergreen2 sentences1994The reasonable time requirement set forth in section 473 has been interpreted as requiring both “ ‘a satisfactory excuse for [the] default, and . . . diligence in making the motion after discovery of the default.’ [Citation.]” (Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 625 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 42 ].) Because the operative language in section 473 is the same as the language in section 473.5, we conclude that the same interpretation should be given to the reasonable time requirement set forth in both sections. 1994The reasonable time requirement set forth in section 473 has been interpreted as requiring both “ ‘a satisfactory excuse for [the] default, and . . . diligence in making the motion after discovery of the default.’ [Citation.]” (Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 625 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 42 ].) Because the operative language in section 473 is the same as the language in section 473.5, we conclude that the same interpretation should be given to the reasonable time requirement set forth in both sections. | 1 | 1 |
Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Falesgreen2 sentences1983Co. v. Fales (1973) 8 Cal.3d 712, 718 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 505 P.2d 213 ], italics added.) This places “an opposing party on notice within a reasonable time that a claim is pending against him . . . .” (Id., at p. 718.) These statutes were enacted to prevent fraud, not to provide a protective shield for its perpetration. 1983Co. v. Fales (1973) 8 Cal.3d 712, 718 [ 106 Cal.Rptr. 21 , 505 P.2d 213 ], italics added.) This places “an opposing party on notice within a reasonable time that a claim is pending against him . . . .” (Id., at p. 718.) These statutes were enacted to prevent fraud, not to provide a protective shield for its perpetration. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
In Re Estate of Jung
green
2 sentences2006There is, however, no requirement that the witnesses sign before the testator's death; in a given case, the reasonable-time requirement could be satisfied even if the witnesses sign after the testator's death." ( Id., com. to § 2-502, at p. 145.) The Arizona Court of Appeals relied upon the above quoted comment in Estate of Jung (App.2005) 210 Ariz. 202 , 109 P.3d 97 , to hold that an Arizona statute that codified this provision of the Uniform Probate Code did not require that a witness sign the will prior to the death of the testator, noting that the statute required only that the witness sig 2006There is, however, no requirement that the witnesses sign before the testator's death; in a given case, the reasonable-time requirement could be satisfied even if the witnesses sign after the testator's death." ( Id., com. to § 2-502, at p. 145.) The Arizona Court of Appeals relied upon the above quoted comment in Estate of Jung (App.2005) 210 Ariz. 202 , 109 P.3d 97 , to hold that an Arizona statute that codified this provision of the Uniform Probate Code did not require that a witness sign the will prior to the death of the testator, noting that the statute required only that the witness sig | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Matter of Estate of Royal
green
2 sentences2006(Matter of Estate of Royal (Colo. 1992) 826 P.2d 1236 [“Therefore, if the will speaks as of the date of the testator’s death, it follows that the document should be complete at that time. 2006There is, however, no requirement that the witnesses sign before the testator's death; in a given case, the reasonable-time requirement could be satisfied even if the witnesses sign after the testator's death." ( Id., com. to § 2-502, at p. 145.) The Arizona Court of Appeals relied upon the above quoted comment in Estate of Jung (App.2005) 210 Ariz. 202 , 109 P.3d 97 , to hold that an Arizona statute that codified this provision of the Uniform Probate Code did not require that a witness sign the will prior to the death of the testator, noting that the statute required only that the witness sig | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Krotin v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc.
green
1 sentence2010Accordingly, the jury instruction [the lessee] complained of which required the lessee in the present case to reject or revoke acceptance within a reasonable time was error.” (Krotin, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 .) GM cites no authority to support the proposition that Lukather himself had a duty to act promptly under the Act. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Rogers v. Rogers
green
1 sentence2006Consequently, we adopt the bright line rule that witnesses' signatures should be affixed to the document at least by the time it becomes operative, the death of the testator."]; Estate of Rogers (1984) 71 Or. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
City of Fresno v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1984(See Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d 468 ; Shank v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 152 ; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 25 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 807 ]; Shaddox v. Melcher (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 80 ].) The court also found Dunston failed to meet the reasonable time requirement of section 946.6. 1984(See Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d 468 ; Shank v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 152 ; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 25 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 807 ]; Shaddox v. Melcher (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 80 ].) The court also found Dunston failed to meet the reasonable time requirement of section 946.6. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Shank v. County of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence1984(See Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d 468 ; Shank v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 152 ; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 25 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 807 ]; Shaddox v. Melcher (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 80 ].) The court also found Dunston failed to meet the reasonable time requirement of section 946.6. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Shaddox v. Melcher
green
2 sentences1984(See Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d 468 ; Shank v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 152 ; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 25 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 807 ]; Shaddox v. Melcher (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 80 ].) The court also found Dunston failed to meet the reasonable time requirement of section 946.6. 1984(See Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d 468 ; Shank v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 152 ; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 25 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 807 ]; Shaddox v. Melcher (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 80 ].) The court also found Dunston failed to meet the reasonable time requirement of section 946.6. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Tammen v. County of San Diego
green
1 sentence1984(See Tammen v. County of San Diego, supra, 66 Cal.2d 468 ; Shank v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 152 ; City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 25 [ 163 Cal.Rptr. 807 ]; Shaddox v. Melcher (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 598 [ 76 Cal.Rptr. 80 ].) The court also found Dunston failed to meet the reasonable time requirement of section 946.6. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Stevenson v. Boyd
green
1 sentence1911It has, however, never been decided in this state (see Stevenson v. Boyd, 153 Cal. 630 , [19 L. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.