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11 Tennessee opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2003 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Crumpgreen2 sentences2001Instead, we hold that a defendant may seek suppression of non-testimonial evidence discovered through his or her unwarned statements only when the statements are the product of an actual violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, i.e., such as when actual coercion in obtaining the statement is involved or when the invocation of the right to remain silent or to have counsel present is not “scrupulously honored.” Cf. State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tenn.1992) (holding that a refusal to honor the right to remain silent, “by definition, is of constitutional magnitude”). 2001Instead, we hold that a defendant may seek suppression of non-testimonial evidence discovered through his or her unwarned statements only when the statements are the product of an actual violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, i.e., such as when actual coercion in obtaining the statement is involved or when the invocation of the right to remain silent or to have counsel present is not "scrupulously honored." Cf. State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 270 (Tenn.1992) (holding that a refusal to honor the right to remain silent, "by definition, is of constitutional magnitude"). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Waltongreen2 sentences2003State v. Walton, 41 S.W.3d 75, 92 (Tenn. 2001). 2001Instead, we hold that a defendant may seek suppression of non-testimonial evidence discovered through his or her unwarned statements only when the statements are the product of an actual violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, i.e., such as when actual coercion in obtaining the statement is involved or when the invocation of the right to remain silent or to have counsel present is not “scrupulously honored.” Walton, 41 S.W.3d at 92 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Turnmiregreen1 sentence2003Id. at 582-83 ; see also State v. Turnmire, 762 S.W.2d 893, 896-97 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Rice v. Stategreen1 sentence2000The Rice Court allowed the jury to consider “the fact of the witness having been directed by the prisoner where to find the goods, and his having found them accordingly,” though it did not allow “the acknowledgment [through the confession] of the prisoner having stolen or put them there.” Id. at 224-25.18 Given these federal and state authorities, we conclude that a per se exclusionary rule, which would automatically exclude non-testimonial evidence obtained from a technical failure to give Miranda warnings, is not warranted. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kirby v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1972In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 , the United States Supreme Court held that the per se exclusionary rule of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 , and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 , does not apply to pre-indictment confrontations. 1972In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 , the United States Supreme Court held that the per se exclusionary rule of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 , and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 , does not apply to pre-indictment confrontations. | 3 | 1972–1980 |
Gilbert v. California
green
2 sentences1972In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 , the United States Supreme Court held that the per se exclusionary rule of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 , and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 , does not apply to pre-indictment confrontations. 1972In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 , the United States Supreme Court held that the per se exclusionary rule of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 , and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 , does not apply to pre-indictment confrontations. | 2 | 1972–1972 |
United States v. Wade
green
2 sentences1972In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 , the United States Supreme Court held that the per se exclusionary rule of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 , and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 , does not apply to pre-indictment confrontations. 1972In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 , 92 S.Ct. 1877 , 32 L.Ed.2d 411 , the United States Supreme Court held that the per se exclusionary rule of United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 , and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , 87 S.Ct. 1951 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 , does not apply to pre-indictment confrontations. | 2 | 1972–1972 |
State v. Callahan
green
1 sentence2003Id. at 582-83 ; see also State v. Turnmire, 762 S.W.2d 893, 896-97 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Benoit
green
2 sentences1998The defendant, however, urges this Court to replace the totality-of-the-cir-cumstanees approach with the per se exclusionary rule adopted by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6 , 490 A.2d 295 (N.H.1985). 1998The defendant, however, urges this Court to replace the totality-of-the-cir-cumstanees approach with the per se exclusionary rule adopted by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Benoit, 126 N.H. 6 , 490 A.2d 295 (N.H.1985). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.