9 Illinois opinions name it 1 courts 1994–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Burchell v. Marshgreen2 sentences2026A contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of the Chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the end, of the litigation.’ ” Garver v. Ferguson, 76 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1979), quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854). ¶ 25 Morgan further asserts that an arbitrator exceeds his power when he “appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.” This argument implicates the “manifest disregard of the law” standard, which provides that a court may vacate an arb 2025A contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of the Chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the end, of the litigation.’ ” Garver v. Ferguson, 76 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1979), quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854). 11 No. 1-24-1488 ¶ 26 Morgan further asserts that an arbitrator exceeds his power when he “appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.” This argument implicates the “manifest disregard of the law” standard, which provides that a court | 3 | 3 |
TruServ Corp. v. Ernst & Young LLPgreen2 sentences2026TruServ Corp. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 376 Ill. 2025TruServ Corp. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 376 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Garver v. Fergusongreen2 sentences2026A contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of the Chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the end, of the litigation.’ ” Garver v. Ferguson, 76 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1979), quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854). ¶ 25 Morgan further asserts that an arbitrator exceeds his power when he “appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.” This argument implicates the “manifest disregard of the law” standard, which provides that a court may vacate an arb 2025A contrary course would be a substitution of the judgment of the Chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties, and would make an award the commencement, not the end, of the litigation.’ ” Garver v. Ferguson, 76 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1979), quoting Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854). 11 No. 1-24-1488 ¶ 26 Morgan further asserts that an arbitrator exceeds his power when he “appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.” This argument implicates the “manifest disregard of the law” standard, which provides that a court | 3 | 3 |
Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.green2 sentences2019See also id. at 602 (stating that “[i]f the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the [federal Natural Gas Act of 1938 ( 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. (1940))] is at an end”). ¶ 47 Notably, the intervenors argue that Gorman testified that a ROE of 9% would maintain IAWC’s financial integrity but ignore that Moul criticized Gorman’s analysis. 2018See also id. at 602 , 64 S.Ct. 281 (stating that "[i]f the total effect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial inquiry under the [federal Natural Gas Act of 1938 ( 15 U.S.C. § 717 et seq. (1940) ) ] is at an end"). ¶ 47 Notably, the intervenors argue that Gorman testified that a ROE of 9% would maintain IAWC's financial integrity but ignore that Moul criticized Gorman's analysis. *390 *239 As the Commission observes on appeal, Gorman admitted that his analysis was not as comprehensive as Standard & Poor's financial review. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Perezgreen1 sentence1996United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 1995) ("the governing legal standard for resolving [when a civil penalty may constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes] is whether the civil sanction serves solely a remedial purpose”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Beggs v. The Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186
green
2 sentences2021We will uphold the Board’s discharge decision unless, after applying the governing legal standard for discharge to the established facts, we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 43 The Board’s finding that Longanecker committed the misconduct charged in this case was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 2021We will uphold the Board’s discharge decision unless, after applying the governing legal standard for discharge to the established facts, we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 58 We find no such mistake here. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
United States v. Guy Jerome Ursery
green
1 sentence1996United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Davis
green
1 sentence1994(People v. Davis (1982), 105 Ill. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.