scientific principle in Connecticut

2017"Once the validity of a scientific principle has been satisfactorily established, any remaining questions regarding the manner in which that technique was applied in a particular case is generally an issue of fact that goes to weight, and not admissibility." (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 88 n.31, 698 A.2d 739 .

2007Second, it is well settled that, "[o]nce the validity of a scientific principle has been satisfactorily established, any remaining *870 questions regarding the manner in which that technique was applied in a particular case . . . generally [present] an issue of fact that goes to weight, and not admissibility." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 88 n. 31, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S.Ct. 1384 , 140 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998); accord State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540, 551-52 , 757 A.2d 482 (2000) (rejecting defendant's claim that trial court improperly admitte

1987Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’ Id., 1014 .

1987Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Frye v. United States, supra, 1014 .

2016Id., at 279-86 [ 604 A.2d 793 ].

2010Finally, it is well established that “[t]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility [and relevancy] of evidence. . . . [Accordingly] [t]he trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion. . . . [Consistent [therewith] ... a trial court’s ruling on a Porter issue is subject to an abuse of discretion standard on appeal”; (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Kirsch, 263 Conn. 390, 399 , 820 A.2d 236 (2003); as is the court’s determination that the probative value of evid

2010Finally, it is well established that “[t]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility [and relevancy] of evidence. . . . [Accordingly] [t]he trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discretion. . . . [Consistent [therewith] ... a trial court’s ruling on a Porter issue is subject to an abuse of discretion standard on appeal”; (citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Kirsch, 263 Conn. 390, 399 , 820 A.2d 236 (2003); as is the court’s determination that the probative value of evid

2007Second, it is well settled that, “[o]nce the validity of a scientific principle has been satisfactorily established, any remaining questions regarding the manner in which that technique was applied in a particular case . . . generally [present] an issue of fact that goes to weight, and not admissibility.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 88 n.31, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2007Second, it is well settled that, "[o]nce the validity of a scientific principle has been satisfactorily established, any remaining *870 questions regarding the manner in which that technique was applied in a particular case . . . generally [present] an issue of fact that goes to weight, and not admissibility." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 88 n. 31, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S.Ct. 1384 , 140 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998); accord State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540, 551-52 , 757 A.2d 482 (2000) (rejecting defendant's claim that trial court improperly admitte

2007Second, it is well settled that, “[o]nce the validity of a scientific principle has been satisfactorily established, any remaining questions regarding the manner in which that technique was applied in a particular case . . . generally [present] an issue of fact that goes to weight, and not admissibility.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 88 n.31, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2007Second, it is well settled that, "[o]nce the validity of a scientific principle has been satisfactorily established, any remaining *870 questions regarding the manner in which that technique was applied in a particular case . . . generally [present] an issue of fact that goes to weight, and not admissibility." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 88 n. 31, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S.Ct. 1384 , 140 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998); accord State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540, 551-52 , 757 A.2d 482 (2000) (rejecting defendant's claim that trial court improperly admitte

2007Second, it is well settled that, “[o]nce the validity of a scientific principle has been satisfactorily established, any remaining questions regarding the manner in which that technique was applied in a particular case . . . generally [present] an issue of fact that goes to weight, and not admissibility.” (Emphasis in original.) State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 88 n.31, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S. Ct. 1384 , 140 L.

2007Second, it is well settled that, "[o]nce the validity of a scientific principle has been satisfactorily established, any remaining *870 questions regarding the manner in which that technique was applied in a particular case . . . generally [present] an issue of fact that goes to weight, and not admissibility." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57 , 88 n. 31, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058 , 118 S.Ct. 1384 , 140 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998); accord State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540, 551-52 , 757 A.2d 482 (2000) (rejecting defendant's claim that trial court improperly admitte

2005See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 266 Ga. App. 233, 236-37 , 596 S.E.2d 725 (concluding that challenge to administration of test pertains to weight of evidence, not to admissibility), cert. denied, 2004 Ga. LEXIS 772 (September 7, 2004); State v. Ito, supra, 90 Haw. 239 (same); Fargo v. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700, 707 (N.D. 1994) (same); Smith v. State, 11 P.3d 931 , 936 (Wyo. 2000) (same). 10 Indeed, our Supreme Court stated in Porter that “[ojnce the validity of a scientific principle has been *580 satisfactorily established, any remaining questions regarding the manner in which that technique was

2002(Emphasis in original.) "Several factors properly may play a role in a court's assessment of the validity of a scientific methodology." State v. Pappas, supra , 256 Conn. at 876 .

1994In holding that the Frye test is “not a necessary precondition for the admission of expert testimony on battered woman’s syndrome”; State v. Borelli, 227 Conn. 153, 165 , 629 A.2d 1105 (1993); the court stated that it “does not apply the Frye test to all types of expert testimony, even if technical or scientific concepts are involved.

1994In holding that the Frye test is “not a necessary precondition for the admission of expert testimony on battered woman’s syndrome”; State v. Borelli, 227 Conn. 153, 165 , 629 A.2d 1105 (1993); the court stated that it “does not apply the Frye test to all types of expert testimony, even if technical or scientific concepts are involved.

1993Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hasan, 205 Conn. 485, 489 , 534 A.2d 877 (1987).

1993Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Hasan, 205 Conn. 485, 489 , 534 A.2d 877 (1987).

1993We recognize that the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

1993We recognize that the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 2786 , 125 L.

1992We do not agree with the trial court, and we conclude that a scientific test or experiment, within the plain meaning of § 769, requires “more than the mere inspection of [tangible objects].” United States v. Peters, supra, 1426 .

1987The Frye “general acceptance” test has been employed to assess the admissibility of spectrographic voice analysis; People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24 , 549 P.2d 1240 , 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191 , 327 N.E. 2d 671 (1975); ion microprobic analysis of hair samples; United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); and hypnotically refreshed recollection.

1987The Frye “general acceptance” test has been employed to assess the admissibility of spectrographic voice analysis; People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24 , 549 P.2d 1240 , 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191 , 327 N.E. 2d 671 (1975); ion microprobic analysis of hair samples; United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); and hypnotically refreshed recollection.

1987The Frye “general acceptance” test has been employed to assess the admissibility of spectrographic voice analysis; People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24 , 549 P.2d 1240 , 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191 , 327 N.E. 2d 671 (1975); ion microprobic analysis of hair samples; United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); and hypnotically refreshed recollection.

1987The Frye “general acceptance” test has been employed to assess the admissibility of spectrographic voice analysis; People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24 , 549 P.2d 1240 , 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191 , 327 N.E. 2d 671 (1975); ion microprobic analysis of hair samples; United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); and hypnotically refreshed recollection.

1987The Frye “general acceptance” test has been employed to assess the admissibility of spectrographic voice analysis; People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24 , 549 P.2d 1240 , 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191 , 327 N.E. 2d 671 (1975); ion microprobic analysis of hair samples; United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); and hypnotically refreshed recollection.

1986United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 , 18 L.

1986United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 , 87 S. Ct. 1926 , 18 L.

1963“The speed of an automobile is not, strictly speaking, a scientific inquiry.” 5 Berry, Automobiles (7th Ed.) § 5.274; see Porcello v. Finnan, 113 Conn. 730, 732 ; Gardiner v. Hayes, 128 Conn. 332, 335 .