scientific principle in Florida

2019Moreover, “[i]n utilizing the Frye test, the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply that principle to the facts of the case at hand.” Ramirez v. State, 651 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995).

2018Under Frye , "the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply that principle to the facts of the case at hand." Ramirez v. State , 651 So.2d 1164 , 1168 (Fla. 1995).

2018Cir. 1923), a short opinion, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia pronounced that the line between when a scientific discovery or principle crosses from experimental to demonstrable is indiscernible so that courts would do better "admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery." Id. at 1014 .

2018Cir. 1923), a short opinion, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia pronounced that the line between when a scientific discovery or principle crosses from experimental to demonstrable is indiscernible so that courts would do better “admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery.” Id. at 1014 .

2017See ch. 2013-107, §§ 1 - 2, Laws of Fla. The Frye test only applies to expert testimony based upon new or novel scientific evidence, and “in order to introduce expert testimony deduced from a scientific principle or discovery, the principle or discovery ‘must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’ ” Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.

2017See ch. 2013-107, §§ 1-2, Laws of Fla. The Frye test only applies to expert testimony based upon new or novel scientific evidence, and “in order to introduce expert testimony deduced from a scientific principle or discovery, the principle or discovery ‘must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’ ” Flanagan v. State, 625 So.2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.

2007Flanagan, 625 So.2d at 828 ; see also Hodden, 690 So.2d at 579-80 (same); Herlihy v. State, 927 So.2d 146, 148 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) ("[A] diagnosis based on an expert's *549 opinion and experience, versus a specific scientific test, would not be subject to a Frye hearing."); Gelsthorpe, 897 So.2d at 510-11 (finding Frye inapplicable to "pure opinion testimony based upon clinical experience" where the "testimony did not rely on any study, test, procedure, or methodology that constituted new or novel scientific evidence," but instead was based on an analysis of medical records and differential di

2007Flanagan, 625 So.2d at 828 ; Hodden, 690 So.2d at 576, 580 ; see also Brim, 695 So.2d at 272 (recognizing that under Frye , "the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply, that principle to the facts at hand") (quoting Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995)).

2007Flanagan, 625 So.2d at 828 ; Hodden, 690 So.2d at 576, 580 ; see also Brim, 695 So.2d at 272 (recognizing that under Frye , "the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply, that principle to the facts at hand") (quoting Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164, 1168 (Fla. 1995)).

2007See Brim, 695 So.2d at 272 ("[W]e have expressly held that the trial judge must treat new or novel scientific evidence as a matter of admissibility (for the judge) rather than a matter of weight (for the jury)."); Ramirez, 651 So.2d at 1168 (recognizing that "[t]he trial judge has the sole responsibility to determine" "the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply that principle to the facts at hand").

2007"This standard requires a determination, by the judge, that the basic underlying principles of scientific evidence have been sufficiently tested and accepted by the relevant scientific community." Brim v. State, 695 So.2d 268, 272 (Fla.1997); see also Ramirez v. State, 810 So.2d 836, 843 (Fla.2001) ("Evidence based on a novel scientific theory is inherently unreliable and inadmissible in a legal proceeding in Florida unless the theory has been adequately tested and accepted in the relevant scientific community.").

2003Rather, proof of general scientific acceptance "requires the testimony of impartial experts or scientists" as to "both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply the principle to the facts of the case at hand." Id. at 851 .

2011Under Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923), before admitting into evidence the testimony of an expert witness concerning a new scientific principle, "a trial court must determine (1) whether such expert testimony would assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in deciding a fact in issue; (2) whether such testimony is based on a scientific principle which has gained general acceptance in that particular scientific community; and (3) whether the expert witness is sufficiently qualified to render an opinion on the subject.” Murray v. State, 692 So.2d 157, 161 (Fla.1997).

2001See Murray v. State, 692 So.2d 157, 161 (Fla.1997); Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164, 1168 (Fla.1995).

2007Contrary to our admonition in Stokes, 548 So.2d at 193-94 ("[A] courtroom is not a laboratory. . . .

1993NOTES [1] Compare this requirement for admission with the usual requirement for admission of novel scientific evidence that the scientific principle or principles upon which the testimony is based must be "`sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs,'" and must have "`attained sufficient scientific and psychological accuracy ... [to be] capable of definite and certain interpretation.'" Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 188, 193 (Fla. 1989) (quoting Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 , 1014 & 1026 (D.C.

2002See Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164 (Fla.1995)(holding under Frye the proponent must establish the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedure used to apply that principle to the facts of the case at hand); Cella v. United States, 998 F.2d 418, 425 (7th Cir.1993)("the Frye standard requires that the methodology and reasoning used by an expert in reaching a conclusion be generally accepted within the relative scientific community").

1998See, e.g., Cella v. United States, 998 F.2d 418, 425 (7th Cir. 1993)("the Frye standard requires that the methodology and reasoning used by an expert in reaching a conclusion be generally accepted within the relative scientific community"); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1111 (5th Cir.1991)(in applying Frye test ask whether the expert, in reaching his conclusion, used a well founded methodology or mode of reasoning), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 912 , 112 S.Ct. 1280 , 117 L.Ed.2d 506 (1992); Peteet v. Dow Chem.

1996Crawford v. Shivashankar, 474 So.2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

1995Crawford v. Shivashankar, 474 So.2d 873, 875 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

1991Coppolino v State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied. 399 U.S. 927 (1970).

1987Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68, 70 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), app. dismissed, 234 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970).

2006Under the three prong test in Bender , "a scientific test result on intoxication is admissible ‘if a proper predicate establishes that: (1) the test was reliable, (2) the test was performed by a qualified operator with proper equipment, and (3) expert testimony was presented concerning the meaning of the test.' ” Cardenas, 867 So.2d at 390 (quoting Bender, 382 So.2d at 699 ). .

2004Under the common law, a scientific test result on intoxication is admissible "if a proper predicate established that (1) the test was reliable, (2) the test was performed by a qualified operator with the proper equipment and (3) expert testimony was presented concerning the meaning of the test." State v. Bender, 382 So.2d 697, 699 (Fla.1980).

1983State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); State v. Duke, 378 So.2d 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Lowery v. State, 402 So.2d 1287 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981).

1981State v. Duke, 378 So.2d 96 (Fla.2d DCA 1979); State v. Esperti, 220 So.2d 416 (Fla.2d DCA 1969).

2009However, a de novo standard "applies to the trial court's determination under Frye as to whether both the scientific principle and the testing procedures applying the procedure to the case at hand are generally accepted in the relevant community." Id. at 791 .

2007See also Hildwin v. State, 951 So.2d 784, 792 (Fla.2006) ("The principal inquiry under the Frye test is whether the scientific theory or discovery from which an expert derives an opinion is reliable.") (quoting Ramirez, 651 So.2d at 1167 ).

2008The court reasoned that "[c]ertificates of chemical analysis are neither discretionary nor based on opinion; rather, they merely state the results of a well-recognized scientific test determining the composition and quantity of the substance." Id. at 705.

2008Thus, the "drug certificates are well within the public records exception to the confrontation clause." Id.