governing legal principle (New York) · Go Syfert
← New York issues

governing legal principle in New York

44 New York opinions name it 4 courts 1998–2026 17 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (26)

CaseFollowedCited
Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc.green
ny · 2006 · cited in 16 New York opinions naming this issue, 2007–2026
2 sentences

2026The record does not establish that the arbitrator knew of a governing legal principle yet either refused to apply it or ignored it altogether ( see Wien & Malkin LLP, 6 NY3d at 481).

2026"To . . . vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case" ( Wien & Malkin LLP v Helmsley-Spear, Inc. , 6 NY3d at 481 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Panos v Mid Hudson Med.

1316
Michael E. Wallace, David Jacaruso and Joseph Scotti v. Daljit S. Buttar and Paramjit Buttar, Robert Winston, Additionalgreen
ca2 · 2004 · cited in 10 New York opinions naming this issue, 2004–2025
2 sentences

2025Specifically, petitioner did not make the required showing that the arbitration panel acted in "manifest disregard" of the applicable law, as petitioner failed to establish that the arbitrators "knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether" ( Wallace v Buttar , 378 F3d 182, 189 [2d Cir 2004]; see also Cantor Fitzgerald Sec. v Refco Sec., LLC , 83 AD3d 592, 593 [1st Dept 2011]).

2022"To modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, a court must find 'both that (1) the arbitrator[ ] knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator[ ] was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case'" ( Wien & Malkin LLP v Helmsley-Spear, Inc. , 6 NY3d at 481, quoting Wallace v Buttar , 378 F3d 182, 189 [2d Cir]).

710
Schiferle v. Capital Fence Co., Inc.green
nyappdiv · 2017 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2021–2024
2 sentences

2024"To modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrator[ ] knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator[ ] was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case" ( Schiferle , 155 AD3d at 127 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wien & Malkin LLP , 6 NY3d at 481 ; Barone v Haskins , 193 AD3d 1388, 1391 [4th Dept 2021], appeal dismissed 37 NY3d 1032 [2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 919 [2022]).

2024In any event, even if the two prior arbitration awards constituted substantive law, inasmuch as the record establishes that the arbitrator considered, but distinguished, those arbitration awards, we conclude that petitioner failed to establish that the arbitrator "knew of a governing legal principle" that was "well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case" and "yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether" ( Schiferle , 155 AD3d at 127 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of McKenna, Long & Aldridge, LLP v Ironshore Specialty Ins.

22
Pokoik v. Pokoikgreen
nyappdiv · 2014 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
2 sentences

2024Under Delaware or New York law, the managing member of an LLC owes fiduciary duties to the LLC members ( see Feeley v NHAOCG, LLC , 62 A3d 649, 660 [Del Ch 2012]; Pokoik v Pokoik , 115 AD3d 428, 429 [1st Dept 2014]).

2024Under Delaware or New York law, the managing member of an LLC owes fiduciary duties to the LLC members ( see Feeley v NHAOCG, LLC , 62 A3d 649, 660 [Del Ch 2012]; Pokoik v Pokoik , 115 AD3d 428, 429 [1st Dept 2014]).

22
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Suttergreen
scotus · 2013 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023
2 sentences

2023As the US Supreme Court stated in Oxford Health Plans Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter ( 569 US 564, 569 [2013]), "[b]ecause the parties 'bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their agreement,' an arbitral decision 'even arguably construing or applying the contract' must stand, regardless of a court's view of its (de)merits." Here, the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the applicable law in reasoning that "the plain meaning of the words of the arbitration clause unambiguously permitted class arbitrations." As the arbitrator noted, SG intentionally broadened the standard AAA arbi

2023As the US Supreme Court stated in Oxford Health Plans Oxford Health Plans LLC v Sutter ( 569 US 564, 569 [2013]), "[b]ecause the parties 'bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their agreement,' an arbitral decision 'even arguably construing or applying the contract' must stand, regardless of a court's view of its (de)merits." Here, the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the applicable law in reasoning that "the plain meaning of the words of the arbitration clause unambiguously permitted class arbitrations." As the arbitrator noted, SG intentionally broadened the standard AAA arbi

22
Banco De Seguros Del Estado v. Mutual Marine Office, Inc. And Mt. McKinley Insurance Company, as Successor of the Gibraltar Casualty Companygreen
ca2 · 2003 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2006–2018
2 sentences

2018Off., Inc. , 344 F3d 255, 263 [2d Cir 2003])" ( Wien & Malkin , 6 NY3d at 480-481 [footnotes omitted]). [FN11] We turn first to the arbitrators' dismissal of NutraSweet's second and third counterclaims for equitable rescission of the transaction based on fraud in the inducement.

2006Off., Inc., 344 F3d 255, 263 [2d Cir 2003]).

22
Transparent Value, L.L.C. v. Johnsongreen
nyappdiv · 2012 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
2 sentences

2017“To modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, a court must find ‘both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case’ ” (id. at 481, quoting Wallace v Buttar, 378 F3d 182, 189 [2004]; see Transparent Value, L.L.C. v Johnson, 93 AD3d 599, 601 [2012] [recapitulating standard]; see e.g.

2017"To modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case' " (id. at 481, quoting Wallace v Buttar, 378 F3d 182, 189 ; see Transparent Value, L.L.C. v Johnson, 93 AD3d 599, 601 [recapitulating standard]; see e.g.

22
Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v. Sterngreen
nyappdiv · 2012 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013The particular vagaries of how long it takes to procure the structured dismissal of a bankruptcy case are not within the usual knowledge of an ordinary person, nor are they purely a matter of bankruptcy law which the court could have determined without the benefit of an expert opinion (compare Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v Stern, 99 AD3d 58, 63 [1st Dept 2012] [expert opinion was not required where “the mechanics of the governing legal framework (of a Tike-kind exchange’ under Internal Revenue Code [26 USC] § 1031) (we)re undisputed, and the issue of proximate cause turn(ed) on the discrete factu

2013The particular vagaries of how long it takes to procure the structured dismissal of a bankruptcy case are not within the usual knowledge of an ordinary person, nor are they purely a matter of bankruptcy law which the court could have determined without the benefit of an expert opinion (compare Wo Yee Hing Realty Corp. v Stern, 99 AD3d 58, 63 [1st Dept 2012] [expert opinion was not required where “the mechanics of the governing legal framework (of a Tike-kind exchange’ under Internal Revenue Code [26 USC] § 1031) (we)re undisputed, and the issue of proximate cause turn(ed) on the discrete factu

22
Matter of Panos v. Mid Hudson Med. Group, P.C.green
nyappdiv · 2022 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2025–2026
2 sentences

2026Group, P.C. , 204 AD3d 1016, 1018 ).

2025Group, P.C. , 204 AD3d 1016, 1018 [internal quotation marks omitted], quoting Wien & Malkin LLP v Helmsley-Spear, Inc. , 6 NY3d at 481 ).

12
Duferco International Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/sgreen
ca2 · 2003 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2008–2017
2 sentences

2017Rather, the award is subject to vacatur “only if a reviewing court finds both that (1) the arbitrator [ ] knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator [ ] was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case” (Wallace v Buttar, 378 F3d 182, 189 [2d Cir 2004] [internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipsis and citations omitted]; see Duferco, 333 F3d at 389 ).

2008Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F3d 383 [2d Cir 2003].) To vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, it must be shown that (1) “the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether,” and (2) “the law ignored by the arbitrators [was] well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.” (Matter of Roffler v Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 13 AD3d at 310 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted].) “It is not enough that the moving party provide proof that the arbitrator was aware of the governing legal principle; there must

12
Roffler v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogggreen
nyappdiv · 2004 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2008–2017
2 sentences

2017A court must determine whether "the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether," and whether the governing law ignored was "well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case" ( Matter of Roffler v Spear, Leeds & Kellogg , 13 AD3d 308 , 310 [1st Dept 2004]).

2017A court must determine whether "the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether," and whether the governing law ignored was "well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case" ( Matter of Roffler v Spear, Leeds & Kellogg , 13 AD3d 308 , 310 [1st Dept 2004]).

12
Westerbeke Corporation v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd.green
ca2 · 2002 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2006–2008
2 sentences

2008Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F3d 383 [2d Cir 2003].) To vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, it must be shown that (1) “the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether,” and (2) “the law ignored by the arbitrators [was] well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.” (Matter of Roffler v Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 13 AD3d at 310 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted].) “It is not enough that the moving party provide proof that the arbitrator was aware of the governing legal principle; there must

2008Klaveness Shipping A/S, 333 F3d 383 [2d Cir 2003].) To vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, it must be shown that (1) “the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether,” and (2) “the law ignored by the arbitrators [was] well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.” (Matter of Roffler v Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 13 AD3d at 310 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted].) “It is not enough that the moving party provide proof that the arbitrator was aware of the governing legal principle; there must

12
Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, Bv v. Standard Microsystems Corporationgreen
ca2 · 1997 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2003–2004
2 sentences

2004As we noted in Sawtelle v Waddell & Reed, Inc. ( 304 AD2d 103, 108 [2003]): “Under the [FAA], a court may vacate an arbitration award either on the grounds set forth in section 10 (a) of the FAA or on one of the several judicially recognized ‘nonstatutory’ grounds, such as irrationality . . . manifest disregard of the law ... or public policy . . . “ ‘Manifest disregard “clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law” [citation omitted]’ and ‘to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal princip

2003Since arbitration awards are, under federal law, subject to extremely limited review, the “showing required to avoid summary confirmation of an arbitration award is high”; a party moving to vacate the award has the burden of proof (Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F3d 9, 12 [2d Cir]; Halligan, 148 F3d at 202 ). “[M]anifest disregard ‘clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law’ [citation omitted]” and “to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principl

12
Sawtelle v. Waddell & Reed, Inc.green
nyappdiv · 2003 · cited in 2 New York opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
2 sentences

2004Moreover, manifest disregard of the law means more than an error or misunderstanding of the applicable law (see Sawtelle, 304 AD2d at 108 ).

2004As we noted in Sawtelle v Waddell & Reed, Inc. ( 304 AD2d 103, 108 [2003]): “Under the [FAA], a court may vacate an arbitration award either on the grounds set forth in section 10 (a) of the FAA or on one of the several judicially recognized ‘nonstatutory’ grounds, such as irrationality . . . manifest disregard of the law ... or public policy . . . “ ‘Manifest disregard “clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law” [citation omitted]’ and ‘to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal princip

12
Runner v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.green
ny · 2009 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026The relevant inquiry is not the precise distance the object traveled, or the amount of kinetic energy generated, but whether the injury was the direct consequence of a failure to provide adequate protection against a gravity-related risk (see Runner v New York Stock Exch., Inc., 13 NY3d 599, 604 [2009]; Wilinski v 334 E. 92nd Hous.

11
Joseph Saint v. Syracuse Supply Companygreen
ny · 2015 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2026–2026
1 sentence

2026Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and contractors to provide safety devices that give proper protection to workers exposed to elevation-related risks, and it imposes absolute liability where a violation of the statute is a proximate cause of the injury (see Saint v Syracuse Supply Co., 25 NY3d 117, 124 [2015]; Ross v Curtis–Palmer Hydro–Elec.

11
Karedes v. Colellagreen
ny · 2003 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
2 sentences

2025Our case law makes clear, however, that the governing legal standard asks whether the municipal body purported to "contractually bind[ ] its successors in [an] area[ ] relating to governance," with no balancing test involved ( Karedes , 100 NY2d at 50).

2025Our case law makes clear, however, that the governing legal standard asks whether the municipal body purported to "contractually bind[ ] its successors in [an] area[ ] relating to governance," with no balancing test involved ( Karedes , 100 NY2d at 50 ).

11
Cantor Fitzgerald Securities v. Refco Securities, LLCgreen
nyappdiv · 2011 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025Specifically, petitioner did not make the required showing that the arbitration panel acted in "manifest disregard" of the applicable law, as petitioner failed to establish that the arbitrators "knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether" ( Wallace v Buttar , 378 F3d 182, 189 [2d Cir 2004]; see also Cantor Fitzgerald Sec. v Refco Sec., LLC , 83 AD3d 592, 593 [1st Dept 2011]).

11
People v. McBroomgreen
nyappdiv · 2015 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025
1 sentence

2025On the contrary, it is apparent from a review of the arbitration award that the panel considered the language of this contract and the authorities cited by Zurich and analyzed both extensively ( see Matter of Abell v JetBlue Airways Corp. , 134 AD3d 476, 477 [1st Dept 2015]).

11
Barone v. Haskinsgreen
nyappdiv · 2021 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2024–2024
1 sentence

2024"To modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrator[ ] knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator[ ] was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case" ( Schiferle , 155 AD3d at 127 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wien & Malkin LLP , 6 NY3d at 481 ; Barone v Haskins , 193 AD3d 1388, 1391 [4th Dept 2021], appeal dismissed 37 NY3d 1032 [2021], lv denied 37 NY3d 919 [2022]).

11
Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., Bear, Stearns Securities Corp., and Richard Harriton v. 1109580 Ontario, Inc., Docket No. 04-3632-Cvgreen
ca2 · 2005 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019Application of the "manifest disregard of law" standard requires the court to make, in essence, three inquiries: (1) whether the legal principle allegedly ignored by the arbitrator was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable; (2) whether the arbitrators knew of the governing legal principle; and, (3) whether knowing that principle, the arbitrators refused to apply it or ignored it ( id.; see also Bear, Stearns & Co. v Ontario , Inc., 409 F3d 87 [2d Cir 2005]; Wallace v Buttar , 378 F3d 182 [2d Cir 2004]).

11
T. CO METALS, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc.green
ca2 · 2010 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2017–2017
1 sentence

2017Thus, an arbitral award must be enforced if there is even a “barely colorable justification for the outcome reached” (T.Co Metals, 592 F3d at 339 [emphasis omitted]).

11
In re the Arbitration between Stewart Tabori & Chang, Inc. & Stewartgreen
nyappdiv · 2001 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2009–2009
11
Morgan Stanley DW Inc. v. Afridigreen
nyappdiv · 2004 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
11
Basso v. Millergreen
ny · 1976 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
11
Eisenberg v. Angelo, Gordon & Co.green
nysd · 2000 · cited in 1 New York opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000
11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (18)

CaseCitedYears
Wien & Malkin LLP v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc. green
scotus · 2006
2 sentences

2019"To modify or vacate an award on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case" ( Wien & Malkin LLP v Helmsley-Spear, Inc. , 6 NY3d 471, 481 [2006], cert dismissed 548 US 940 [2006] [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2015The court properly found that the arbitration panel’s decision to enforce the provision of the letter agreement between the parties, which limited the prevailing parties’ damages to the actual damages suffered, did not evince a manifest disregard of the law, which requires a court to “find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case” (Wien & Malkin LLP v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 6 NY3d 471, 481 [2006] [internal quotation

32012–2019
cluster 755560 green
ca2 · 1998
2 sentences

2004As we noted in Sawtelle v Waddell & Reed, Inc. ( 304 AD2d 103, 108 [2003]): “Under the [FAA], a court may vacate an arbitration award either on the grounds set forth in section 10 (a) of the FAA or on one of the several judicially recognized ‘nonstatutory’ grounds, such as irrationality . . . manifest disregard of the law ... or public policy . . . “ ‘Manifest disregard “clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law” [citation omitted]’ and ‘to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal princip

2003Since arbitration awards are, under federal law, subject to extremely limited review, the “showing required to avoid summary confirmation of an arbitration award is high”; a party moving to vacate the award has the burden of proof (Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F3d 9, 12 [2d Cir]; Halligan, 148 F3d at 202 ). “[M]anifest disregard ‘clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law’ [citation omitted]” and “to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principl

32000–2004
Blair & Co., Inc. v. Gottdiener green
ca2 · 2006
2 sentences

2024A party seeking to vacate an arbitration award on the basis of manifest disregard of the law must satisfy a two-pronged test, proving that: "(1) the arbitrator knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case" ( id. at 111 ).

2024A party seeking to vacate an arbitration award on the basis of manifest disregard of the law must satisfy a two-pronged test, proving that: "(1) the arbitrator knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrator was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case" ( id. at 111 ).

22024–2024
Kingdon Capital Manangement v. Kaufman neutral
nyappdiv · 2013
2 sentences

2017Matter of Kingdon Capital Mgt., LLC v Kaufman, 110 AD3d 648 , 648 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 861 [2014] [recognizing and applying manifest disregard standard]; Matter of WBP Cent.

2017Matter of Kingdon Capital Mgt., LLC v Kaufman, 110 AD3d 648 , 648, lv denied 22 NY3d 861 [recognizing and applying manifest disregard standard]; Matter of WBP Cent.

22017–2017
COLOMBO SAVINGS BANK, FSB v. Heiko neutral
scotus · 2006
2 sentences

2008The arbitration award was not marked by manifest disregard of the law, there being no showing that the arbitrators had ignored or refused to apply a governing legal principle that was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case (see Wien & Malkin LLP v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 6 NY3d 471, 481 [2006], cert dismissed — US —, 127 S Ct 34 [2006]).

2008Petitioner has not established that the arbitration award was in manifest disregard of the law, since there has been no showing that the arbitrators ignored or refused to apply a governing legal principle (see Wien & Malkin LLP v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 6 NY3d 471, 479-481 [2006], cert dismissed — US — , 127 S Ct 34 [2006]).

22008–2008
Schwartz v. Sullivan green
scotus · 1998
2 sentences

2004As we noted in Sawtelle v Waddell & Reed, Inc. ( 304 AD2d 103, 108 [2003]): “Under the [FAA], a court may vacate an arbitration award either on the grounds set forth in section 10 (a) of the FAA or on one of the several judicially recognized ‘nonstatutory’ grounds, such as irrationality . . . manifest disregard of the law ... or public policy . . . “ ‘Manifest disregard “clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law” [citation omitted]’ and ‘to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal princip

2003Since arbitration awards are, under federal law, subject to extremely limited review, the “showing required to avoid summary confirmation of an arbitration award is high”; a party moving to vacate the award has the burden of proof (Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F3d 9, 12 [2d Cir]; Halligan, 148 F3d at 202 ). “[M]anifest disregard ‘clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law’ [citation omitted]” and “to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principl

22003–2004
DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. green
ca2 · 1997
2 sentences

2004As we noted in Sawtelle v Waddell & Reed, Inc. ( 304 AD2d 103, 108 [2003]): “Under the [FAA], a court may vacate an arbitration award either on the grounds set forth in section 10 (a) of the FAA or on one of the several judicially recognized ‘nonstatutory’ grounds, such as irrationality . . . manifest disregard of the law ... or public policy . . . “ ‘Manifest disregard “clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law” [citation omitted]’ and ‘to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal princip

2003Since arbitration awards are, under federal law, subject to extremely limited review, the “showing required to avoid summary confirmation of an arbitration award is high”; a party moving to vacate the award has the burden of proof (Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F3d 9, 12 [2d Cir]; Halligan, 148 F3d at 202 ). “[M]anifest disregard ‘clearly means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law’ [citation omitted]” and “to modify or vacate an award on this ground, a court must find both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principl

22003–2004
Benevolent Assn v. Perb green
ny · 2006
1 sentence

2023Without explanation, it departs from our general test for prohibited subjects of bargaining in favor of a new test that a subject we have previously deemed “prohibited” (PBA, 6 NY3d at 572 ) can remain 4 Auburn’s holding is much more limited than the majority implies and is irrelevant here.

12023–2023
In re of an Investigation into the Death of Jon L. green
ny · 1982
12015–2015
McCormick v. Favreau green
ny · 2011
12012–2012
Kalyanaram v. New York Institute of Technology green
nyappdiv · 2010
12012–2012
People v. Gil green
nyappdiv · 2006
12009–2009
Porzig v. Dresdner, Kleinwort, Benson, North America LLC green
ca2 · 2007
12008–2008
Kaminsky v. Segura green
nyappdiv · 2006
12008–2008
Spear, Leeds & Kellogg v. Bullseye Securities, Inc. green
nyappdiv · 2002
12003–2003
Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co. green
scotus · 1999
12000–2000
Sommer v. Federal Signal Corp. green
ny · 1992
11998–1998
Colnaghi, U.S.A., Ltd. v. Jewelers Protection Services, Ltd. green
ny · 1993
11998–1998

Statutes the citing opinions construe

USC § 9u.s.c.10 (13) USC § 9u.s.c.1 (6) USC § 9u.s.c.11 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

NY 44 (1998–2026) CT 41 (1996–2025) PA 32 (1985–2026) UT 23 (1996–2024) CA 18 (1975–2026) SC 13 (1998–2014) ID 12 (2005–2025) TX 11 (2011–2023) VA 10 (2004–2025) LA 10 (1991–2023) IL 9 (1994–2026) NJ 6 (1992–2026) CO 6 (2004–2025) MI 6 (1982–2019) KS 6 (2002–2024) AL 5 (2001–2013) MT 5 (1997–2013) GA 5 (2002–2014) WA 5 (1972–2018) VT 4 (2006–2023) OH 3 (2007–2019) AR 3 (2007–2008) MA 3 (2010–2017) MN 3 (1998–2014) OR 3 (2007–2022) KY 3 (2006–2018) MO 2 (2004–2017) FL 2 (2007–2012) IN 2 (1933–1935) OK 2 (2014–2014) MD 2 (2015–2015)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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