scientific principle in District of Columbia

2016Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 5 Id. at 1014 .

2010See Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923) ("[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 633 (D.C.1992) ("[U]nder Frye , the proponent of a new technology must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that this technology has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific com

2011The "issue is consensus versus controversy over a particular technique, not its validity." United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013, 1022 (D.C.2005) (citing United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 633 (D.C.1992)).

2010See Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923) ("[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 633 (D.C.1992) ("[U]nder Frye , the proponent of a new technology must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that this technology has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific com

2010See Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923) ("[W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 633 (D.C.1992) ("[U]nder Frye , the proponent of a new technology must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that this technology has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific com

1986Cleary 1972); see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 637 (D.C.1979), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (1983) (the scientific principle or discovery from which the expert deduces an opinion "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs") (quoting Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)). [17] Brown v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093, 1096 (D.C.1979), is not to the contrary.

2017P. 16 (b)(1)(B) (providing that ―[i]f a defendant requests disclosure [of any report of a scientific test] under Rule 16 (a)(1)(F) and the government complies, the defendant must permit the government, upon request, to inspect and to copy or photograph the results or reports of any . . . scientific test or experiment [within the defendant‘s possession, custody, or control] if . . . the defendant intends to use the item in the defendant‘s case-in-chief at trial, or intends to call the witness who prepared the report and the report relates to the witness‘s testimony‖). (continued…) 33 Without th

2013She also “emphasize[d] the limited reach of the Court’s opinion,” for it did not resolve the issue that might be presented in some other “substitute” witness scenarios, where “the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue,” rather than someone who “played no role in producing the ... report.” Id. at 2719, 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

2013We recognize that Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Buttcoming left open the question whether expert testimony like Dr. Bae-chtel's would be admissible as substantive evidence without the in-court testimony of the analysts if "the person testifying” is someone with “a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue,” for example, "a supervisor who observed an analyst conducting a test.” Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

2013This case, however, is governed by our decisions in Young and Veney v. United States, 936 A.2d 809, 811 (D.C.2007).

2011The "issue is consensus versus controversy over a particular technique, not its validity." United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013, 1022 (D.C.2005) (citing United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 633 (D.C.1992)).

2011The “issue is consensus versus controversy over a particular technique, not its validity.” United States v. Jenkins, 887 A.2d 1013, 1022 (D.C.2005) (citing United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 633 (D.C.1992)).

2011The Frye Standard In the District of Columbia, "before expert testimony about a new scientific principle [may] be admitted, the testing methodology must have become `sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.'" Williams v. District of Columbia, 558 A.2d 344, 346 (D.C.1989) (quoting Frye, 54 App.D.C. at 47, 293 F. at 1014).

2011The Frye Standard In the District of Columbia, “before expert testimony about a new scientific principle [may] be admitted, the testing methodology must have become ‘sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’ ” Williams v. District of Columbia, 558 A.2d 344, 346 (D.C.1989) (quoting Frye, 54 App.D.C. at 47, 293 F. at 1014).

2010See Nixon v. United States, 728 A.2d 582, 594 (D.C.1999). 13 .

1992Although it is now forty years since James Watson of the United States and Francis Crick of Great Britain received the Nobel Prize for their pioneering work on the DNA molecule, see People v. Axell, 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 845 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411, 415 (1991), review denied, (1992), forensic use of DNA technologies is of comparatively recent vintage (but boundless potential).

1992Although it is now forty years since James Watson of the United States and Francis Crick of Great Britain received the Nobel Prize for their pioneering work on the DNA molecule, see People v. Axell, 235 Cal.App.3d 836, 845 , 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 411, 415 (1991), review denied, (1992), forensic use of DNA technologies is of comparatively recent vintage (but boundless potential).

1986Cleary 1972); see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 637 (D.C.1979), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (1983) (the scientific principle or discovery from which the expert deduces an opinion "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs”) (quoting Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)). .

1986Cleary 1972); see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 637 (D.C.1979), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (1983) (the scientific principle or discovery from which the expert deduces an opinion "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs") (quoting Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)). [17] Brown v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093, 1096 (D.C.1979), is not to the contrary.

1986Brown v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093, 1096 (D.C.1979), is not to the contrary.

1986Cleary 1972); see also Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 637 (D.C.1979), appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (1983) (the scientific principle or discovery from which the expert deduces an opinion "must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs") (quoting Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923)). [17] Brown v. United States, 409 A.2d 1093, 1096 (D.C.1979), is not to the contrary.