without error in Illinois

2025People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (2005).” People v. Quintero, 394 Ill.

2025The standard for review of trial court errors stated in Quintero derives (through People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (2005), and People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363 (2003)) from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), where the United States Supreme Court said that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 90 In In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d at 180 , this court explained that the reasonable doubt standard applied to constitutional errors but that “evidentiary error is harmless w

2004Our assessment of the evidence is reinforced by the trial court's statement that whether Ortiz identified the defendant near the scene of the robbery "doesn't matter at all [because] there is more than enough without this." "An error is harmless where a reviewing court can safely conclude that a trial without the error would produce no different result." Bradley , 336 Ill.

2004Our assessment of the evidence is reinforced by the trial court’s statement that whether Ortiz identified the defendant near the scene of the robbery “doesn’t matter at all [because] there is more than enough without this.” “An error is harmless where a reviewing court can safely conclude that a trial without the error would produce no different result.” Bradley, 336 Ill.

2002People v. Dunn , 326 Ill.

2002People v. Dunn, 326 Ill.

1997We have considered the totality of the evidence presented and can safely conclude that a trial without this error would produce no different result'"), rev'g 73 Ill.App.3d 783 , 392 N.E.2d 334 (1979).

1997We have considered the totality of the evidence presented and can safely conclude that a trial without this error would produce no different result’ ”), rev’g 73 Ill.

1993App. 3d 880, 884 , 334 N.E.2d 825 .) However, this is not without exception.

1991App. 3d 880 , 334 N.E.2d 825 .) However, this is not without exception.

2025The standard for review of trial court errors stated in Quintero derives (through People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 (2005), and People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 363 (2003)) from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), where the United States Supreme Court said that, “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” ¶ 90 In In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d at 180 , this court explained that the reasonable doubt standard applied to constitutional errors but that “evidentiary error is harmless w

2025App. 3d 716, 728 (2009), asserted, “ ‘The State bears the burden of persuasion to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been the same without the error.’ ” 2023 IL App (1st) 220427, ¶ 36 .

2022People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112 , ¶ 127. ¶ 56 Here, as the State points out, the defendant was charged with DUI under section 11- 501(a)(2) of the Vehicle Code.

2001Elliott, 308 Ill.

1996People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163 (1987).

1992Ed. 2d 171, 173 , 84 S. Ct. 229, 230 .) Considering the totality of the evidence presented, we conclude that a trial without this error would produce no different result.

1991(See People v. Parmly (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 386 , 512 N.E.2d 1213 .) Any error was harmless because defendant’s guilt was established by overwhelming evidence.

1991(See People v. Parmly (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 386 , 512 N.E.2d 1213 .) Any error was harmless because defendant’s guilt was established by overwhelming evidence.

1990App. 3d 427 , 405 N.E.2d 507 , a post-judgment petition to vacate a property settlement was denied by the trial court without a hearing.

1987The standard of review of an error of constitutional magnitude is that the court must find it to be not merely “harmless,” but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Martin-Trigona (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 295, 304 , 489 N.E.2d 1356, 1360 ), and the reviewing court must be able to “safely conclude that a trial without the error would produce no different result” (People v. Myles (1985), 131 Ill.

1987The standard of review of an error of constitutional magnitude is that the court must find it to be not merely “harmless,” but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Martin-Trigona (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 295, 304 , 489 N.E.2d 1356, 1360 ), and the reviewing court must be able to “safely conclude that a trial without the error would produce no different result” (People v. Myles (1985), 131 Ill.

1987The standard of review of an error of constitutional magnitude is that the court must find it to be not merely “harmless,” but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Martin-Trigona (1986), 111 Ill. 2d 295, 304 , 489 N.E.2d 1356, 1360 ), and the reviewing court must be able to “safely conclude that a trial without the error would produce no different result” (People v. Myles (1985), 131 Ill.

1987App. 3d 1034, 1044 , 476 N.E.2d 1333, 1340 ).

1985Ed. 2d 96, 105-06 , 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1980 .) Error is harmless where a reviewing court can safely conclude that a trial without the error would produce no different result.

1984App. 3d 189 , 429 N.E.2d 548 , a case cited by neither of the parties to this action, the court found without analysis that a defendant’s traffic court conviction for driving too fast for conditions was admissible in a later civil case.

1982In this type of situation, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to seek out and validate any claim of prejudice which is “founded on mere conjecture.” (People v. Lewis (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 152, 158 , 330 N.E.2d 857 .) We “can safely conclude that a trial without this error would produce no different result.” People v. Warmack (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 112, 128-29 .

1982In this type of situation, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to seek out and validate any claim of prejudice which is “founded on mere conjecture.” (People v. Lewis (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 152, 158 , 330 N.E.2d 857 .) We “can safely conclude that a trial without this error would produce no different result.” People v. Warmack (1980), 83 Ill. 2d 112, 128-29 .

1980In In re Estate of Kunz (1972), 7 Ill.

1979App. 3d 782, 807 , 344 N.E.2d 583 .) In summary, although the trial was not without error, we believe defendant received a fair trial and that a new trial is not mandated.