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7 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Cortland Bay Fulton, Also Known as Tairu Owolabi Alabi, Cortland Bay Fulton v. Warden, Ray Brook Correctional Facilitygreen1 sentence2022The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, has applied a per se exclusionary rule in an additional context—‘‘when an attorney is implicated in the crimes of his or her client because the attorney cannot be free from fear that a vigorous defense should lead the prosecutor or the trial judge to discover evidence of the attorney’s own wrongdoing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cardoza v. Rock, supra, 183 , quoting United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1993). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lawrence Salvatore Iorizzogreen1 sentence2022In all other cases, however, including those in which defense counsel previously represented the victim; see e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, supra, 164–65; or previously represented a witness in a case; see, e.g., United States v. Iorizzo, 786 F.2d 52 , 57–58 (2d Cir. 1986); the defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict existed—i.e., one that ‘‘compelled [defense counsel] to compromise his or her duty of loyalty or zealous advocacy to the accused by choosing between or blending the divergent or competing interests of a former or current client.’’ Perillo v. Johnson, supra, 205 F.3d 781 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Courchesnegreen2 sentences2013See State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 710 , 998 A.2d 1 (2010) (“it is axiomatic that those who promulgate statutes ... do not intend to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results” [internal quotation marks omitted]). 2013See State v. Courchesne, 296 Conn. 622, 710 , 998 A.2d 1 (2010) (“it is axiomatic that those who promulgate statutes ... do not intend to promulgate statutes . . . that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results” [internal quotation marks omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Julio Piccinonnagreen2 sentences1997The court did emphasize, however, that “[n] either of these two modifications to the per se exclusionary rule should be construed to preempt or limit in any way the trial court’s discretion to exclude polygraph expert testimony on other grounds under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” Id., 1536 . 1997In United States v. Piccinonna, 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989), the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, sitting en banc, abandoned the per se exclusionary rule regarding polygraph evidence, even before Daubert was decided. 15 “Since the Frye decision, tremendous advances have been made in polygraph instrumentation and technique. 16 Better equip ment is being used by more adequately trained polygraph administrators. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gilbert v. California
green
2 sentences2016Id. 1981Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-74 , 87 S. Ct. 1951 , 18 L. | 2 | 1981–2016 |
Manson v. Brathwaite
green
2 sentences2016Although both the per se exclusionary rule and the Biggers test help to keep unreliable evidence from the jury, "[t]he per se rule ... goes too far since its application automatically and peremptorily, and without consideration of alleviating factors, keeps evidence from the jury that is reliable and relevant." Id., at 112 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 . 2016Although both the per se exclusionary rule and the Biggers test help to keep unreliable evidence from the jury, "[t]he per se rule ... goes too far since its application automatically and peremptorily, and without consideration of alleviating factors, keeps evidence from the jury that is reliable and relevant." Id., at 112 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 . | 2 | 1979–2016 |
Cardoza v. Rock
green
1 sentence2022The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, has applied a per se exclusionary rule in an additional context—‘‘when an attorney is implicated in the crimes of his or her client because the attorney cannot be free from fear that a vigorous defense should lead the prosecutor or the trial judge to discover evidence of the attorney’s own wrongdoing.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cardoza v. Rock, supra, 183 , quoting United States v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1993). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
In re David W.
green
2 sentences2009In re David W., 52 Conn. App. 576, 589-90 , 727 A.2d 264 (1999), rev’d, 254 Conn. 676 , 759 A.2d 89 (2000). 2009In re David W., 52 Conn. App. 576, 589-90 , 727 A.2d 264 (1999), rev’d, 254 Conn. 676 , 759 A.2d 89 (2000). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
In re David W.
neutral
2 sentences2009In re David W., 52 Conn. App. 576, 589-90 , 727 A.2d 264 (1999), rev’d, 254 Conn. 676 , 759 A.2d 89 (2000). 2009In re David W., 52 Conn. App. 576, 589-90 , 727 A.2d 264 (1999), rev’d, 254 Conn. 676 , 759 A.2d 89 (2000). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Rock v. Arkansas
green
1 sentence1997The inaccuracies the process introduces can be reduced, although perhaps not eliminated, by the use of procedural safeguards.” (Citations omitted.) Id., 60 . 32 On the basis of Rock , one commentator has pointed out that a per se exclusionary rule regarding polygraph evidence violates a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Neil v. Biggers
green
2 sentences1979Ed. 2d 401 (1972), the United States Supreme Court expressly declined to adopt a per se exclusionary rule as regards "unnecessarily suggestive" identification procedures, holding instead that the admissibility of such evidence should be determined by "the totality of the circumstances." The court in Biggers emphasized that the central question in such situations is "whether ... the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure [used] was suggestive." Id., 199 . 1979Ed. 2d 401 (1972), the United States Supreme Court expressly declined to adopt a per se exclusionary rule as regards “unnecessarily suggestive” identification, procedures, holding instead that the admissibility of such evidence should be determined by “the totality of the circumstances.” The court in Biggers emphasized that the central question in such situations is “whether . . . the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure [used] was suggestive.” Id., 199 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.