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9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Derrington v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2008Id. at 442 (citing Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1341 (D.C.1985)). 1996Geddie v. United States, 663 A.2d 531, 534 (D.C.1995); see Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1341 (D.C.1985); Wilson v. United States, 380 A.2d 1001, 1004 (D.C.1977). | 2 | 2 |
Wilson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996Geddie v. United States, 663 A.2d 531, 534 (D.C.1995); see Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1341 (D.C.1985); Wilson v. United States, 380 A.2d 1001, 1004 (D.C.1977). 1995See Wilson v. United States, 380 A.2d 1001, 1004 (D.C.1977) (“Generally, the trial court may decide a motion for a new trial without a hearing.” (citing Poteat v. United States, 363 A.2d 295, 297 (D.C.1976))). | 2 | 2 |
Poteat v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1995See Wilson v. United States, 380 A.2d 1001, 1004 (D.C.1977) (“Generally, the trial court may decide a motion for a new trial without a hearing.” (citing Poteat v. United States, 363 A.2d 295, 297 (D.C.1976))). 1977See Poteat v. United States, D.C.App., 363 A.2d 295, 297 (1976). | 2 | 2 |
Ellerbe v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2020In short, although we acknowledge that the evidence regarding whether Mr. Dorsey’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to procuring a defense expert is not entirely one-sided,5 the record essentially supports appellant’s assertion that counsel failed to arrange for the DNA expert assistance that he viewed as “necessary to Mr. Dorsey’s defense[.]” We are satisfied that on the deficient-representation prong of the Strickland analysis, no hearing was necessary, because the claim “can[] be disposed of by resort to the files and records of the case[.]” Ellerb | 1 | 1 |
Lane v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2020In short, although we acknowledge that the evidence regarding whether Mr. Dorsey’s trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to procuring a defense expert is not entirely one-sided,5 the record essentially supports appellant’s assertion that counsel failed to arrange for the DNA expert assistance that he viewed as “necessary to Mr. Dorsey’s defense[.]” We are satisfied that on the deficient-representation prong of the Strickland analysis, no hearing was necessary, because the claim “can[] be disposed of by resort to the files and records of the case[.]” Ellerb | 1 | 1 |
Geddie v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1996Geddie v. United States, 663 A.2d 531, 534 (D.C.1995); see Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1341 (D.C.1985); Wilson v. United States, 380 A.2d 1001, 1004 (D.C.1977). 1996Geddie v. United States, 663 A.2d 531, 534 (D.C.1995); see Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1341 (D.C.1985); Wilson v. United States, 380 A.2d 1001, 1004 (D.C. 1977). | 1 | 1 |
Corley v. BP Oil Corp.green1 sentence1994GMK seeks a remand for an award of the entire $12,629 33 and for the imposition of additional sanctions for what it contends was caused by appellees’ efforts to avoid the initial sanction. 34 Sanctions for failure to make discovery are “particularly committed to the trial court’s discretion.” Corley v. BP Oil Corp., 402 A.2d 1258, 1261 (D.C.1979) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Ramsey v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1994In addition, the trial judge found that by bringing out Pree’s prior inconsistent statements in her effort to get out of prison, trial counsel had produced “ ‘powerful evidence of Pree’s motives to accuse [appellant] falsely, motives far more potent than bias’ without incurring the risk of engendering jury hostility.” Third, the trial judge could properly deny appellant’s motion for a new trial without a hearing because “the record conclusively shows that he is not entitled to the relief he seeks because his claims are ‘palpa *97 bly incredible.’” 8 See Wright v. United States, 608 A.2d 763, 7 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lloyd Ray Bradshawgreen1 sentence1994In addition, the trial judge found that by bringing out Pree’s prior inconsistent statements in her effort to get out of prison, trial counsel had produced “ ‘powerful evidence of Pree’s motives to accuse [appellant] falsely, motives far more potent than bias’ without incurring the risk of engendering jury hostility.” Third, the trial judge could properly deny appellant’s motion for a new trial without a hearing because “the record conclusively shows that he is not entitled to the relief he seeks because his claims are ‘palpa *97 bly incredible.’” 8 See Wright v. United States, 608 A.2d 763, 7 | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1994In addition, the trial judge found that by bringing out Pree’s prior inconsistent statements in her effort to get out of prison, trial counsel had produced “ ‘powerful evidence of Pree’s motives to accuse [appellant] falsely, motives far more potent than bias’ without incurring the risk of engendering jury hostility.” Third, the trial judge could properly deny appellant’s motion for a new trial without a hearing because “the record conclusively shows that he is not entitled to the relief he seeks because his claims are ‘palpa *97 bly incredible.’” 8 See Wright v. United States, 608 A.2d 763, 7 | 1 | 1 |
Tibbs v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1994In addition, the trial judge found that by bringing out Pree’s prior inconsistent statements in her effort to get out of prison, trial counsel had produced “ ‘powerful evidence of Pree’s motives to accuse [appellant] falsely, motives far more potent than bias’ without incurring the risk of engendering jury hostility.” Third, the trial judge could properly deny appellant’s motion for a new trial without a hearing because “the record conclusively shows that he is not entitled to the relief he seeks because his claims are ‘palpa *97 bly incredible.’” 8 See Wright v. United States, 608 A.2d 763, 7 | 1 | 1 |
Doepel v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1986Moreover, the court notes that the Court of Appeals in its decision in Doepel v. United States, (supra) at p. 453, held that the defendant’s written confession was “sufficient evidence to justify the verdict of guilty” to the Murder I offense, and refused to find error with the trial court’s treatment of the defendant’s insanity defense when he raised the issue of “pathological intoxication.” The correctness of this order of denial is before us. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Herbin v. United States
green
1 sentence2008Id. at 442 (citing Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1341 (D.C.1985)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Godfrey v. United States
green
2 sentences1994In addition, the trial judge found that by bringing out Pree’s prior inconsistent statements in her effort to get out of prison, trial counsel had produced “ ‘powerful evidence of Pree’s motives to accuse [appellant] falsely, motives far more potent than bias’ without incurring the risk of engendering jury hostility.” Third, the trial judge could properly deny appellant’s motion for a new trial without a hearing because “the record conclusively shows that he is not entitled to the relief he seeks because his claims are ‘palpa *97 bly incredible.’” 8 See Wright v. United States, 608 A.2d 763, 7 1994In addition, the trial judge found that by bringing out Pree’s prior inconsistent statements in her effort to get out of prison, trial counsel had produced “ ‘powerful evidence of Pree’s motives to accuse [appellant] falsely, motives far more potent than bias’ without incurring the risk of engendering jury hostility.” Third, the trial judge could properly deny appellant’s motion for a new trial without a hearing because “the record conclusively shows that he is not entitled to the relief he seeks because his claims are ‘palpa *97 bly incredible.’” 8 See Wright v. United States, 608 A.2d 763, 7 | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Local Union No. 368 of Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, & Paperhangers v. Barker Painting Co.
neutral
2 sentences1985Cf. Local 368, Brotherhood of Painters v. Barker Painting Co., 58 App.D.C. 51 , 24 F.2d 879 (1928) (in declaring attorney’s fees recoverable as damages upon an injunction bond, court rejected distinction between an interlocutory order and a final decree). 1985Cf. Local 368, Brotherhood of Painters v. Barker Painting Co., 58 App.D.C. 51 , 24 F.2d 879 (1928) (in declaring attorney’s fees recoverable as damages upon an injunction bond, court rejected distinction between an interlocutory order and a final decree). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.