without violation in Texas

1939Under the undisputed facts shown by this record, the failure of Corbin to include this strip in his original lease to Adkisson in 1930 (if it be conceded that *233 Re did not so include it), his subsequent conveyance of the strip to Burnett in 1935, and the quit-claim from Jackson, Wise & Snedden to Jordan in 1937, manifestly constituted a voluntary subdivision thereof from a larger tract capable of development as a whole without an exception to Rule 37, which under the rules of the Commission and numerous decisions of this court, beginning with Sun Oil Co. v. Railroad Comm., Tex.Civ.App., 68

1938Under these circumstances in the early consideration of these harrassing and perplexing questions this court, in the several rule 37 cases reported in 68 S.W.2d 609 -628, and in subsequent decisions wherein the Supreme Court has refused writs of error have adhered thereto, has held that the spacing provisions constituted, prima facie, a finding by the Commission that, absent some differentiating conditions, wells spaced at lesser distances and producing' equally would tend to cause waste; and likewise that one who, after the rule became applicable, acquired by voluntary segregation a leasehold

2025“A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections.” “The validity of a judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503 , 23 L Ed 398 “A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not a judicial determination of his rights.” Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261 , 31 L Ed 430 , 8 S Ct 461 Let us remember that the rules of procedure exist to ensure fairness and efficiency.

2025“A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections.” “The validity of a judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503 , 23 L Ed 398 “A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not a judicial determination of his rights.” Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261 , 31 L Ed 430 , 8 S Ct 461 Let us remember that the rules of procedure exist to ensure fairness and efficiency.

2025“A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections.” “The validity of a judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503 , 23 L Ed 398 “A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not a judicial determination of his rights.” Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261 , 31 L Ed 430 , 8 S Ct 461 Let us remember that the rules of procedure exist to ensure fairness and efficiency.

2025“A judgment may not be rendered in violation of constitutional protections.” “The validity of a judgment may be affected by a failure to give the constitutionally required due process notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Earle v. McVeigh, 91 US 503 , 23 L Ed 398 “A judgment of a court without hearing the party or giving him an opportunity to be heard is not a judicial determination of his rights.” Sabariego v Maverick, 124 US 261 , 31 L Ed 430 , 8 S Ct 461 Let us remember that the rules of procedure exist to ensure fairness and efficiency.

2016App. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Beck, 769 S.W.2d at 527 ; Rachuig v. State, 972 S.W.2d 170, 177 (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. ref’d).4 Because the State filed a separate notice meeting the requirements of Texas law, we overrule this issue. (3) Neither a New Trial nor a Hearing on Jones’ Motion for New Trial Was Required Jones also claims that he was improperly denied a new trial without a hearing.

2015Ex Parte Reis, 117 Tex. Crim. 123 , 33 S.W. 2d 435 (1930) was returned, the sheriff released relator COUNSEL: Marsene Johnson, Jr., of on a bond in the sum of five hundred Galveston, for appellant. dollars.

2015Ex Parte Reis, 117 Tex. Crim. 123 , 33 S.W. 2d 435 (1930) was returned, the sheriff released relator COUNSEL: Marsene Johnson, Jr., of on a bond in the sum of five hundred Galveston, for appellant. dollars.

1993Hernandez, 804 S.W.2d at 563 ; O’Merry, 727 S.W.2d at 601 .

1993Hernandez, 804 S.W.2d at 563 ; O’Merry, 727 S.W.2d at 601 .

1980Grant v. State, 59 Tex.Cr.R. 123 , 127 S.W. 173 . [emphasis added] This language in Moore fails to support the majority’s qualified version of the rule— that a conviction is prohibited on any state of facts “of which the accused has not been effectively notified.” I further submit that, other than in May v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 115 , 171 S.W.2d 488 (1943), this Court without exception has read Moore to stand for the basic proposition that the court in charging the jury, is bound by the allegations of the indictment.

1980Grant v. State, 59 Tex.Cr.R. 123 , 127 S.W. 173 . [emphasis added] This language in Moore fails to support the majority’s qualified version of the rule— that a conviction is prohibited on any state of facts “of which the accused has not been effectively notified.” I further submit that, other than in May v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 115 , 171 S.W.2d 488 (1943), this Court without exception has read Moore to stand for the basic proposition that the court in charging the jury, is bound by the allegations of the indictment.

1980Grant v. State, 59 Tex.Cr.R. 123 , 127 S.W. 173 . [emphasis added] This language in Moore fails to support the majority’s qualified version of the rule— that a conviction is prohibited on any state of facts “of which the accused has not been effectively notified.” I further submit that, other than in May v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 115 , 171 S.W.2d 488 (1943), this Court without exception has read Moore to stand for the basic proposition that the court in charging the jury, is bound by the allegations of the indictment.

1980Grant v. State, 59 Tex.Cr.R. 123 , 127 S.W. 173 . [emphasis added] This language in Moore fails to support the majority’s qualified version of the rule— that a conviction is prohibited on any state of facts “of which the accused has not been effectively notified.” I further submit that, other than in May v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 115 , 171 S.W.2d 488 (1943), this Court without exception has read Moore to stand for the basic proposition that the court in charging the jury, is bound by the allegations of the indictment.

1968On July 12, 1968, the petitioner presented another habeas corpus petition to the convicting court contending, among other things, that the jury which imposed the death penalty upon him was selected in violation of the doctrine of Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 , which decision of the United States Supreme Court is to be applied retroactively.

1968On July 12, 1968, the petitioner presented another habeas corpus petition to the convicting court contending, among other things, that the jury which imposed the death penalty upon him was selected in violation of the doctrine of Witherspoon v. State of Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 , which decision of the United States Supreme Court is to be applied retroactively.

1946On original consideration this court affirmed that judgment but on rehearing reversed its holding that there was no evidence, Judge Brown stating, “We think that the evidence is not such as to preclude a difference of opinion upon the question of negligence on the part of the defendant, and that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in the direction that it gave to the trial court,” and remanded the case to the trial court without instruction. 90 Texas, 82 , 36 S. W., 247 , 37 S. W., 319 .

1946On original consideration this court affirmed that judgment but on rehearing reversed its holding that there was no evidence, Judge Brown stating, “We think that the evidence is not such as to preclude a difference of opinion upon the question of negligence on the part of the defendant, and that the Court of Civil Appeals erred in the direction that it gave to the trial court,” and remanded the case to the trial court without instruction. 90 Texas, 82 , 36 S. W., 247 , 37 S. W., 319 .

1945In Smith v. State, 6 S. W. 40 , it was held that the record on *49 appeal “must show the reasons for the selection of, and the manner in which he became, special judge,” A number of authorities were cited and relied upon.

1921In 31 Cyc. pp. 1269 to 1270, it is said: "A principal also has a right to receive money from an agent in payment of a debt due from the latter without inquiry as to the source from which it came; and if it is in good faith so received and applied by the principal, its subsequent retention after he learns that it was procured through an unauthorized transaction entered into by the agent in his name will not amount to a ratification of such transaction." See, also, Kauffman v. Robey, 60 Tex. 308 , 48 Am.Rep. 264 ; Texas Loan Agency v. Taylor, 88 Tex. 47 , 29 S.W. 1057 ; Holmes v. Uvalde Nat.

1921In 31 Cyc. pp. 1269 to 1270, it is said: "A principal also has a right to receive money from an agent in payment of a debt due from the latter without inquiry as to the source from which it came; and if it is in good faith so received and applied by the principal, its subsequent retention after he learns that it was procured through an unauthorized transaction entered into by the agent in his name will not amount to a ratification of such transaction." See, also, Kauffman v. Robey, 60 Tex. 308 , 48 Am.Rep. 264 ; Texas Loan Agency v. Taylor, 88 Tex. 47 , 29 S.W. 1057 ; Holmes v. Uvalde Nat.

1921In 31 Cyc. pp. 1269 to 1270, it is said: "A principal also has a right to receive money from an agent in payment of a debt due from the latter without inquiry as to the source from which it came; and if it is in good faith so received and applied by the principal, its subsequent retention after he learns that it was procured through an unauthorized transaction entered into by the agent in his name will not amount to a ratification of such transaction." See, also, Kauffman v. Robey, 60 Tex. 308 , 48 Am.Rep. 264 ; Texas Loan Agency v. Taylor, 88 Tex. 47 , 29 S.W. 1057 ; Holmes v. Uvalde Nat.

1921In 31 Oye. pp. 1269 to 1270, it is said: “A principal also has a right to receive money from an agent in payment of a debt due from the latter without inquiry as to the source from which it came; and if it is in good faith so received and applied by the principal, its subsequent retention after he learns that it was procured through an unauthorized transaction entered into by the agent in his name will not amount to a ratification of such trans-aqtion.” See, also, Kauffman v. Robey, 60 Tex. 308 , 48 Am.

1921Bank, 222 S.W. 640 , and cases therein cited.

1910Richardson v. State, 3 App., 69 ; Cherry v. State, 4 App., 4 ; Gerald v. State, 4 App., 308 ; Johnson v. State, 26 App., 395 ; Neubauer v. State, 31 Texas Crim.