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6 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1937–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tedesco v. Municipal Authority of Hazle Townshipgreen2 sentences2009See also Tedesco v. Municipal Authority of Hazle Township, 799 A.2d 931 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (stating that in applying the reasonable time standard, the court will consider whether there has been a change in the condemned property during the passage of. time), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 669 , 820 A.2d 706 (2003); Klick v. Department of Transportation, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 627 , 342 A.2d 794 (1975) (noting that as a general principle, a sale between three to seven years before the condemnation will be found to have occurred within a “reasonable” time but upholding the trial court’s ruling to exclude a five-ye 2009See also Tedesco v. Municipal Authority of Hazle Township, 799 A.2d 931 (Pa. Cmwlth.2002) (stating that in applying the reasonable time standard, the court will consider whether there has been a change in the condemned property during the passage of time), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 669 , 820 A.2d 706 (2003); Klick v. Department of Transportation, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 627 , 342 A.2d 794 (1975) (noting that as a general principle, a sale between three to seven years before the condemnation will be found to have occurred within a "reasonable" time but upholding the trial court's ruling to exclude a five-ye | 2 | 2 |
In Re NCgreen1 sentence2018In re N.C., 763 A.2d 913, 918 (Pa. Super. 2000). | 1 | 1 |
Lally v. Central Valley Railroadgreen2 sentences1937We need not, for the purposes of this case, speculate on what would be a reasonable time for the challenge of such accounts stated; as the period of limitations fixed by statute is only six years, the jury should have been instructed that on the admitted facts plaintiff by her silence during the periods specified had estopped herself from recovering for any items charged to her account prior to the last balancing of the book January, 1924: see Morgan v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 215 Pa. 443, 447 , 64 A. 633 . 1937We need not, for the purposes of this case, speculate on what would be a reasonable time for the challenge of such accounts stated; as the period of limitations fixed by statute is only six years, the jury should have been instructed that on the admitted facts plaintiff by her silence during the periods specified had estopped herself from recovering for any items charged to her account prior to the last balancing of the book January, 1924: see Morgan v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 215 Pa. 443, 447 , 64 A. 633 .” *295 I found nothing in this entire record which would warrant the holding that there | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co.green2 sentences1937We need not, for the purposes of this case, speculate on what would be a reasonable time for the challenge of such accounts stated; as the period of limitations fixed by statute is only six years, the jury should have been instructed that on the admitted facts plaintiff by her silence during the periods specified had estopped herself from recovering for any items charged to her account prior to the last balancing of the book January, 1924: see Morgan v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 215 Pa. 443, 447 , 64 A. 633 . 1937We need not, for the purposes of this case, speculate on what would be a reasonable time for the challenge of such accounts stated; as the period of limitations fixed by statute is only six years, the jury should have been instructed that on the admitted facts plaintiff by her silence during the periods specified had estopped herself from recovering for any items charged to her account prior to the last balancing of the book January, 1924: see Morgan v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 215 Pa. 443, 447 , 64 A. 633 .” *295 I found nothing in this entire record which would warrant the holding that there | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Klick v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2009See also Tedesco v. Municipal Authority of Hazle Township, 799 A.2d 931 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (stating that in applying the reasonable time standard, the court will consider whether there has been a change in the condemned property during the passage of. time), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 669 , 820 A.2d 706 (2003); Klick v. Department of Transportation, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 627 , 342 A.2d 794 (1975) (noting that as a general principle, a sale between three to seven years before the condemnation will be found to have occurred within a “reasonable” time but upholding the trial court’s ruling to exclude a five-ye 2009See also Tedesco v. Municipal Authority of Hazle Township, 799 A.2d 931 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002) (stating that in applying the reasonable time standard, the court will consider whether there has been a change in the condemned property during the passage of. time), appeal denied, 573 Pa. 669 , 820 A.2d 706 (2003); Klick v. Department of Transportation, 20 Pa.Cmwlth. 627 , 342 A.2d 794 (1975) (noting that as a general principle, a sale between three to seven years before the condemnation will be found to have occurred within a “reasonable” time but upholding the trial court’s ruling to exclude a five-ye | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Morrissey v. Brewer
green
2 sentences1977The United States Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 , 97 S.Ct. 274 , 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976), held that postponing a parole revocation hearing until after the parolee has completed the sentence for the conviction which constituted the parole violation does not offend the principles of due process set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). 1977The United States Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 , 97 S.Ct. 274 , 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976), held that postponing a parole revocation hearing until after the parolee has completed the sentence for the conviction which constituted the parole violation does not offend the principles of due process set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Moody v. Daggett
green
2 sentences1977The United States Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 , 97 S.Ct. 274 , 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976), held that postponing a parole revocation hearing until after the parolee has completed the sentence for the conviction which constituted the parole violation does not offend the principles of due process set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). 1977The United States Supreme Court, in its recent decision in Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 , 97 S.Ct. 274 , 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976), held that postponing a parole revocation hearing until after the parolee has completed the sentence for the conviction which constituted the parole violation does not offend the principles of due process set forth in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. East Lansdowne Borough
green
2 sentences1970Plaintiff cites the case of Humble Oil and Refining Company v. East Lansdowne Borough, decided by this court, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, 424 Pa. 309 , 227 A.2d 664 (1967); and Garchinsky v. Borough of Clifton Heights, of this court (unreported but filed to 3485 of 1969), both of which cases were decided under the provisions of the Borough Code of May 4, 1927, P. L. 519, as amended July 10, 1947, P. L. 1621, sec. 93; and August 25, 1959, P. L. 757, sec. 1; 53 PS §48307, now repealed by the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Act, but which provided at that time: “(f) The board of adjus 1970Plaintiff cites the case of Humble Oil and Refining Company v. East Lansdowne Borough, decided by this court, and affirmed by the Supreme Court, 424 Pa. 309 , 227 A.2d 664 (1967); and Garchinsky v. Borough of Clifton Heights, of this court (unreported but filed to 3485 of 1969), both of which cases were decided under the provisions of the Borough Code of May 4, 1927, P. L. 519, as amended July 10, 1947, P. L. 1621, sec. 93; and August 25, 1959, P. L. 757, sec. 1; 53 PS §48307, now repealed by the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Act, but which provided at that time: “(f) The board of adjus | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Penn Bank's Estate
neutral
2 sentences1937In Penn Bank’s Estate, Walters’s Appeal, 152 Pa. 65 , 25 A. 310 , the court said: “The bank stated his account and delivered it to him. 1937In Penn Bank’s Estate, Walters’s Appeal, 152 Pa. 65 , 25 A. 310 , the court said: “The bank stated his account and delivered it to him. | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.