scientific principle (Maine) · Go Syfert
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scientific principle in Maine

6 Maine opinions name it 1 courts 1954–2025 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
Boeche v. Stategreen
neb · 1949 · cited in 2 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1954–1978
2 sentences

1978Holding polygraph evidence generally inadmissible, this Court in State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588 (1954) resorted to language contained in the Nebraska opinion in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368 , 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949), as follows: “ ‘It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that the scientific principle involved in the use of such polygraph has not yet gone beyond the experimental and reached the demonstrable stage, and that it has not yet received general scientific acceptance.’ ” See also State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974); State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325 , 184 A.

1978Holding polygraph evidence generally inadmissible, this Court in State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588 (1954) resorted to language contained in the Nebraska opinion in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368 , 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949), as follows: “ ‘It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that the scientific principle involved in the use of such polygraph has not yet gone beyond the experimental and reached the demonstrable stage, and that it has not yet received general scientific acceptance.’ ” See also State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974); State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325 , 184 A.

12
State v. Grigsbygreen
me · 1995 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025We have explained that the statutory presumptions regarding impairment are unavailable absent “scientific blood alcohol test results[.]” Souther, 2017 ME 184, ¶ 12 , 169 A.3d 927 ; see also State v. Grigsby, 666 A.2d 503, 505 (Me. 1995) (concluding that “evidence of an individual’s blood-alcohol content has procedural effect under [the predecessor statute to section 2432] only when it is obtained as a result of a scientific test administered contemporaneously with an arrest.” (quotation marks omitted)).

11
State v. Superior Courtgreen
ariz · 1986 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
1 sentence

1997See Schultz v. State, 106 Md.App. 145 , 664 A.2d 60, 65-66 (1995) (“The principle underlying the HGN test, i.e., that it is an accurate measure of the intoxication of a suspect, is a scientific principle.”); State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 178 (“The HGN test is a different type of test from balancing on one leg or walking a straight line because it rests almost entirely upon an assertion of scientific legitimacy rather than a basis of common knowledge).

11
Schultz v. Stategreen
mdctspecapp · 1995 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997
2 sentences

1997See Schultz v. State, 106 Md.App. 145 , 664 A.2d 60, 65-66 (1995) (“The principle underlying the HGN test, i.e., that it is an accurate measure of the intoxication of a suspect, is a scientific principle.”); State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 178 (“The HGN test is a different type of test from balancing on one leg or walking a straight line because it rests almost entirely upon an assertion of scientific legitimacy rather than a basis of common knowledge).

1997See Schultz v. State, 106 Md.App. 145 , 664 A.2d 60, 65-66 (1995) (“The principle underlying the HGN test, i.e., that it is an accurate measure of the intoxication of a suspect, is a scientific principle.”); State v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d at 178 (“The HGN test is a different type of test from balancing on one leg or walking a straight line because it rests almost entirely upon an assertion of scientific legitimacy rather than a basis of common knowledge).

11
Frye v. United Statesred
cadc · 1923 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1978–1978
2 sentences

1978Defendant argues that speech spectrograph voice identification rests on new developments in the application of scientific principles and therefore its admissibility as evidence should be governed by a special standard, as set forth in Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923): “Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable ■ stages is difficult to define.

1978Defendant argues that speech spectrograph voice identification rests on new developments in the application of scientific principles and therefore its admissibility as evidence should be governed by a special standard, as set forth in Frye v. United States, 54 App.D.C. 46, 47 , 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923): “Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable ■ stages is difficult to define.

11
State v. Knightgreen
· 1857 · cited in 1 Maine opinions naming this issue, 1978–1978
2 sentences

1978In State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11, 133, 134 (1857), the Court upheld the admissibility of scientific testimony as to the properties and appearance of human blood and animal blood.

1978In State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11, 133, 134 (1857), the Court upheld the admissibility of scientific testimony as to the properties and appearance of human blood and animal blood.

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (8)

CaseCitedYears
State of Maine v. Samantha Souther neutral
me · 2017
1 sentence

2025We have explained that the statutory presumptions regarding impairment are unavailable absent “scientific blood alcohol test results[.]” Souther, 2017 ME 184, ¶ 12 , 169 A.3d 927 ; see also State v. Grigsby, 666 A.2d 503, 505 (Me. 1995) (concluding that “evidence of an individual’s blood-alcohol content has procedural effect under [the predecessor statute to section 2432] only when it is obtained as a result of a scientific test administered contemporaneously with an arrest.” (quotation marks omitted)).

12025–2025
State v. Souther neutral
me · 2017
1 sentence

2025We have explained that the statutory presumptions regarding impairment are unavailable absent “scientific blood alcohol test results[.]” Souther, 2017 ME 184, ¶ 12 , 169 A.3d 927 ; see also State v. Grigsby, 666 A.2d 503, 505 (Me. 1995) (concluding that “evidence of an individual’s blood-alcohol content has procedural effect under [the predecessor statute to section 2432] only when it is obtained as a result of a scientific test administered contemporaneously with an arrest.” (quotation marks omitted)).

12025–2025
State v. Taylor green
me · 1997
2 sentences

2025We have never held, however, that the same is true for purposes of proving a violation of section 2411.9 9 Our opinion in State v. Taylor, 1997 ME 81 , 694 A.2d 907 , is not to the contrary.

2025We have never held, however, that the same is true for purposes of proving a violation of section 2411.9 9 Our opinion in State v. Taylor, 1997 ME 81 , 694 A.2d 907 , is not to the contrary.

12025–2025
State v. Richford green
me · 1986
1 sentence

1995“As its context indicates, evidence of an individual’s blood-alcohol content has procedural effect under subsection 5 only when it is obtained as a result of a scientific test administered contemporaneously with an arrest.” State v. Richford, 519 A.2d at 196 n. 1.

11995–1995
State v. Casale green
me · 1954
2 sentences

1978Holding polygraph evidence generally inadmissible, this Court in State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588 (1954) resorted to language contained in the Nebraska opinion in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368 , 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949), as follows: “ ‘It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that the scientific principle involved in the use of such polygraph has not yet gone beyond the experimental and reached the demonstrable stage, and that it has not yet received general scientific acceptance.’ ” See also State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974); State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325 , 184 A.

1978Holding polygraph evidence generally inadmissible, this Court in State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588 (1954) resorted to language contained in the Nebraska opinion in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368 , 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949), as follows: “ ‘It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that the scientific principle involved in the use of such polygraph has not yet gone beyond the experimental and reached the demonstrable stage, and that it has not yet received general scientific acceptance.’ ” See also State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974); State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325 , 184 A.

11978–1978
State v. Mottram green
me · 1962
2 sentences

1978Holding polygraph evidence generally inadmissible, this Court in State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588 (1954) resorted to language contained in the Nebraska opinion in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368 , 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949), as follows: “ ‘It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that the scientific principle involved in the use of such polygraph has not yet gone beyond the experimental and reached the demonstrable stage, and that it has not yet received general scientific acceptance.’ ” See also State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974); State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325 , 184 A.

1978Holding polygraph evidence generally inadmissible, this Court in State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588 (1954) resorted to language contained in the Nebraska opinion in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368 , 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949), as follows: “ ‘It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that the scientific principle involved in the use of such polygraph has not yet gone beyond the experimental and reached the demonstrable stage, and that it has not yet received general scientific acceptance.’ ” See also State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974); State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325 , 184 A.

11978–1978
State v. Mower green
me · 1974
2 sentences

1978Holding polygraph evidence generally inadmissible, this Court in State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588 (1954) resorted to language contained in the Nebraska opinion in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368 , 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949), as follows: “ ‘It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that the scientific principle involved in the use of such polygraph has not yet gone beyond the experimental and reached the demonstrable stage, and that it has not yet received general scientific acceptance.’ ” See also State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974); State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325 , 184 A.

1978Holding polygraph evidence generally inadmissible, this Court in State v. Casale, 150 Me. 310, 320 , 110 A.2d 588 (1954) resorted to language contained in the Nebraska opinion in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368 , 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (1949), as follows: "`It is apparent from the foregoing authorities that the scientific principle involved in the use of such polygraph has not yet gone beyond the experimental and reached the demonstrable stage, and that it has not yet received general scientific acceptance.'" See also State v. Mower, Me., 314 A.2d 840 (1974); State v. Mottram, 158 Me. 325 , 184 A.2d

11978–1978
State v. Inman green
me · 1973
1 sentence

1976In Inman we also said: “Experts in dactylography recognize that palm prints have the characteristic of uniqueness and that they contain reference points that enable accurate and conclusive comparisons just as do fingerprints.’’ (Emphasis added.) State v. Inman, supra, 301 A.2d at 353 .

11976–1976

Statutes the citing opinions construe

ME § Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 29, § 1312 (3) ME § Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 29-A, § 2411 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 133 (1979–2025) TX 87 (1957–2025) OH 84 (1923–2026) NY 81 (1938–2026) FL 78 (1979–2019) PA 69 (1944–2026) GA 47 (1981–2026) WA 44 (1978–2020) MD 41 (1977–2024) CA 40 (1933–2026) AZ 35 (1962–2025) AL 26 (1897–2014) NJ 25 (1974–2022) LA 21 (1975–2024) MO 20 (1915–2016) MN 20 (1971–2016) NM 18 (1966–2025) MI 17 (1949–2018) MA 17 (1978–2025) NE 16 (1949–2018) CT 16 (1963–2017) VA 15 (1984–2015) NC 13 (1914–2024) KS 13 (1982–2011) CO 12 (1981–2007) AK 12 (1983–2020) IN 12 (1980–2015) DC 12 (1979–2017) TN 11 (1997–2021) WV 11 (1903–2013) MS 11 (1912–2016) SD 11 (1979–2013) OR 10 (1976–2020) RI 9 (1980–2006) HI 9 (1999–2025) WI 9 (1974–2022) DE 8 (1985–2025) ME 6 (1954–2025) ID 5 (1984–2023) UT 5 (1980–1989) IA 5 (1980–2016) OK 4 (1994–2010) KY 4 (1974–2023) NH 4 (1969–2008) WY 3 (1982–2025) VT 2 (2010–2011)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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