47 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Harper v. Stategreen2 sentences2023“The trial court [could] make this determination from evidence presented to it at trial by the parties,” or else “base its determination on exhibits, treatises[,] or the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions.” Harper, 249 Ga. at 525 (1); see also Walsh v. State, 303 Ga. 276, 279 (811 SE2d 353) (2018) (“[t]he foundation for evidence based on a scientific principle or technique requires two findings regarding the evidence’s reliability: . . . (1) the general scientific principles and techniques involved are valid and capable of producing reliable results, and (2) the person performing the te 2023“The trial court [could] make this determination from evidence presented to it at trial by the parties,” or else “base its determination on exhibits, treatises[,] or the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions.” Harper, 249 Ga. at 525 (1); see also Walsh v. State, 303 Ga. 276, 279 ( 811 SE2d 353 ) (2018) (“[t]he foundation for evidence based on a scientific principle or technique requires two findings regarding the evidence’s reliability: . . . (1) the general scientific principles and techniques involved are valid and capable of producing reliable results, and (2) the person performing the | 5 | 10 |
State v. Pastorinigreen2 sentences2005State v. Pastorini, 222 Ga. App. 316, 319 ( 474 SE2d 122 ) (1996). 1 The foundation for evidence based on a scientific principle or technique requires two findings regarding the evidence’s reliability: such evidence is admissible upon a showing by the party offering the evidence 2 that (1) “the general scientific principles and techniques involved . . . are valid and capable of producing reliable results[,]” and (2) the person performing the test “substantially performed the scientific procedures in an acceptable manner.” (Citations omitted.) Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 456, 458 (5) ( 448 SE2d 1 2005State v. Pastorini, 222 Ga. App. 316, 319 ( 474 SE2d 122 ) (1996). 1 The foundation for evidence based on a scientific principle or technique requires two findings regarding the evidence’s reliability: such evidence is admissible upon a showing by the party offering the evidence 2 that (1) “the general scientific principles and techniques involved . . . are valid and capable of producing reliable results[,]” and (2) the person performing the test “substantially performed the scientific procedures in an acceptable manner.” (Citations omitted.) Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 456, 458 (5) ( 448 SE2d 1 | 5 | 5 |
DISHAROON v. Stategreen2 sentences2023In Disharoon, we recognized Bullcoming’s condemnation of “surrogate testimony” but held that Bullcoming does not require the exclusion of a substitute witness who “is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). 2023In Disharoon, we recognized Bullcoming’s condemnation of “surrogate testimony” but held that Bullcoming does not require the exclusion of a substitute witness who “is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue.” Id. (citation and punctuation omitted). | 3 | 6 |
Leger v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See also Leger v. State, 291 Ga. 584, 592 (5) ( 732 SE2d 53 ) (2012) (scientist who did not personally perform DNA tests, but supervised worker who did, interpreted worker’s results and wrote lab report could testify at trial); Thomas v. State, 342 Ga. App. 310, 314 (2) ( 803 SE2d 131 ) (2017) (second chemist who did not personally perform drug identification tests, but reached an independent conclusion and interpreted procedures and analysis performed by first chemist who was unavailable to testify at trial, could testify at trial); Estrada v. State, 319 Ga. App. 762, 765-766 (3) ( 738 SE2d 3 2017In Disharoon v. State, 291 Ga. 45 ( 727 SE2d 465 ) (2012), the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized Bullcoming’s condemnation of “surrogate testimony” but ruled that Bullcoming does not require the exclusion of a substitute witness who “is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 48; see also Leger, 291 Ga. at 592 (5) (scientist who did not personally perform DNA tests, but supervised worker who did, interpreted worker’s results, and wrote lab report could testify at trial); E | 3 | 3 |
Adams v. Stategreen2 sentences2026See also Adams v. State, 284 Ga. App. 534, 536-537 (2007) (holding that it did not violate the continuing witness rule to allow a blood test report from the crime lab to go out with the jury, as the report was “direct evidence of the manner in which a scientific test was conducted and of the results thereby obtained” and that “[t]he proscription on the jury’s possession of written 19 testimony does not extend to documents which are themselves relevant and admissible as original documentary evidence in a case” (quotation marks omitted)); Tanner v. State, 259 Ga. App. 94, 98 (2003) (same). 2026See also Adams v. State, 284 Ga. App. 534, 536-537 (2007) (holding that it did not violate the continuing witness rule to allow a blood test report from the crime lab to go out with the jury, as the report was “direct evidence of the manner in which a scientific test was conducted and of the results thereby obtained” and that “[t]he proscription on the jury’s possession of written 19 testimony does not extend to documents which are themselves relevant and admissible as original documentary evidence in a case” (quotation marks omitted)); Tanner v. State, 259 Ga. App. 94, 98 (2003) (same). | 2 | 3 |
Estrada v. Stategreen2 sentences2017In Disharoon v. State, 291 Ga. 45 ( 727 SE2d 465 ) (2012), the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized Bullcoming’s condemnation of “surrogate testimony” but ruled that Bullcoming does not require the exclusion of a substitute witness who “is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 48; see also Leger, 291 Ga. at 592 (5) (scientist who did not personally perform DNA tests, but supervised worker who did, interpreted worker’s results, and wrote lab report could testify at trial); E 2017In Disharoon v. State, 291 Ga. 45 ( 727 SE2d 465 ) (2012), the Supreme Court of Georgia recognized Bullcoming’s condemnation of “surrogate testimony” but ruled that Bullcoming does not require the exclusion of a substitute witness who “is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 48; see also Leger, 291 Ga. at 592 (5) (scientist who did not personally perform DNA tests, but supervised worker who did, interpreted worker’s results, and wrote lab report could testify at trial); E | 2 | 3 |
Parker v. Stategreen2 sentences2018The Harper opinion guides a trial court’s determination of whether a scientific principle or technique is competent evidence in a criminal case: 1 The officer testified that the HGN test is performed by moving a stimulus, often a pen, through the subject’s vision, while the test subject keeps his vision fixed on the stimulus; the tester then looks for nystagmus in the subject’s eyes, and there are “six validated clues; a lack of smooth pursuit in [each] eye, a distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation in [each] eye[ ,] and an onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees in [each eye.]” See also Parker 2011The state, however, failed to demonstrate that the fracture match analysis evidence was founded on valid scientific principles. “[E Ividence based on a scientific principle or technique is admissible only if the science underlying the evidence is a phenomenon that may be verified with such certainty that it is competent evidence in a court of law.” Parker v. State, 307 Ga. App. 61 ( 704 SE2d 438 ) (2010). | 2 | 3 |
Tanner v. Stategreen2 sentences2026See also Adams v. State, 284 Ga. App. 534, 536-537 (2007) (holding that it did not violate the continuing witness rule to allow a blood test report from the crime lab to go out with the jury, as the report was “direct evidence of the manner in which a scientific test was conducted and of the results thereby obtained” and that “[t]he proscription on the jury’s possession of written 19 testimony does not extend to documents which are themselves relevant and admissible as original documentary evidence in a case” (quotation marks omitted)); Tanner v. State, 259 Ga. App. 94, 98 (2003) (same). 2026See also Adams v. State, 284 Ga. App. 534, 536-537 (2007) (holding that it did not violate the continuing witness rule to allow a blood test report from the crime lab to go out with the jury, as the report was “direct evidence of the manner in which a scientific test was conducted and of the results thereby obtained” and that “[t]he proscription on the jury’s possession of written 19 testimony does not extend to documents which are themselves relevant and admissible as original documentary evidence in a case” (quotation marks omitted)); Tanner v. State, 259 Ga. App. 94, 98 (2003) (same). | 2 | 2 |
Roberts v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Chapple relies on Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 552 (2007), to argue that the crime lab reports in this case could not go out with the jury as original documentary evidence. 2026Chapple relies on Roberts v. State, 282 Ga. 548, 552 (2007), to argue that the crime lab reports in this case could not go out with the jury as original documentary evidence. | 2 | 2 |
Walsh v. Stategreen2 sentences2023“The trial court [could] make this determination from evidence presented to it at trial by the parties,” or else “base its determination on exhibits, treatises[,] or the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions.” Harper, 249 Ga. at 525 (1); see also Walsh v. State, 303 Ga. 276, 279 (811 SE2d 353) (2018) (“[t]he foundation for evidence based on a scientific principle or technique requires two findings regarding the evidence’s reliability: . . . (1) the general scientific principles and techniques involved are valid and capable of producing reliable results, and (2) the person performing the te 2023“The trial court [could] make this determination from evidence presented to it at trial by the parties,” or else “base its determination on exhibits, treatises[,] or the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions.” Harper, 249 Ga. at 525 (1); see also Walsh v. State, 303 Ga. 276, 279 ( 811 SE2d 353 ) (2018) (“[t]he foundation for evidence based on a scientific principle or technique requires two findings regarding the evidence’s reliability: . . . (1) the general scientific principles and techniques involved are valid and capable of producing reliable results, and (2) the person performing the | 2 | 2 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexicogreen2 sentences2023When analyzing and applying the holding of Bullcoming, this Court has looked to the concurring opinion in that case, which explained, among other things, that Bullcoming was “not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue.” 10 Bullcoming, 564 U. S. at 672 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part). 2023When analyzing and applying the holding of Bullcoming, this Court has looked to the concurring opinion in that case, which explained, among other things, that Bullcoming was “not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue.”10 Bullcoming, 564 U. S. at 672 (II) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part). | 2 | 2 |
Hawkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2018The Harper opinion guides a trial court’s determination of whether a scientific principle or technique is competent evidence in a criminal case: 1 The officer testified that the HGN test is performed by moving a stimulus, often a pen, through the subject’s vision, while the test subject keeps his vision fixed on the stimulus; the tester then looks for nystagmus in the subject’s eyes, and there are “six validated clues; a lack of smooth pursuit in [each] eye, a distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation in [each] eye[ ,] and an onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees in [each eye.]” See also Parker 2018The Harper opinion guides a trial court’s determination of whether a scientific principle or technique is competent evidence in a criminal case: 1 The officer testified that the HGN test is performed by moving a stimulus, often a pen, through the subject’s vision, while the test subject keeps his vision fixed on the stimulus; the tester then looks for nystagmus in the subject’s eyes, and there are “six validated clues; a lack of smooth pursuit in [each] eye, a distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation in [each] eye[ ,] and an onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees in [each eye.]” See also Parker | 2 | 2 |
Moody v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Moody v. State , 277 Ga. 676 , 681 (6) (a), 594 S.E.2d 350 (2004) (holding that, when the appellant did not offer what exculpatory evidence an investigator might have found or results a scientific analysis would have shown, he did not show he was prejudiced by his counsel's action in failing to hire an investigator or obtain a scientific analysis); Butts v. State , 279 Ga. App. 28 , 30 (2), 630 S.E.2d 182 (2006) (holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain certain forensic evidence, such as fingerprint testing, when the defendant failed to show that any such eviden 2018See Moody v. State , 277 Ga. 676 , 681 (6) (a), 594 S.E.2d 350 (2004) (holding that, when the appellant did not offer what exculpatory evidence an investigator might have found or results a scientific analysis would have shown, he did not show he was prejudiced by his counsel's action in failing to hire an investigator or obtain a scientific analysis); Butts v. State , 279 Ga. App. 28 , 30 (2), 630 S.E.2d 182 (2006) (holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain certain forensic evidence, such as fingerprint testing, when the defendant failed to show that any such eviden | 2 | 2 |
Stewart v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See generally Stewart v. State, 280 Ga. App. 366, 368-369 (2) ( 634 SE2d 141 ) (2006); State v. Pastorini, 222 Ga. App. 316, 318-319 (2) ( 474 SE2d 122 ) (1996). 3 In the case before us, the only witnesses at the hearing on the motions in limine were the police officers, and only the city police officer testified with respect to “the Romberg balance [sic].” He testified that the subject is instructed to shut his eyes, tilt his head backwards, and estimate the passage of 30 seconds. 2017See generally Stewart v. State, 280 Ga. App. 366, 368-369 (2) ( 634 SE2d 141 ) (2006); State v. Pastorini, 222 Ga. App. 316, 318-319 (2) ( 474 SE2d 122 ) (1996). 3 In the case before us, the only witnesses at the hearing on the motions in limine were the police officers, and only the city police officer testified with respect to “the Romberg balance [sic].” He testified that the subject is instructed to shut his eyes, tilt his head backwards, and estimate the passage of 30 seconds. | 2 | 2 |
Sultan v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Smith, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. 1 (Citation omitted.) Slayton v. State, 281 Ga. App. 650 -651 (1) ( 637 SE2d 67 ) (2006). 2 (Footnote omitted.) State v. Hester, 268 Ga. App. 501, 502 ( 602 SE2d 271 ) (2004). 3 The HGN test “is based upon the principle that horizontal gaze nystagmus, an involuntary movement of the eyes, can be caused by the ingestion of alcohol.” (Citation omitted.) Waits v. State, 232 Ga. App. 357, 360 (3) ( 501 SE2d 870 ) (1998). 4 Verola observed two clues out of a possible eight on the walk and turn and two clues on the one-leg stand test. 5 Sultan v. State, 289 Ga. Ap 2008Smith, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. 1 (Citation omitted.) Slayton v. State, 281 Ga. App. 650 -651 (1) ( 637 SE2d 67 ) (2006). 2 (Footnote omitted.) State v. Hester, 268 Ga. App. 501, 502 ( 602 SE2d 271 ) (2004). 3 The HGN test “is based upon the principle that horizontal gaze nystagmus, an involuntary movement of the eyes, can be caused by the ingestion of alcohol.” (Citation omitted.) Waits v. State, 232 Ga. App. 357, 360 (3) ( 501 SE2d 870 ) (1998). 4 Verola observed two clues out of a possible eight on the walk and turn and two clues on the one-leg stand test. 5 Sultan v. State, 289 Ga. Ap | 2 | 2 |
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntoshgreen2 sentences2004This determination [was] for the jury[.]" 215 Ga.App. at 593 (4), 452 S.E.2d 159 . 2004Orkin Exterminating held that Harper did not apply because Orkin “[did] not challenge a particular scientific test or technique employed by plaintiffs experts; [rather] Orkin challenge [d] the conclusions drawn by those experts from testimony and evidence in the record.” Orkin Exterminating, 215 Ga. App. at 593 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Tousleygreen2 sentences2018In Tousley , supra at 876 (n. 1), 611 S.E.2d 139 , the Court of Appeals noted that evidence based upon a scientific principle or technique is sometimes called "novel scientific evidence." We take this opportunity to observe that such a principle or technique may have reached a state of verifiable certainty in the scientific community such that taking judicial notice of it under Harper , supra, occurs with considerable frequency, and that this may make it appear that the scientific evidence has lost any "novelty." Nonetheless, proper administration of the associated testing cannot be considered 2008Smith, P. J., and Adams, J., concur. 1 (Citation omitted.) Slayton v. State, 281 Ga. App. 650 -651 (1) ( 637 SE2d 67 ) (2006). 2 (Footnote omitted.) State v. Hester, 268 Ga. App. 501, 502 ( 602 SE2d 271 ) (2004). 3 The HGN test “is based upon the principle that horizontal gaze nystagmus, an involuntary movement of the eyes, can be caused by the ingestion of alcohol.” (Citation omitted.) Waits v. State, 232 Ga. App. 357, 360 (3) ( 501 SE2d 870 ) (1998). 4 Verola observed two clues out of a possible eight on the walk and turn and two clues on the one-leg stand test. 5 Sultan v. State, 289 Ga. Ap | 1 | 3 |
Walsh v. Stategreen2 sentences2023“The trial court [could] make this determination from evidence presented to it at trial by the parties,” or else “base its determination on exhibits, treatises[,] or the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions.” Harper, 249 Ga. at 525 (1); see also Walsh v. State, 303 Ga. 276, 279 (811 SE2d 353) (2018) (“[t]he foundation for evidence based on a scientific principle or technique requires two findings regarding the evidence’s reliability: . . . (1) the general scientific principles and techniques involved are valid and capable of producing reliable results, and (2) the person performing the te 2023“The trial court [could] make this determination from evidence presented to it at trial by the parties,” or else “base its determination on exhibits, treatises[,] or the rationale of cases in other jurisdictions.” Harper, 249 Ga. at 525 (1); see also Walsh v. State, 303 Ga. 276, 279 ( 811 SE2d 353 ) (2018) (“[t]he foundation for evidence based on a scientific principle or technique requires two findings regarding the evidence’s reliability: . . . (1) the general scientific principles and techniques involved are valid and capable of producing reliable results, and (2) the person performing the | 1 | 2 |
Thomas v. the Stategreen2 sentences2021See also Leger v. State, 291 Ga. 584, 592 (5) ( 732 SE2d 53 ) (2012) (scientist who did not personally perform DNA tests, but supervised worker who did, interpreted worker’s results and wrote lab report could testify at trial); Thomas v. State, 342 Ga. App. 310, 314 (2) ( 803 SE2d 131 ) (2017) (second chemist who did not personally perform drug identification tests, but reached an independent conclusion and interpreted procedures and analysis performed by first chemist who was unavailable to testify at trial, could testify at trial); Estrada v. State, 319 Ga. App. 762, 765-766 (3) ( 738 SE2d 3 2021See also Leger v. State, 291 Ga. 584, 592 (5) ( 732 SE2d 53 ) (2012) (scientist who did not personally perform DNA tests, but supervised worker who did, interpreted worker’s results and wrote lab report could testify at trial); Thomas v. State, 342 Ga. App. 310, 314 (2) ( 803 SE2d 131 ) (2017) (second chemist who did not personally perform drug identification tests, but reached an independent conclusion and interpreted procedures and analysis performed by first chemist who was unavailable to testify at trial, could testify at trial); Estrada v. State, 319 Ga. App. 762, 765-766 (3) ( 738 SE2d 3 | 1 | 2 |
Mulkey v. Stategreen2 sentences1988The statutory objective is not to produce whatever test results the lab chooses to make “written,” but to give defendant access to “scientific reports . . . which will be introduced in whole or in part against the defendant.” (Emphasis supplied.) “The clear language of the statute provides that any evidence of a scientific test offered by the state in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal is subject to discovery with the accompanying sanction of non-use for failure timely to release the evidence known to the state.” Mulkey v. State, 167 Ga. App. 627, 630 ( 307 SE2d 117 ). 1988The statutory objective is not to produce whatever test results the lab chooses to make “written,” but to give defendant access to “scientific reports . . . which will be introduced in whole or in part against the defendant.” (Emphasis supplied.) “The clear language of the statute provides that any evidence of a scientific test offered by the state in its case-in-chief or in rebuttal is subject to discovery with the accompanying sanction of non-use for failure timely to release the evidence known to the state.” Mulkey v. State, 167 Ga. App. 627, 630 ( 307 SE2d 117 ). | 1 | 2 |
Frye v. United Statesred2 sentences1983“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define . . . [W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.” Id. at 1014 . 1983"Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define . . . [W]hile courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs." Id. at 1014 . | 1 | 2 |
Duncan v. Stategreen2 sentences2023(Footnote omitted.) Duncan v. State, 305 Ga. App. 268, 270-271 (2) ( 699 SE2d 341 ) (2010). 2023(Footnote omitted.) Duncan v. State, 305 Ga. App. 268, 270-271 (2) ( 699 SE2d 341 ) (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Reed v. Heffernangreen2 sentences2019However, the State did not carry its burden in showing that OCGA § 17-16-4 (b) applied in the first instance, that Alexander’s remaining testimony was dependent upon the results of this 12 See, e.g., Reed v. Heffernan, 171 Ga. App. 83, 85 (1) (a) ( 318 SE2d 700 ) (1984), overruled on other grounds by Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31 ( 549 SE2d 107 ) (2001) (in a car crash case, evidence of a separate accident at the same curve of road in similar weather conditions was the “substantial equivalent of a scientific test designed to show the probability of an incident occurring in the way asserted by an 2019However, the State did not carry its burden in showing that OCGA § 17-16-4 (b) applied in the first instance, that Alexander’s remaining testimony was dependent upon the results of this 12 See, e.g., Reed v. Heffernan, 171 Ga. App. 83, 85 (1) (a) ( 318 SE2d 700 ) (1984), overruled on other grounds by Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31 ( 549 SE2d 107 ) (2001) (in a car crash case, evidence of a separate accident at the same curve of road in similar weather conditions was the “substantial equivalent of a scientific test designed to show the probability of an incident occurring in the way asserted by an | 1 | 1 |
Roscoe v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Thus, to the extent that Duncan contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting the fingerprint testing prior to trial, his claim lacks merit. 32 See supra notes 6 and 31. 33 Roscoe v. State , 288 Ga. 775 , 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (2011) (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz v. State , 280 Ga. 392 , 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 (2006). 34 Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 . 35 See Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 57 2018Thus, to the extent that Duncan contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting the fingerprint testing prior to trial, his claim lacks merit. 32 See supra notes 6 and 31. 33 Roscoe v. State , 288 Ga. 775 , 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (2011) (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz v. State , 280 Ga. 392 , 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 (2006). 34 Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 . 35 See Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 57 | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Thus, to the extent that Duncan contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting the fingerprint testing prior to trial, his claim lacks merit. 32 See supra notes 6 and 31. 33 Roscoe v. State , 288 Ga. 775 , 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (2011) (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz v. State , 280 Ga. 392 , 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 (2006). 34 Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 . 35 See Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 57 2018Thus, to the extent that Duncan contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting the fingerprint testing prior to trial, his claim lacks merit. 32 See supra notes 6 and 31. 33 Roscoe v. State , 288 Ga. 775 , 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (2011) (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz v. State , 280 Ga. 392 , 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 (2006). 34 Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 . 35 See Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 57 | 1 | 1 |
Delacruz v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Thus, to the extent that Duncan contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting the fingerprint testing prior to trial, his claim lacks merit. 32 See supra notes 6 and 31. 33 Roscoe v. State , 288 Ga. 775 , 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (2011) (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz v. State , 280 Ga. 392 , 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 (2006). 34 Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 . 35 See Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 57 2018Thus, to the extent that Duncan contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting the fingerprint testing prior to trial, his claim lacks merit. 32 See supra notes 6 and 31. 33 Roscoe v. State , 288 Ga. 775 , 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (2011) (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz v. State , 280 Ga. 392 , 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 (2006). 34 Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 579 . 35 See Roscoe , 288 Ga. at 776 (3), 707 S.E.2d 90 (punctuation omitted); accord Delacruz , 280 Ga. at 396 (3), 627 S.E.2d 57 | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Virginiared | 1 | 1 |
| Manley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jaffray v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dunn v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Foster v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reddick v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Haywood v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rayburn v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Palmakagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Keller v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Waits v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hestergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Graves v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Welch v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sarkar v. CACV OF COLORADO, LLC
green
2 sentences2018The Harper opinion guides a trial court’s determination of whether a scientific principle or technique is competent evidence in a criminal case: 1 The officer testified that the HGN test is performed by moving a stimulus, often a pen, through the subject’s vision, while the test subject keeps his vision fixed on the stimulus; the tester then looks for nystagmus in the subject’s eyes, and there are “six validated clues; a lack of smooth pursuit in [each] eye, a distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation in [each] eye[ ,] and an onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees in [each eye.]” See also Parker 2011The state, however, failed to demonstrate that the fracture match analysis evidence was founded on valid scientific principles. “[E Ividence based on a scientific principle or technique is admissible only if the science underlying the evidence is a phenomenon that may be verified with such certainty that it is competent evidence in a court of law.” Parker v. State, 307 Ga. App. 61 ( 704 SE2d 438 ) (2010). | 3 | 2011–2018 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
green
1 sentence2025Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized[.]”), superseded on other grounds as recognized in Daubert, 509 US at 586–87. 20 Recognizing this reality, we have observed that “a prudent defendant predicating [an extraordinary] motion on scientific developments would wait until he is confident in the materiality of those developments” before presenting the new evidence to the court. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Brown v. State
green
2 sentences2019However, the State did not carry its burden in showing that OCGA § 17-16-4 (b) applied in the first instance, that Alexander’s remaining testimony was dependent upon the results of this 12 See, e.g., Reed v. Heffernan, 171 Ga. App. 83, 85 (1) (a) ( 318 SE2d 700 ) (1984), overruled on other grounds by Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31 ( 549 SE2d 107 ) (2001) (in a car crash case, evidence of a separate accident at the same curve of road in similar weather conditions was the “substantial equivalent of a scientific test designed to show the probability of an incident occurring in the way asserted by an 2019However, the State did not carry its burden in showing that OCGA § 17-16-4 (b) applied in the first instance, that Alexander’s remaining testimony was dependent upon the results of this 12 See, e.g., Reed v. Heffernan, 171 Ga. App. 83, 85 (1) (a) ( 318 SE2d 700 ) (1984), overruled on other grounds by Brown v. State, 274 Ga. 31 ( 549 SE2d 107 ) (2001) (in a car crash case, evidence of a separate accident at the same curve of road in similar weather conditions was the “substantial equivalent of a scientific test designed to show the probability of an incident occurring in the way asserted by an | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Butts v. State
neutral
2 sentences2018See Moody v. State , 277 Ga. 676 , 681 (6) (a), 594 S.E.2d 350 (2004) (holding that, when the appellant did not offer what exculpatory evidence an investigator might have found or results a scientific analysis would have shown, he did not show he was prejudiced by his counsel's action in failing to hire an investigator or obtain a scientific analysis); Butts v. State , 279 Ga. App. 28 , 30 (2), 630 S.E.2d 182 (2006) (holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain certain forensic evidence, such as fingerprint testing, when the defendant failed to show that any such eviden 2018See Moody v. State , 277 Ga. 676 , 681 (6) (a), 594 S.E.2d 350 (2004) (holding that, when the appellant did not offer what exculpatory evidence an investigator might have found or results a scientific analysis would have shown, he did not show he was prejudiced by his counsel's action in failing to hire an investigator or obtain a scientific analysis); Butts v. State , 279 Ga. App. 28 , 30 (2), 630 S.E.2d 182 (2006) (holding that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain certain forensic evidence, such as fingerprint testing, when the defendant failed to show that any such eviden | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Ross v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Slayton v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Jones v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Eason v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Harris v. Central Railroad green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Durden v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Williams v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Williams v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Law v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.