reasonable time rule in Texas

2026In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225 , 228–29 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding).

2025Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228–29.

2026As explained by the Amarillo Court of Appeals: [A reasonable time to rule] is dependent upon a myriad of criteria, not the least of which is the trial court’s actual knowledge of the motion, its overt refusal to act on same, the state of the court’s docket, and the existence of other judicial and administrative matters which must be addressed first. [Ex parte Bates, 65 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding).] So too must the trial court’s inherent power to control its own docket be factored into the mix.

2026As explained by the Amarillo Court of Appeals: [A reasonable time to rule] is dependent upon a myriad of criteria, not the least of which is the trial court’s actual knowledge of the motion, its overt refusal to act on same, the state of the court’s docket, and the existence of other judicial and administrative matters which must be addressed first. [Ex parte Bates, 65 S.W.3d 133, 135 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding).] So too must the trial court’s inherent power to control its own docket be factored into the mix.

2026In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.— Texarkana 2008 , orig. proceeding); In re Hardy, No. 03-25-00028-CV, 2025 WL 352167 , at *1 (Tex. App. Austin Jan. 31, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661 ).

2026See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662 .

2023In re Molina, 94 S.W.3d 885, 886 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

2022See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659 , 661–62 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding) (no mandamus relief absent proof motion was filed, presented to the trial court with a request for a ruling, and trial court given reasonable time to issue ruling); In re Molina, 94 S.W.3d 885, 886 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (mandamus relief not available until trial court has had reasonable opportunity to rule on motion).

2021See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Benchmark Elecs., Inc., 142 S.W.3d 554, 563 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that where no payment due date was specified in sales contract, payment was due within reasonable time); HECI Exploration Co. v. Clajon Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 622, 634 (Tex. App. —Austin 1992, writ denied) (when no specific time for performance is stated in contract, law will imply reasonable time); see also Snyder v. Eanes Indep.

2009See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Benchmark Elecs., Inc., 142 S.W.3d 554, 563 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that where no payment due date was specified in sales contract, payment was due within reasonable time); HECI Exploration Co. v. Clajon Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 622, 634 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied) (when no specific time for performance is stated in contract, law will imply reasonable time); see also Snyder v. Eanes Indep.

2021See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Benchmark Elecs., Inc., 142 S.W.3d 554, 563 (Tex. App. —Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that where no payment due date was specified in sales contract, payment was due within reasonable time); HECI Exploration Co. v. Clajon Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 622, 634 (Tex. App. —Austin 1992, writ denied) (when no specific time for performance is stated in contract, law will imply reasonable time); see also Snyder v. Eanes Indep.

2009See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Benchmark Elecs., Inc., 142 S.W.3d 554, 563 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (holding that where no payment due date was specified in sales contract, payment was due within reasonable time); HECI Exploration Co. v. Clajon Gas Co., 843 S.W.2d 622, 634 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ denied) (when no specific time for performance is stated in contract, law will imply reasonable time); see also Snyder v. Eanes Indep.

2015In re Layton, 257 S.W.3d 794, 795 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, orig. proceeding).

2013In re Layton, 257 S.W.3d 794, 795 (Tex. App.--~Amariiio 2008, orig. proceeding).

2003Compare Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus, 17 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account "delay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation”), and DeRuy v. Garza, 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (one-year delay reasonable), and Work v. Duval, 809 S.W.2d 351, 353-354 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (fact that injury was discovered

2003Compare Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus, 17 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account Adelay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation@), and DuRuy v. Garza, 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.CSan 20 was impossible or exceedingly difficult for Ms. O=Reilly to discover her injury and bring suit requires an entirely different standard than determining whether suit wa

2003Compare Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus, 17 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account "delay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation”), and DeRuy v. Garza, 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (one-year delay reasonable), and Work v. Duval, 809 S.W.2d 351, 353-354 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (fact that injury was discovered

2003Compare Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus, 17 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account Adelay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation@), and DuRuy v. Garza, 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.CSan 20 was impossible or exceedingly difficult for Ms. O=Reilly to discover her injury and bring suit requires an entirely different standard than determining whether suit wa

2015Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has stated, “The reasonable-time rule is a court-made standard, which has heretofore been applied only in a limited number of cases involving adult plaintiffs who, because of the nature of their claim, did not have a reasonable opportunity to discover their injuries and bring suit within a prescribed limitations period.” Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis added); Ericson v. Roberts, 910 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, no writ) (“To have a valid argument that Section 10.01 was unconstitutional, the Ericsons would have had to alle

2003Those courts held that the above factors could be considered when examining the reasonable-time rule, which applies only to open-courts violations. 15 See Weiner, 900 S.W.2d at 316 .

2008See id.

2008Under the circumstances alleged by Mitchell, Respondent has had a reasonable time to rule on Mitchell’s motion for default judgment. [1] See id.

2026See Ho v. University of Texas at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672 , 694–95 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (holding that a court has the inherent authority to control its own docket).

2026See Ho v. University of Texas at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672 , 694–695 (Tex. App.— Amarillo 1998, pet. denied) (holding that a court has the inherent authority to control its own docket).

2021In re Mesa Petroleum Partners, L.P., 538 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, orig. proceeding).

2019In re Mesa Petroleum Partners, L.P., 538 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2017, orig. proceeding).

2003Compare Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus, 17 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account "delay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation”), and DeRuy v. Garza, 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (one-year delay reasonable), and Work v. Duval, 809 S.W.2d 351, 353-354 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (fact that injury was discovered

2003Compare Shah , 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus , 17 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account "delay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation"), and DuRuy v. Garza , 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (one-year delay reasonable), and Work v. Duval , 809 S.W.2d 351, 353-354 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (fact that injury was

2003Compare Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus, 17 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tex. App.CHouston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account Adelay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation@), and DuRuy v. Garza, 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.CSan 20 was impossible or exceedingly difficult for Ms. O=Reilly to discover her injury and bring suit requires an entirely different standard than determining whether suit wa

2003Compare Shah , 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus , 17 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account "delay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation"), and DuRuy v. Garza , 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (one-year delay reasonable), and Work v. Duval , 809 S.W.2d 351, 353-354 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (fact that injury was

2003Compare Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus, 17 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account "delay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation”), and DeRuy v. Garza, 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (one-year delay reasonable), and Work v. Duval, 809 S.W.2d 351, 353-354 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (fact that injury was discovered

2003Compare Shah , 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus , 17 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account "delay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation"), and DuRuy v. Garza , 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (one-year delay reasonable), and Work v. Duval , 809 S.W.2d 351, 353-354 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (fact that injury was

2003Compare Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus, 17 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account "delay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation”), and DeRuy v. Garza, 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (one-year delay reasonable), and Work v. Duval, 809 S.W.2d 351, 353-354 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (fact that injury was discovered

2003Compare Shah , 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus , 17 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account "delay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation"), and DuRuy v. Garza , 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (one-year delay reasonable), and Work v. Duval , 809 S.W.2d 351, 353-354 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (fact that injury was

2024Dist. v. Woody, 865 F.3d 303, 320 (5th Cir. 2017) (inferring a reasonable time standard for districts to refer disabled children for evaluations because otherwise they would be “perverse[ly] incentiv[ized]” not to comply to “stall accrual” of obligations); Hotze v. Turner, 672 S.W.3d 380 , 388 (Tex. 2023) (relying on Section 311.021’s presumptions to reject an interpretation that would “permit a municipality to indefinitely delay giving effect to an amendment”). 45 See TEX.

2024Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 549 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring); see United Rentals N. Am., Inc. v. Evans, 668 S.W.3d 627 , 637 (Tex. 2023) (“We should strive throughout the law for easily administrable bright-line rules, which can be followed by parties with confidence and applied by judges with predictability.”). 57 A reasonable time standard is not foreign to jurisdictional contexts.

2015Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has stated, “The reasonable-time rule is a court-made standard, which has heretofore been applied only in a limited number of cases involving adult plaintiffs who, because of the nature of their claim, did not have a reasonable opportunity to discover their injuries and bring suit within a prescribed limitations period.” Weiner v. Wasson, 900 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. 1995) (emphasis added); Ericson v. Roberts, 910 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1995, no writ) (“To have a valid argument that Section 10.01 was unconstitutional, the Ericsons would have had to alle

2003Compare Shah, 67 S.W.3d at 847 (endorsing a one-year limit to what is considered unreasonable as a matter of law), and Gagnier v. Wichelhaus, 17 S.W.3d 739, 745 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (ten-month delay reasonable when taking into account "delay in providing medical records, the time for recovery, consultation with an attorney and investigation”), and DeRuy v. Garza, 995 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (one-year delay reasonable), and Work v. Duval, 809 S.W.2d 351, 353-354 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (fact that injury was discovered

1996However, under similar circumstances, application of the discovery rule was held to be the proper procedure in Hellman v. Mateo, 772 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex.1989).

1995See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d at 921-22 .

1995See Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d at 921-22 .