scientific principle in California

2026Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013, 1014 , involving the admissibility of polygraph tests: ‘Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.

2026Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013, 1014 , involving the admissibility of polygraph tests: ‘Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.

1997The courts have consistently held that whether the test is a polygraph test, or a sodium amytal or sodium pentothal test, the results are not such as to be admissible for or against the defendant because of a lack of scientific certainty about the results. [Citations.]” (Italics added.) 9 Although Jones did not cite Frye by name, 10 the California Supreme Court later explained in Huntingdon v. Crowley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 647 , *117 653-654 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 254 , 414 P.2d 382 ], that it had applied the Frye test in Jones , stating: “ ‘Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be

1997The courts have consistently held that whether the test is a polygraph test, or a sodium amytal or sodium pentothal test, the results are not such as to be admissible for or against the defendant because of a lack of scientific certainty about the results. [Citations.]” (Italics added.) 9 Although Jones did not cite Frye by name, 10 the California Supreme Court later explained in Huntingdon v. Crowley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 647 , *117 653-654 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 254 , 414 P.2d 382 ], that it had applied the Frye test in Jones , stating: “ ‘Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be

2025Alvarez argues that the testimony was not properly scrutinized for the scientific requirement for admissibility under People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30 (Kelly) in a hearing12 and was not relevant, thereby prejudicially violating his state and federal rights to a fair trial.

2013In 1993, the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded Frye [citation], and our state law rule is now referred to simply as the Kelly test or rule. [Citation.]” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 545 .) 53. that decision is affirmed on appeal by a published appellate decision, the precedent so established may control subsequent trials, at least until new evidence is presented reflecting a change in the attitude of the scientific community.” (Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 32 ; Venegas, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 53 .) Thus, a defendant is not foreclos

2022(Id. at p. 662.) In a concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor made several observations “to emphasize the limited reach of the Court’s opinion.” (Bullcoming, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 668 (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.).) As relevant here, Justice Sotomayor observed, “this is not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue. . . .

2013(Bullcoming, supra, 564 U.S. at p. __ [ 131 S.Ct. at p. 2722 ] (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.).) Second, because the surrogate analyst testified that he had no part in producing any portion of the report and did not observe the testing process, “this is not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue.” ( Bullcoming, supra, 564 U.S. at p.__[ 131 S.Ct. at p. 2722 ] (conc. opn. of Sotomayor, J.).) For example, a supervisor who observed an analyst conducting the test might be allowed to t

1974Unquestionably, the trial court enjoys great latitude in determining the qualification of an expert, and its determination will not normally be disturbed on appeal. *75 (People v. Busch (1961) 56 Cal.2d 868, 878 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 898 , 366 P.2d 314 ]; Huffman v. Lindquist (1951) 37 Cal.2d 465, 476 [ 234 P.2d 34 , 29 A.L.R.2d 485 ]; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 1175, p. 1088.) While there have been some statements that the same amount of discretion rests in the trial court to determine whether a new scientific test or process has passed from the experimental into the demonstrable stage an

1974Unquestionably, the trial court enjoys great latitude in determining the qualification of an expert, and its determination will not normally be disturbed on appeal. *75 (People v. Busch (1961) 56 Cal.2d 868, 878 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 898 , 366 P.2d 314 ]; Huffman v. Lindquist (1951) 37 Cal.2d 465, 476 [ 234 P.2d 34 , 29 A.L.R.2d 485 ]; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 1175, p. 1088.) While there have been some statements that the same amount of discretion rests in the trial court to determine whether a new scientific test or process has passed from the experimental into the demonstrable stage an

1974Unquestionably, the trial court enjoys great latitude in determining the qualification of an expert, and its determination will not normally be disturbed on appeal. *75 (People v. Busch (1961) 56 Cal.2d 868, 878 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 898 , 366 P.2d 314 ]; Huffman v. Lindquist (1951) 37 Cal.2d 465, 476 [ 234 P.2d 34 , 29 A.L.R.2d 485 ]; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 1175, p. 1088.) While there have been some statements that the same amount of discretion rests in the trial court to determine whether a new scientific test or process has passed from the experimental into the demonstrable stage an

1974Unquestionably, the trial court enjoys great latitude in determining the qualification of an expert, and its determination will not normally be disturbed on appeal. *75 (People v. Busch (1961) 56 Cal.2d 868, 878 [ 16 Cal.Rptr. 898 , 366 P.2d 314 ]; Huffman v. Lindquist (1951) 37 Cal.2d 465, 476 [ 234 P.2d 34 , 29 A.L.R.2d 485 ]; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) § 1175, p. 1088.) While there have been some statements that the same amount of discretion rests in the trial court to determine whether a new scientific test or process has passed from the experimental into the demonstrable stage an

2013(People v. Allen (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1100-1101 ; People v. Smith (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 19, 25 .) We independently review the trial court‟s first-prong rulings on general acceptance.

2013(People v. Allen (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1100-1101 ; People v. Smith (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 19, 25 .) We independently review the trial court‟s first-prong rulings on general acceptance.

1997(See, e.g., People v. Jones[, supra,] 52 Cal.2d [at p.] 653 . . . [‘truth serum’]; People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737 , 752 . . . [Tie detector’ test] . . . .)” (Huntingdon v. Crowley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at pp. 653-654.) Fourteen years after Jones wás decided, an appellate court rejected the reliability of sodium amytal interviews in People v. Johnson (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 988 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 118 ], where a videotape of the defendant’s sodium amytal interview had been admitted over his objection.

1966(See, e.g., People v. Jones (1959) 52 Cal.2d 636, 653 [ 343 P.2d 577 ] [“truth serum”] ; People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737, 752 [ 312 P.2d 665 ] [“lie detector” test] ; cf. People v. Williams (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d Supp. 858, 860-862 [ 331 P.2d 251 ] [“Nalline” test].) In applying this rule the trial court considered, in the absence of the jury, the testimony of Drs.

1994The Attorney General also observes that the Kelly/Frye test is uncertain in various respects, such as (1) whether, and to what extent, it applies to expert testimony (see People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 372-373 [ 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 , 46 A.L.R.4th 1011 ]), (2) whether there must be general acceptance of the scientific technique itself or merely the scientific principle underlying it, (3) whether "probability estimates" (e.g., in DNA cases) are subject to Kelly/Frye, (4) what is the "relevant" scientific community, and (5) what constitutes "general acceptance" (e.g., a si

1994The Attorney General also observes that the Kelly/Frye test is uncertain in various respects, such as (1) whether, and to what extent, it applies to expert testimony (see People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 372-373 [ 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 , 690 P.2d 709 , 46 A.L.R.4th 1011 ]), (2) whether there must be general acceptance of the scientific technique itself or merely the scientific principle underlying it, (3) whether "probability estimates" (e.g., in DNA cases) are subject to Kelly/Frye, (4) what is the "relevant" scientific community, and (5) what constitutes "general acceptance" (e.g., a si

1973(Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal.2d 647 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 254 , 414 P.2d 382]; People v. King, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d 437, 443 ; People v. Williams, 164 Cal.App.2d Supp. 858 [ 331 P.2d 251 ].) “The determination of whether a scientific test has received general acceptance by recognized experts in the field so as to- justify the admission of expert testimony based on the results of the test is primarily a question of fact for the trial court. [Citations.] “The trial court enjoys considerable latitude in determining the qualifi *785 cation of an expert.

1973(Huntingdon v. Crowley, 64 Cal.2d 647 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 254 , 414 P.2d 382]; People v. King, supra, 266 Cal.App.2d 437, 443 ; People v. Williams, 164 Cal.App.2d Supp. 858 [ 331 P.2d 251 ].) “The determination of whether a scientific test has received general acceptance by recognized experts in the field so as to- justify the admission of expert testimony based on the results of the test is primarily a question of fact for the trial court. [Citations.] “The trial court enjoys considerable latitude in determining the qualifi *785 cation of an expert.

2020DISCUSSION Standard of Review In order to overturn OEHHA’s listing of DINP, Chemistry must show OEHHA’s action is “inconsistent with the governing statute, section 25249.8.” (Western Crop Protection Assn. v. Davis (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 741, 757 .) A review of OEHHA’s scientific analysis regarding a chemical’s listing under Proposition 65 requires deference: “ ‘ “[I]n technical matters requiring the assistance of experts and the study of marshaled scientific data as reflected herein, courts will permit administrative agencies to work out their problems with as little judicial interference as po

2007(See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Verde, supra, 827 N.E.2d at p. 705 ["Certificates of chemical analysis ... merely state the results of a well-recognized scientific test determining the composition and quantity of a substance]; State v. Lackey, supra, 120 P.3d at p. 352 [Preclusion of autopsy report because of unavailability of medical examiner would be "a harsh and unnecessary result in light of the fact that autopsy reports generally make routine and descriptive observations of the physical body ..."]; People v. Brown, supra, 801 N.Y.S.2d at p. p. 711 ["The notes and records of the laboratory tec

2007(See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Verde, supra, 827 N.E.2d at p. 705 [“Certificates of chemical analysis . . . merely state the results of a well-recognized scientific test determining the composition and quantity of the substance”]; State v. Lackey, supra, 120 P.3d at p. 351 [Preclusion of autopsy report because of unavailability of medical examiner would be “a harsh and unnecessary result in light of the fact that autopsy reports generally make routine and descriptive observations of the physical body . . . .”]; People v. Brown, supra, 801 N.Y.S.2d at p. 711 [“The notes and records of the laborato

2007In People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 414 P.2d 633 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 540 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 ], and People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 442 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 ], our Supreme Court rejected a claim of unlawful search and seizure “predicated on the fact that the automobile was removed from the. scene and the trunk opened and searched subsequently.” (People v. Talbot, supra, at p. 708.) Discovery of blood on the automobile and other circumstances warranted transporting it “for a later, mor

2007In People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 414 P.2d 633 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 540 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 ], and People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 442 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 ], our Supreme Court rejected a claim of unlawful search and seizure “predicated on the fact that the automobile was removed from the. scene and the trunk opened and searched subsequently.” (People v. Talbot, supra, at p. 708.) Discovery of blood on the automobile and other circumstances warranted transporting it “for a later, mor

2007In People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 414 P.2d 633 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 540 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 ], and People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 442 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 ], our Supreme Court rejected a claim of unlawful search and seizure “predicated on the fact that the automobile was removed from the. scene and the trunk opened and searched subsequently.” (People v. Talbot, supra, at p. 708.) Discovery of blood on the automobile and other circumstances warranted transporting it “for a later, mor

2007In People v. Talbot (1966) 64 Cal.2d 691 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 414 P.2d 633 ], overruled on other grounds in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 540 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 450 P.2d 580 ], and People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 442 [ 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 ], our Supreme Court rejected a claim of unlawful search and seizure “predicated on the fact that the automobile was removed from the. scene and the trunk opened and searched subsequently.” (People v. Talbot, supra, at p. 708.) Discovery of blood on the automobile and other circumstances warranted transporting it “for a later, mor

2007Rules Evid, rule 803(6), 28 U.S.C.; United States v. Ellis, supra, 460 F.3d at pp. 926-927.) [12] Thus, we find unpersuasive those cases, cited above, holding that under Davis various types of forensic evidence in the form of laboratory reports were testimonial because their primary purpose was to establish a fact at trial regarding the defendant's guilt of the charged crime. ( State v. March, supra, 216 S.W.3d 663 (Mo.2007); State v. Kent, supra, 391 N.J.Super. 352 , 918 A.2d 626 ; State v. Miller, supra, 208 Or.App. 424 , 144 P.3d 1052 .) This reading of Davis equates a testimonial statement

2007Rules Evid, rule 803(6), 28 U.S.C.; United States v. Ellis, supra, 460 F.3d at pp. 926-927.) [12] Thus, we find unpersuasive those cases, cited above, holding that under Davis various types of forensic evidence in the form of laboratory reports were testimonial because their primary purpose was to establish a fact at trial regarding the defendant's guilt of the charged crime. ( State v. March, supra, 216 S.W.3d 663 (Mo.2007); State v. Kent, supra, 391 N.J.Super. 352 , 918 A.2d 626 ; State v. Miller, supra, 208 Or.App. 424 , 144 P.3d 1052 .) This reading of Davis equates a testimonial statement

2007Rules Evid, rule 803(6), 28 U.S.C.; United States v. Ellis, supra, 460 F.3d at pp. 926-927.) [12] Thus, we find unpersuasive those cases, cited above, holding that under Davis various types of forensic evidence in the form of laboratory reports were testimonial because their primary purpose was to establish a fact at trial regarding the defendant's guilt of the charged crime. ( State v. March, supra, 216 S.W.3d 663 (Mo.2007); State v. Kent, supra, 391 N.J.Super. 352 , 918 A.2d 626 ; State v. Miller, supra, 208 Or.App. 424 , 144 P.3d 1052 .) This reading of Davis equates a testimonial statement

2007Rules Evid., rule 803(6), 28 U.S.C.; see U.S. v. Ellis, supra, 460 F.3d at pp. 926-927.) 12 Thus, we find unpersuasive those cases, cited above, holding that under Davis various types of forensic evidence in the form of laboratory reports were testimonial because their primary purpose was to establish a fact at trial regarding the defendant’s guilt of the charged crime.

2007(See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Verde, supra, 827 N.E.2d at p. 705 ["Certificates of chemical analysis ... merely state the results of a well-recognized scientific test determining the composition and quantity of a substance]; State v. Lackey, supra, 120 P.3d at p. 352 [Preclusion of autopsy report because of unavailability of medical examiner would be "a harsh and unnecessary result in light of the fact that autopsy reports generally make routine and descriptive observations of the physical body ..."]; People v. Brown, supra, 801 N.Y.S.2d at p. p. 711 ["The notes and records of the laboratory tec

2007(See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Verde, supra, 827 N.E.2d at p. 705 [“Certificates of chemical analysis . . . merely state the results of a well-recognized scientific test determining the composition and quantity of the substance”]; State v. Lackey, supra, 120 P.3d at p. 351 [Preclusion of autopsy report because of unavailability of medical examiner would be “a harsh and unnecessary result in light of the fact that autopsy reports generally make routine and descriptive observations of the physical body . . . .”]; People v. Brown, supra, 801 N.Y.S.2d at p. 711 [“The notes and records of the laborato