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6 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gilbert v. Californiagreen2 sentences2019As to the pretrial identification testimony the State sought to admit in Gilbert , the Court reasoned that such evidence was the "direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [ ]the primary[ ] illegality,' " and only the sanction of automatic exclusion could assure law enforcement authorities' respect for the accused's right to presence of counsel. 388 U.S. at 272-73, 87 S.Ct. 1951 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 , 488, 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ). ¶33 But as to the in-court identifications in both Wade and Gilbert , the Court reasoned that a per 1973Therefore, defendant argues, reversible error predicated on this previous counselless photo identification occurred in two different facets of the jury trial: first, the trial court failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification made by the service station attendant was independent of the prior photographic identification, in accordance with the standards set forth in Wade, supra, and secondly, that the previous photographic identification of defendant fell within the ambit of the per se exclusionary rule developed by Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 , | 1 | 2 |
Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2019As to the pretrial identification testimony the State sought to admit in Gilbert , the Court reasoned that such evidence was the "direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [ ]the primary[ ] illegality,' " and only the sanction of automatic exclusion could assure law enforcement authorities' respect for the accused's right to presence of counsel. 388 U.S. at 272-73, 87 S.Ct. 1951 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 , 488, 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ). ¶33 But as to the in-court identifications in both Wade and Gilbert , the Court reasoned that a per 2019As to the pretrial identification testimony the State sought to admit in Gilbert , the Court reasoned that such evidence was the "direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [ ]the primary[ ] illegality,' " and only the sanction of automatic exclusion could assure law enforcement authorities' respect for the accused's right to presence of counsel. 388 U.S. at 272-73, 87 S.Ct. 1951 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States , 371 U.S. 471 , 488, 83 S.Ct. 407 , 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ). ¶33 But as to the in-court identifications in both Wade and Gilbert , the Court reasoned that a per | 1 | 1 |
State v. Menagreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226 , 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.1980); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206 , 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981). 1987See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226 , 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.1980); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206 , 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Shirleygreen2 sentences1982See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18 , 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 (1982); Collins v. State, 52 Md.App. 186 , 447 A.2d 1272 (Md.App.1982). 1982See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18 , 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 (1982); Collins v. State, 52 Md.App. 186 , 447 A.2d 1272 (Md.App.1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Wade
green
1 sentence2019Wade , 388 U.S. at 240 , 87 S.Ct. 1926 ; accord Gilbert , 388 U.S. at 272 , 87 S.Ct. 1951 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. MacK
green
2 sentences1987See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226 , 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.1980); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206 , 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981). 1987See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226 , 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.1980); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206 , 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Palmer
green
2 sentences1987See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226 , 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.1980); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206 , 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981). 1987See, e.g., State v. Mena, 128 Ariz. 226 , 624 P.2d 1274 (1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.1980); State v. Palmer, 210 Neb. 206 , 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Collins v. State
green
2 sentences1982See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18 , 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 (1982); Collins v. State, 52 Md.App. 186 , 447 A.2d 1272 (Md.App.1982). 1982See, e.g., People v. Shirley, 31 Cal.3d 18 , 181 Cal.Rptr. 243 , 641 P.2d 775 (1982); Collins v. State, 52 Md.App. 186 , 447 A.2d 1272 (Md.App.1982). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Anderson
green
1 sentence1982By application of the Frye test, a per se exclusionary rule was adopted concerning evidence of polygraph results in People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354 (Colo.1981). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
People v. Atencio
green
2 sentences1980First, he argues that we should abandon the restrictive rule limiting the suppression of evidence in probation revocation proceedings to cases of gross official misconduct, People v. Wilkerson, 189 Colo. 448 , 541 P.2d 896 (1975); People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76 , 525 P.2d 461 (1974), and, in its stead, we should adopt a per se exclusionary rule. 1980First, he argues that we should abandon the restrictive rule limiting the suppression of evidence in probation revocation proceedings to cases of gross official misconduct, People v. Wilkerson, 189 Colo. 448 , 541 P.2d 896 (1975); People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76 , 525 P.2d 461 (1974), and, in its stead, we should adopt a per se exclusionary rule. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Wilkerson
green
2 sentences1980First, he argues that we should abandon the restrictive rule limiting the suppression of evidence in probation revocation proceedings to cases of gross official misconduct, People v. Wilkerson, 189 Colo. 448 , 541 P.2d 896 (1975); People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76 , 525 P.2d 461 (1974), and, in its stead, we should adopt a per se exclusionary rule. 1980First, he argues that we should abandon the restrictive rule limiting the suppression of evidence in probation revocation proceedings to cases of gross official misconduct, People v. Wilkerson, 189 Colo. 448 , 541 P.2d 896 (1975); People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76 , 525 P.2d 461 (1974), and, in its stead, we should adopt a per se exclusionary rule. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Simmons v. United States
green
2 sentences1976He would therefore have us apply the per se exclusionary rule of Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 , and hold that Mrs. McVay’s in-court identification should not have been permitted. 1976He would therefore have us apply the per se exclusionary rule of Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 , and hold that Mrs. McVay’s in-court identification should not have been permitted. | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.