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14 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1993–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Workman v. Nagle Construction, Inc.green2 sentences2008The reasonable time requirement is generally satisfied if the moving party shows that it "`acted diligently once the basis for relief became available, and that the delay in seeking relief did not cause undue hardship to the opposing party.'" Id. (quoting Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 752 (Utah Ct.App. 1990)). 2008The reasonable time requirement is generally satisfied if the moving party shows that it '" 'acted diligently once the basis for relief became available, and that the delay in seeking relief did not cause undue hardship to the opposing party'" Id. (quoting Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 752 (Utah Ct.App.1990)). | 2 | 2 |
Day v. Barnesgreen1 sentence2024Thus, the plain language of the rule “does not provide for an appeal-like review of a commissioner’s decision, but instead requires independent findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence.” Day, 2018 UT App 143, ¶ 16 (quotation simplified). 20220090-CA 14 2024 UT App 6 Holt v. Holt ¶30 In the case at hand, after the commissioner made his recommendation, Christopher filed an objection wherein he explained that while the commissioner “correctly found” that the reasonable-time rule applied to section 9(B) of the decree, he erred because the recommendation was not based on eviden | 1 | 1 |
Wong v. Di Graziagreen2 sentences1998Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 295 F.2d 136, 138 (D.C.Cir.1961) (indicating that statement requiring lessor to “diligently pursue” a zoning variance implied a reasonable time requirement); Myers v. Hardin, 208 Ark. 505 , 186 S.W.2d 925, 928 (1945) (implying a reasonable time requirement for a trustee who must distribute res “as soon as possible”); Wong, 35 Cal.Rptr. 241 , 386 P.2d at 824-25 (“The use of terms ‘forthwith’ and ‘continue expeditiously,’ and additional clauses, contained in a contract which sets no specific date for completion of construction imposes upon defendants an obligation to co 1998Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 295 F.2d 136, 138 (D.C.Cir.1961) (indicating that statement requiring lessor to “diligently pursue” a zoning variance implied a reasonable time requirement); Myers v. Hardin, 208 Ark. 505 , 186 S.W.2d 925, 928 (1945) (implying a reasonable time requirement for a trustee who must distribute res “as soon as possible”); Wong, 35 Cal.Rptr. 241 , 386 P.2d at 824-25 (“The use of terms ‘forthwith’ and ‘continue expeditiously,’ and additional clauses, contained in a contract which sets no specific date for completion of construction imposes upon defendants an obligation to co | 1 | 1 |
Milton Isen v. Giant Food, Inc.green1 sentence1998Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 295 F.2d 136, 138 (D.C.Cir.1961) (indicating that statement requiring lessor to “diligently pursue” a zoning variance implied a reasonable time requirement); Myers v. Hardin, 208 Ark. 505 , 186 S.W.2d 925, 928 (1945) (implying a reasonable time requirement for a trustee who must distribute res “as soon as possible”); Wong, 35 Cal.Rptr. 241 , 386 P.2d at 824-25 (“The use of terms ‘forthwith’ and ‘continue expeditiously,’ and additional clauses, contained in a contract which sets no specific date for completion of construction imposes upon defendants an obligation to co | 1 | 1 |
Myers v. Hardin, Administratorgreen2 sentences1998Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 295 F.2d 136, 138 (D.C.Cir.1961) (indicating that statement requiring lessor to “diligently pursue” a zoning variance implied a reasonable time requirement); Myers v. Hardin, 208 Ark. 505 , 186 S.W.2d 925, 928 (1945) (implying a reasonable time requirement for a trustee who must distribute res “as soon as possible”); Wong, 35 Cal.Rptr. 241 , 386 P.2d at 824-25 (“The use of terms ‘forthwith’ and ‘continue expeditiously,’ and additional clauses, contained in a contract which sets no specific date for completion of construction imposes upon defendants an obligation to co 1998Isen v. Giant Food, Inc., 295 F.2d 136, 138 (D.C.Cir.1961) (indicating that statement requiring lessor to “diligently pursue” a zoning variance implied a reasonable time requirement); Myers v. Hardin, 208 Ark. 505 , 186 S.W.2d 925, 928 (1945) (implying a reasonable time requirement for a trustee who must distribute res “as soon as possible”); Wong, 35 Cal.Rptr. 241 , 386 P.2d at 824-25 (“The use of terms ‘forthwith’ and ‘continue expeditiously,’ and additional clauses, contained in a contract which sets no specific date for completion of construction imposes upon defendants an obligation to co | 1 | 1 |
Fisher v. Baileygreen2 sentences1996Not only did the Fisher court conduct what is essentially a reasonable time inquiry, but it concluded with language sounding suspiciously like reasonable-time-analysis language, 3 stating; “[UJnder these circumstances it would be unreasonable to hold that the option to purchase any of these lots could be exercised any substantial period of time after January 1, 1964, and therefore this contract does not violate the rule against perpetuities.” 4 Id. at 988 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 1996Not only did the Fisher court conduct what is essentially a reasonable time inquiry, but it concluded with language sounding suspiciously like reasonable-time-analysis language, [3] stating: " [U]nder these circumstances it would be unreasonable to hold that the option to purchase any of these lots could be exercised any substantial period of time after January 1, 1964, and therefore this contract does not violate the rule against perpetuities." [4] Id. at 988 (emphasis added) *1265 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Edward A. Ashford v. Charles Steuart, Don Erby, Ray Beaman, Steve Stedfelt, and Maynard Rossgreen2 sentences1993See also Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259 (Utah Ct.App.1992), where our court of appeals recently held that a reasonable time under rule 60(b) "depends upon the facts of each case, considering such factors as the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties." Id. at 261 (citing Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir.1981)). 1993See also Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259 (Utah Ct.App.1992), where our court of appeals recently held that a reasonable time under rule 60(b) “depends upon the facts of each case, considering such factors as the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.” Id. at 261 (citing Ashford v. Stewart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir.1981)). | 1 | 1 |
Maertz v. Maertzgreen2 sentences1993See also Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259 (Utah Ct.App.1992), where our court of appeals recently held that a reasonable time under rule 60(b) “depends upon the facts of each case, considering such factors as the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.” Id. at 261 (citing Ashford v. Stewart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir.1981)). 1993See also Maertz v. Maertz, 827 P.2d 259 (Utah Ct.App.1992), where our court of appeals recently held that a reasonable time under rule 60(b) “depends upon the facts of each case, considering such factors as the interest in finality, the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.” Id. at 261 (citing Ashford v. Stewart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir.1981)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Garcia v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2021Therefore, it must be regarded as an unsettled issue whether all motions brought under rule 60(b)(4), aside from those turning on defective service of process, see Garcia, 712 P.2d at 290 , are subject to the reasonable time requirement of 60(c), and we cannot rely on the language in Migliore to conclude that Travis’s second motion was not subject to the reasonable time limit imposed by rule 60(c). ¶21 But just as our Supreme Court did in In re Estate of Willey, we determine that it is unnecessary to resolve this question in 20200618-CA 12 2021 UT App 122 Sanders v. Sanders this case, 6 and we 2016Therefore, apart from the dicta in Garcia, this court has not extended the exemption from the reasonable time requirement in rule 60(c) to claims other than those based on ―fatally defective service of process.‖9 Id. 9 Mr. McBroom‘s reliance on Murray Place v. Varela, 2013 UT App 19, ¶ 3 , 297 P.3d 642 , is unavailing. | 4 | 2016–2021 |
In re Estate of RC Willey
green
2 sentences2021In re Estate of Willey, 2016 UT 53 , ¶ 17 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted). 2016The language he cites from Murray Place that ―a motion under rule 60(b)(4) may ‗succeed on the basis of a mere showing that the judgment was void because of some defect in (cont.) 8 Cite as: 2016 UT 53 Opinion of the Court ¶ 18 There is a split among other jurisdictions on whether motions made under rule 60(b)(4) are subject to a reasonable time limit. | 3 | 2016–2021 |
Menzies v. Galetka
green
2 sentences2017What constitutes a reasonable time under rule 60(b)(6) depends on “the facts of each case, considering such factors as the interest in finality, the reason for the delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.” Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 65 , 150 P.3d 480 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 2017What constitutes a reasonable time under rule 60(b)(6) depends on “the facts of each case, considering such factors as the interest in finality, the reason for the delay, the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to other parties.” Menzies, 2006 UT 81, ¶ 65 , 150 P.3d 480 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2012–2017 |
Murray Place v. Varela
neutral
2 sentences2016Therefore, apart from the dicta in Garcia, this court has not extended the exemption from the reasonable time requirement in rule 60(c) to claims other than those based on ―fatally defective service of process.‖9 Id. 9 Mr. McBroom‘s reliance on Murray Place v. Varela, 2013 UT App 19, ¶ 3 , 297 P.3d 642 , is unavailing. 2016Therefore, apart from the dicta in Garcia, this court has not extended the exemption from the reasonable time requirement in rule 60(c) to claims other than those based on ―fatally defective service of process.‖9 Id. 9 Mr. McBroom‘s reliance on Murray Place v. Varela, 2013 UT App 19, ¶ 3 , 297 P.3d 642 , is unavailing. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Thayer v. Thayer
green
2 sentences2024We then determine what constitutes a reasonable time for Rhonda’s performance under the circumstances. ¶20 A stipulated divorce decree represents an enforceable contract between divorcing spouses, and so “we interpret the parties’ decree according to established rules of contract 20220090-CA 9 2024 UT App 6 Holt v. Holt interpretation.” Thayer v. Thayer, 2016 UT App 146, ¶ 17 , 378 P.3d 1232 (quotation simplified). 2024We then determine what constitutes a reasonable time for Rhonda’s performance under the circumstances. ¶20 A stipulated divorce decree represents an enforceable contract between divorcing spouses, and so “we interpret the parties’ decree according to established rules of contract 20220090-CA 9 2024 UT App 6 Holt v. Holt interpretation.” Thayer v. Thayer, 2016 UT App 146, ¶ 17 , 378 P.3d 1232 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
New York Ave. LLC v. Harrison
green
1 sentence2024In that case, a seller 20220090-CA 10 2024 UT App 6 Holt v. Holt contracted with a buyer for the sale of certain real estate. 2016 UT App 240, ¶ 3 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
ATLANTIC CREDIT v. Jensen
green
1 sentence2024“We interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of contract interpretation.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 2011 UT App 41, ¶ 5 , 248 P.3d 65 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 255 P.3d 684 (Utah 5. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Mitchell v. Mitchell
green
2 sentences2024“We interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of contract interpretation.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 2011 UT App 41, ¶ 5 , 248 P.3d 65 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 255 P.3d 684 (Utah 5. 2024“We interpret a divorce decree according to established rules of contract interpretation.” Mitchell v. Mitchell, 2011 UT App 41, ¶ 5 , 248 P.3d 65 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 255 P.3d 684 (Utah 5. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Holt v. Holt
green
2 sentences2024In reviewing the conclusions of the court, we must evaluate the plain language of section 9(B) 20220090-CA 11 2024 UT App 6 Holt v. Holt of the decree to determine if the district court correctly held that the reasonable-time rule did not apply. ¶25 Based on the plain language of section 9(B), it is obvious that nowhere in its four sentences is there any provision regarding a specific date by which Rhonda must sell the property. 2024Thus, the plain language of the rule “does not provide for an appeal-like review of a commissioner’s decision, but instead requires independent findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence.” Day, 2018 UT App 143, ¶ 16 (quotation simplified). 20220090-CA 14 2024 UT App 6 Holt v. Holt ¶30 In the case at hand, after the commissioner made his recommendation, Christopher filed an objection wherein he explained that while the commissioner “correctly found” that the reasonable-time rule applied to section 9(B) of the decree, he erred because the recommendation was not based on eviden | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Sanders v. Sanders
green
1 sentence2021Therefore, it must be regarded as an unsettled issue whether all motions brought under rule 60(b)(4), aside from those turning on defective service of process, see Garcia, 712 P.2d at 290 , are subject to the reasonable time requirement of 60(c), and we cannot rely on the language in Migliore to conclude that Travis’s second motion was not subject to the reasonable time limit imposed by rule 60(c). ¶21 But just as our Supreme Court did in In re Estate of Willey, we determine that it is unnecessary to resolve this question in 20200618-CA 12 2021 UT App 122 Sanders v. Sanders this case, 6 and we | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Alarm Protection v. Crandall
green
1 sentence2021It then observed that the motion had been filed “eleven 4 Cite as: 2021 UT 26 Opinion of the Court months after the Judgment and seven months after the writ” and noted that Crandall had “been represented by the same counsel since this case was filed” and had “not claimed that he didn’t receive copies of the Judgment and Writ.” Ultimately, the court concluded that Crandall had provided “no rationale for the delay other than not knowing what a Judgment or Writ means”—“not a reasonable justification” for the delay. ¶11 In denying the motion for return of excess proceeds, the district court conclu | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Gilbert M. Hair and Ethel Blaine Millett (On Behalf of Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated) v. United States
green
1 sentence2012The remedy afforded by the Fifth Amendment is subject to a reasonable time bar designed to protect other important societal values." Id. at 1260 . € 49 As Hair illustrates, the idea that lapse of time cannot validate wrongfully exercised power is far from unique to structural constitutional violations, as the FLDSA insists. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Gillmor v. Wright
green
2 sentences2008The reasonable time requirement is generally satisfied if the moving party shows that it "`acted diligently once the basis for relief became available, and that the delay in seeking relief did not cause undue hardship to the opposing party.'" Id. (quoting Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 752 (Utah Ct.App. 1990)). 2008The reasonable time requirement is generally satisfied if the moving party shows that it '" 'acted diligently once the basis for relief became available, and that the delay in seeking relief did not cause undue hardship to the opposing party'" Id. (quoting Workman v. Nagle Constr., Inc., 802 P.2d 749, 752 (Utah Ct.App.1990)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.