11 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1903–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Frye v. United Statesred2 sentences2002The seminal case [18] on the admissibility of scientific evidence is Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 , 54 App. D.C. 46 (1923), wherein the court succinctly stated: Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. 2002The seminal case [18] on the admissibility of scientific evidence is Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 , 54 App. D.C. 46 (1923), wherein the court succinctly stated: Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. | 3 | 8 |
State v. Clawsongreen2 sentences2013Syllabus point 1 of Barker provides that “ ‘[i]n order for a scientific test to be initially admissible, there must be general acceptance of the scientific principle which underlies the test.’ Syl. pt. 7, State v. Clawson, 165 W.Va. 588 , 270 S.E.2d 659 (1980).” We reject Ms. McCormick’s reliance on Syllabus point 1 of Barker . 2013Syllabus point 1 of Barker provides that “ ‘[i]n order for a scientific test to be initially admissible, there must be general acceptance of the scientific principle which underlies the test.’ Syl. pt. 7, State v. Clawson, 165 W.Va. 588 , 270 S.E.2d 659 (1980).” We reject Ms. McCormick’s reliance on Syllabus point 1 of Barker . | 1 | 4 |
State v. Leepgreen2 sentences2013First, Ms. McCormick has failed to realize that the “general acceptance” test under Barker and Clawson was expressly overruled by Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993). 11 See State v. Leep, 212 W.Va. 57, 67 , 569 S.E.2d 133, 143 (2002) (“[T]he prior ‘general acceptance’ standard ... is obsolete and has been replaced by the more liberal determinative criteria enunciated in Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)1 Wilt, Gentry [v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512 , 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995) ], and Rule 702 of the Federal and West V 2013First, Ms. McCormick has failed to realize that the “general acceptance” test under Barker and Clawson was expressly overruled by Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993). 11 See State v. Leep, 212 W.Va. 57, 67 , 569 S.E.2d 133, 143 (2002) (“[T]he prior ‘general acceptance’ standard ... is obsolete and has been replaced by the more liberal determinative criteria enunciated in Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)1 Wilt, Gentry [v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512 , 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995) ], and Rule 702 of the Federal and West V | 1 | 1 |
State v. Armstronggreen2 sentences1994As we stated in Syllabus Point 8 of Clawson , where the scientific test is generally accepted, it can be judicially noticed and the expert need not demonstrate its scientific validity. [5] We also stated in note 4 of State v. Armstrong, 179 W.Va. at 439-40, 369 S.E.2d at 874-75 (1988), that there is a general trend under Rule 702 to liberalize the Frye rule: "An increasing number of the courts and many of the leading commentators interpret Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which is identical to our Rule 702, as limiting the Frye `general acceptance' test to a test solely for determini 1994As we stated in Syllabus Point 8 of Clawson , where the scientific test is generally accepted, it can be judicially noticed and the expert need not demonstrate its scientific validity. [5] We also stated in note 4 of State v. Armstrong, 179 W.Va. at 439-40, 369 S.E.2d at 874-75 (1988), that there is a general trend under Rule 702 to liberalize the Frye rule: "An increasing number of the courts and many of the leading commentators interpret Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which is identical to our Rule 702, as limiting the Frye `general acceptance' test to a test solely for determini | 1 | 1 |
State v. Woodallgreen2 sentences1994Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 54 App.D.C. at 47 , 293 F. at 1014 . [5] We elaborated on this point in State v. Woodall, 182 W.Va. 15, 22 , 385 S.E.2d 253, 260 (1989): "The basic reliability of scientific tests is often at issue when such evidence is ad 1994Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." 54 App.D.C. at 47 , 293 F. at 1014 . [5] We elaborated on this point in State v. Woodall, 182 W.Va. 15, 22 , 385 S.E.2d 253, 260 (1989): "The basic reliability of scientific tests is often at issue when such evidence is ad | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Carl Joseph Baller, Jr.green1 sentence1980United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic test for hair identification); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163-164 (8th Cir. 1975) (polygraph); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. W. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Steven John Alexandergreen1 sentence1980United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic test for hair identification); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163-164 (8th Cir. 1975) (polygraph); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. W. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Hayward Leslie Browngreen2 sentences1980United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40 , 396 N.E.2d 735 , 421 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1979). *618 Undoubtedly there are certain scientific tests that have been widely used over a long period of time, such that their general acceptance in the scientific community can be judicially noticed. 1980United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 556 (6th Cir. 1977) (ion microprobic test for hair identification); United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 163-164 (8th Cir. 1975) (polygraph); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. W. | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. Stategreen2 sentences1980Va. _, 267 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1980), recognized that one technique to ensure a fair trial where adverse publicity existed was to permit “a thorough and individual voir dire of the jury.” 14 Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381 , 391 A.2d 364, 367-68 (1978), made this observation on the standard for reliability of a scientific test as it relates to a trial court’s discretion: “The question of the reliability of a scientific technique or process is unlike the question, for example, of the helpfulness of particular expert testimony to the trier of facts in a specific case. 1980Va. _, 267 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1980), recognized that one technique to ensure a fair trial where adverse publicity existed was to permit “a thorough and individual voir dire of the jury.” 14 Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381 , 391 A.2d 364, 367-68 (1978), made this observation on the standard for reliability of a scientific test as it relates to a trial court’s discretion: “The question of the reliability of a scientific technique or process is unlike the question, for example, of the helpfulness of particular expert testimony to the trier of facts in a specific case. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Herald Mail Co. v. Hamiltongreen1 sentence1980Va. _, 267 S.E.2d 544, 550 (1980), recognized that one technique to ensure a fair trial where adverse publicity existed was to permit “a thorough and individual voir dire of the jury.” 14 Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 381 , 391 A.2d 364, 367-68 (1978), made this observation on the standard for reliability of a scientific test as it relates to a trial court’s discretion: “The question of the reliability of a scientific technique or process is unlike the question, for example, of the helpfulness of particular expert testimony to the trier of facts in a specific case. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
2 sentences2013First, Ms. McCormick has failed to realize that the “general acceptance” test under Barker and Clawson was expressly overruled by Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993). 11 See State v. Leep, 212 W.Va. 57, 67 , 569 S.E.2d 133, 143 (2002) (“[T]he prior ‘general acceptance’ standard ... is obsolete and has been replaced by the more liberal determinative criteria enunciated in Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)1 Wilt, Gentry [v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512 , 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995) ], and Rule 702 of the Federal and West V 2013First, Ms. McCormick has failed to realize that the “general acceptance” test under Barker and Clawson was expressly overruled by Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993). 11 See State v. Leep, 212 W.Va. 57, 67 , 569 S.E.2d 133, 143 (2002) (“[T]he prior ‘general acceptance’ standard ... is obsolete and has been replaced by the more liberal determinative criteria enunciated in Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)1 Wilt, Gentry [v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512 , 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995) ], and Rule 702 of the Federal and West V | 2 | 2002–2013 |
State v. Barker
green
2 sentences1988In syllabus point 7 of State v. Clawson, 165 W.Va. 588 , 270 S.E.2d 659 (1980), the Court held: "In order for a scientific test to be initially admissible, there must be general acceptance of the scientific principle which underlies the test.” Accord, syl. pt. 1, State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988) (Horizontal Gaze Nystag-mus test to estimate blood alcohol content). 1988In syllabus point 7 of State v. Clawson, 165 W.Va. 588 , 270 S.E.2d 659 (1980), the Court held: "In order for a scientific test to be initially admissible, there must be general acceptance of the scientific principle which underlies the test.” Accord, syl. pt. 1, State v. Barker, 179 W.Va. 194 , 366 S.E.2d 642 (1988) (Horizontal Gaze Nystag-mus test to estimate blood alcohol content). | 2 | 1988–1994 |
Gentry v. Mangum
green
2 sentences2013First, Ms. McCormick has failed to realize that the “general acceptance” test under Barker and Clawson was expressly overruled by Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993). 11 See State v. Leep, 212 W.Va. 57, 67 , 569 S.E.2d 133, 143 (2002) (“[T]he prior ‘general acceptance’ standard ... is obsolete and has been replaced by the more liberal determinative criteria enunciated in Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)1 Wilt, Gentry [v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512 , 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995) ], and Rule 702 of the Federal and West V 2013First, Ms. McCormick has failed to realize that the “general acceptance” test under Barker and Clawson was expressly overruled by Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993). 11 See State v. Leep, 212 W.Va. 57, 67 , 569 S.E.2d 133, 143 (2002) (“[T]he prior ‘general acceptance’ standard ... is obsolete and has been replaced by the more liberal determinative criteria enunciated in Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)1 Wilt, Gentry [v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512 , 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995) ], and Rule 702 of the Federal and West V | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Wilt v. Buracker
green
2 sentences2013First, Ms. McCormick has failed to realize that the “general acceptance” test under Barker and Clawson was expressly overruled by Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993). 11 See State v. Leep, 212 W.Va. 57, 67 , 569 S.E.2d 133, 143 (2002) (“[T]he prior ‘general acceptance’ standard ... is obsolete and has been replaced by the more liberal determinative criteria enunciated in Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)1 Wilt, Gentry [v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512 , 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995) ], and Rule 702 of the Federal and West V 2013First, Ms. McCormick has failed to realize that the “general acceptance” test under Barker and Clawson was expressly overruled by Wilt v. Buracker, 191 W.Va. 39 , 443 S.E.2d 196 (1993). 11 See State v. Leep, 212 W.Va. 57, 67 , 569 S.E.2d 133, 143 (2002) (“[T]he prior ‘general acceptance’ standard ... is obsolete and has been replaced by the more liberal determinative criteria enunciated in Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)1 Wilt, Gentry [v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512 , 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995) ], and Rule 702 of the Federal and West V | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
green
2 sentences2012Second, she noted that the surrogate expert was not a “supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue.” Id. 2012Rather, the surrogate “played no role in producing the BAC report and did not observe any portion of [the analyst’s] conduct of the testing.” Id. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Geary Land Co. v. Conley
green
2 sentences1988We need not reach the Frye issue in the present case. 4 The harmless error rule, Rule 61 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to this assignment of error involving the admissibility of expert testimony on the novel prosthesis. 5 In syllabus point 2 of Boggs v. Settle, 150 W.Va. 330 , 145 S.E.2d 446 (1965), the Court held: “On appeal of a case involving an action covered by the Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court will disregard and regard as harmless any error, defect or irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court which does not affect the substantial rights of the par 1988We need not reach the Frye issue in the present case. 4 The harmless error rule, Rule 61 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to this assignment of error involving the admissibility of expert testimony on the novel prosthesis. 5 In syllabus point 2 of Boggs v. Settle, 150 W.Va. 330 , 145 S.E.2d 446 (1965), the Court held: “On appeal of a case involving an action covered by the Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court will disregard and regard as harmless any error, defect or irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court which does not affect the substantial rights of the par | 1 | 1988–1988 |
McAllister v. Weirton Hospital Co.
green
2 sentences1988We need not reach the Frye issue in the present case. 4 The harmless error rule, Rule 61 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to this assignment of error involving the admissibility of expert testimony on the novel prosthesis. 5 In syllabus point 2 of Boggs v. Settle, 150 W.Va. 330 , 145 S.E.2d 446 (1965), the Court held: “On appeal of a case involving an action covered by the Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court will disregard and regard as harmless any error, defect or irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court which does not affect the substantial rights of the par 1988We need not reach the Frye issue in the present case. 4 The harmless error rule, Rule 61 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to this assignment of error involving the admissibility of expert testimony on the novel prosthesis. 5 In syllabus point 2 of Boggs v. Settle, 150 W.Va. 330 , 145 S.E.2d 446 (1965), the Court held: “On appeal of a case involving an action covered by the Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court will disregard and regard as harmless any error, defect or irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court which does not affect the substantial rights of the par | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Boggs v. Settle
green
2 sentences1988We need not reach the Frye issue in the present case. 4 The harmless error rule, Rule 61 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to this assignment of error involving the admissibility of expert testimony on the novel prosthesis. 5 In syllabus point 2 of Boggs v. Settle, 150 W.Va. 330 , 145 S.E.2d 446 (1965), the Court held: “On appeal of a case involving an action covered by the Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court will disregard and regard as harmless any error, defect or irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court which does not affect the substantial rights of the par 1988We need not reach the Frye issue in the present case. 4 The harmless error rule, Rule 61 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to this assignment of error involving the admissibility of expert testimony on the novel prosthesis. 5 In syllabus point 2 of Boggs v. Settle, 150 W.Va. 330 , 145 S.E.2d 446 (1965), the Court held: “On appeal of a case involving an action covered by the Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court will disregard and regard as harmless any error, defect or irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court which does not affect the substantial rights of the par | 1 | 1988–1988 |
ORIGINAL GLORIOUS CHURCH OF GOD v. Myers
green
1 sentence1988We need not reach the Frye issue in the present case. 4 The harmless error rule, Rule 61 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to this assignment of error involving the admissibility of expert testimony on the novel prosthesis. 5 In syllabus point 2 of Boggs v. Settle, 150 W.Va. 330 , 145 S.E.2d 446 (1965), the Court held: “On appeal of a case involving an action covered by the Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court will disregard and regard as harmless any error, defect or irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court which does not affect the substantial rights of the par | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Original Glorious Church of God In Christ, Inc. of the Apostolic Faith v. Myers
green
1 sentence1988We need not reach the Frye issue in the present case. 4 The harmless error rule, Rule 61 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, applies to this assignment of error involving the admissibility of expert testimony on the novel prosthesis. 5 In syllabus point 2 of Boggs v. Settle, 150 W.Va. 330 , 145 S.E.2d 446 (1965), the Court held: “On appeal of a case involving an action covered by the Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court will disregard and regard as harmless any error, defect or irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court which does not affect the substantial rights of the par | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Hood
green
1 sentence1980In State v. Hood, 155 W. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
People v. Allweiss
green
2 sentences1980United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40 , 396 N.E.2d 735 , 421 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1979). *618 Undoubtedly there are certain scientific tests that have been widely used over a long period of time, such that their general acceptance in the scientific community can be judicially noticed. 1980United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40 , 396 N.E.2d 735 , 421 N.Y.S.2d 341 (1979). *618 Undoubtedly there are certain scientific tests that have been widely used over a long period of time, such that their general acceptance in the scientific community can be judicially noticed. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Insurance Co. v. Boon
green
1 sentence1903J., said: “That which is the actual cause of the loss, whether operating directly or by putting intervening agencies, the operation of which could not be reasonably avoided, in motion, by which the loss is produced, is the cause to which such loss should be attributed.” These principles are approved in Insurance Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S. 117 . | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Brady v. North Western Insurance
neutral
1 sentence1903Phillips on Insurance, Section 1093, says: “If two causes conspire and one must be chosen, the more scientific inquiry seems to be, whether one is not the efficient cause, and the other merely instrumental or merely incidental, and not which is nearer in place or time to the consummation of the catastrophe.” At Section 1132, the same work says: “In case of the concurrence of different causes, to one of which it is necessary to attribute the' loss, it is to be attributed to the efficient predominating peril, whether it is or is not in activity at the consummation of the disaster.” In Brady v. I | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.