scientific test in Virginia

2013Further, the testifying analyst conceded that “he played no role in producing the BAC report and did not observe any portion of [the performing analyst’s] conduct of the testing.” Id. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that Bullcoming “is not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue”). 2 Bullcoming is inapplicable to the present case since Holcomb only testified to what she did and what she observed Dishman do under her direct observation and supervision.

2013Further, the testifying analyst conceded that “he played no role in producing the BAC report and did not observe any portion of [the performing analyst’s] conduct of the testing.” Id. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that Bullcoming “is not a case in which the person testifying is a supervisor, reviewer, or someone else with a personal, albeit limited, connection to the scientific test at issue”). 2 Bullcoming is inapplicable to the present case since Holcomb only testified to what she did and what she observed Dishman do under her direct observation and supervision.

2009Long ago Justice Hudgins suggested as much when he remarked that "it would be unreasonable to state that `periods' refer to `one single term.'" Hudson v. Youell, 179 Va. 442, 465 , 19 S.E.2d 705, 716 (1942) (Hudgins, J., dissenting); cf. Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 233, 237-39 , 522 S.E.2d 401, 403-04 (1999) (holding that where a scientific test took multiple samples to produce a single result and the statute gave the defendant the right to observe the "breath test," "sample," and "blood alcohol reading," phrased in the singular, the defendant only had the right to see the final prin

2009Long ago Justice Hudgins suggested as much when he remarked that "it would be unreasonable to state that `periods' refer to `one single term.'" Hudson v. Youell, 179 Va. 442, 465 , 19 S.E.2d 705, 716 (1942) (Hudgins, J., dissenting); cf. Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 233, 237-39 , 522 S.E.2d 401, 403-04 (1999) (holding that where a scientific test took multiple samples to produce a single result and the statute gave the defendant the right to observe the "breath test," "sample," and "blood alcohol reading," phrased in the singular, the defendant only had the right to see the final prin

2009Long ago Justice Hudgins suggested as much when he remarked that "it would be unreasonable to state that `periods' refer to `one single term.'" Hudson v. Youell, 179 Va. 442, 465 , 19 S.E.2d 705, 716 (1942) (Hudgins, J., dissenting); cf. Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 233, 237-39 , 522 S.E.2d 401, 403-04 (1999) (holding that where a scientific test took multiple samples to produce a single result and the statute gave the defendant the right to observe the "breath test," "sample," and "blood alcohol reading," phrased in the singular, the defendant only had the right to see the final prin

2009Long ago Justice Hudgins suggested as much when he remarked that "it would be unreasonable to state that `periods' refer to `one single term.'" Hudson v. Youell, 179 Va. 442, 465 , 19 S.E.2d 705, 716 (1942) (Hudgins, J., dissenting); cf. Rasmussen v. Commonwealth, 31 Va.App. 233, 237-39 , 522 S.E.2d 401, 403-04 (1999) (holding that where a scientific test took multiple samples to produce a single result and the statute gave the defendant the right to observe the "breath test," "sample," and "blood alcohol reading," phrased in the singular, the defendant only had the right to see the final prin

1984See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 136 , 183 S.E.2d 179 (1971).

1984See Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 136 , 183 S.E.2d 179 (1971).

2015See Penny v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 494, 498 , 370 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1988) (holding that “[w]hile standard computer printouts which simply repeat recorded human observations may constitute a classic form of hearsay, . . . the admissibility of the computer generated [evidence is] more appropriately analyzed as a scientific test”).

2015See Penny v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 494, 498 , 370 S.E.2d 314, 316 (1988) (holding that “[w]hile standard computer printouts which simply repeat recorded human observations may constitute a classic form of hearsay, . . . the admissibility of the computer generated [evidence is] more appropriately analyzed as a scientific test”).

2006That court reasoned, “[cjertificates of chemical analysis are neither discretionary nor based on opinion; rather, they merely state the results of a well-recognized scientific test.” Id.

2006Laboratory results which “state the results of a well-recognized scientific test,” Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005), have been classified as non-testimonial in other jurisdictions.

2006See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 311 n. 7, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 1266 n. 7, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (noting that Daubert interpreted and altered the federal rules of evidence, not the Constitution); Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting the appellant's argument that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Barefoot when it later issued its Daubert standards for the admission of scientific evidence); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir.2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (acknowledging that Barefoot remained valid and binding on the lower courts); United Stat

2006See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 311 n. 7, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 1266 n. 7, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (noting that Daubert interpreted and altered the federal rules of evidence, not the Constitution); Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting the appellant’s argument that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Barefoot when it later issued its Daubert standards for the admission of scientific evidence); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir.2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (acknowledging that Barefoot remained valid and binding on the lower courts); United Stat

2006See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 311 n. 7, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 1266 n. 7, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (noting that Daubert interpreted and altered the federal rules of evidence, not the Constitution); Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting the appellant’s argument that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Barefoot when it later issued its Daubert standards for the admission of scientific evidence); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir.2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (acknowledging that Barefoot remained valid and binding on the lower courts); United Stat

2006See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 311 n. 7, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 1266 n. 7, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (noting that Daubert interpreted and altered the federal rules of evidence, not the Constitution); Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting the appellant’s argument that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Barefoot when it later issued its Daubert standards for the admission of scientific evidence); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir.2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (acknowledging that Barefoot remained valid and binding on the lower courts); United Stat

2006See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 311 n. 7, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 1266 n. 7, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (noting that Daubert interpreted and altered the federal rules of evidence, not the Constitution); Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting the appellant's argument that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Barefoot when it later issued its Daubert standards for the admission of scientific evidence); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir.2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (acknowledging that Barefoot remained valid and binding on the lower courts); United Stat

2006See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 311 n. 7, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 1266 n. 7, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (noting that Daubert interpreted and altered the federal rules of evidence, not the Constitution); Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting the appellant’s argument that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Barefoot when it later issued its Daubert standards for the admission of scientific evidence); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir.2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (acknowledging that Barefoot remained valid and binding on the lower courts); United Stat

2006See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 311 n. 7, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 1266 n. 7, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (noting that Daubert interpreted and altered the federal rules of evidence, not the Constitution); Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting the appellant's argument that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Barefoot when it later issued its Daubert standards for the admission of scientific evidence); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir.2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (acknowledging that Barefoot remained valid and binding on the lower courts); United Stat

2006See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 , 311 n. 7, 118 S.Ct. 1261 , 1266 n. 7, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998) (noting that Daubert interpreted and altered the federal rules of evidence, not the Constitution); Johnson v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting the appellant’s argument that the Supreme Court implicitly overruled Barefoot when it later issued its Daubert standards for the admission of scientific evidence); Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 458 (5th Cir.2000) (Garza, J., concurring) (acknowledging that Barefoot remained valid and binding on the lower courts); United Stat

2000See Code § 19.2-270.5; [2] Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 289-90 , 384 S.E.2d 775, 782-83 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 , 110 S.Ct. 759 , 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 239-40 , 421 S.E.2d 821, 832-33 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 , 113 S.Ct. 1319 , 122 L.Ed.2d 705 (1993).

2000See Code § 19.2-270.5; [2] Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 289-90 , 384 S.E.2d 775, 782-83 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 , 110 S.Ct. 759 , 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 239-40 , 421 S.E.2d 821, 832-33 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 , 113 S.Ct. 1319 , 122 L.Ed.2d 705 (1993).

2000See Code § 19.2-270.5; [2] Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 289-90 , 384 S.E.2d 775, 782-83 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 , 110 S.Ct. 759 , 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 239-40 , 421 S.E.2d 821, 832-33 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 , 113 S.Ct. 1319 , 122 L.Ed.2d 705 (1993).

2000See Code § 19.2-270.5; [2] Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 289-90 , 384 S.E.2d 775, 782-83 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 , 110 S.Ct. 759 , 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 239-40 , 421 S.E.2d 821, 832-33 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 933 , 113 S.Ct. 1319 , 122 L.Ed.2d 705 (1993).

1995Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 550 , 323 S.E.2d 577, 587 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985).

1988See People v. Holowko, 109 *498 Ill. 2d 187, 486 N.E.2d 877 (1985); State v. Armstead, 432 So. 2d 837 (La. 1983). 1 While standard computer printouts which simply repeat recorded human observations may constitute a classic form of hearsay, we believe that the admissibility of the computer generated call trap results are more appropriately analyzed as a scientific test.

1988The Supreme Court of the United States has explained that “[t]he primary justification for the exclusion of hearsay is the lack of any opportunity for the adversary to cross-examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is introduced into evidence.” Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974); see also McCormick, Evidence § 245 (3d ed.); 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1362 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974); C.