governing legal standard in Georgia

2014Specifically, OCGA § 37-3-41 requires a peace officer to act pursuant to (1) a physician’s certificate stating that the physician “has personally examined [the] person within the preceding 48 hours and found that . . . the person appears to be a mentally ill person requiring involuntary treatment,” or (2) a court order based upon either the above-referenced physician’s certificate or “upon the affidavits of at least two persons who attest that, within the preceding 48 hours, they have seen the person to be taken into custody and . . . have reason to 11 See Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F3d 725, 7

2014Specifically, OCGA § 37-3-41 requires a peace officer to act pursuant to (1) a physician’s certificate stating that the physician “has personally examined [the] person within the preceding 48 hours and found that . . . the person appears to be a mentally ill person requiring involuntary treatment,” or (2) a court order based upon either the above-referenced physician’s certificate or “upon the affidavits of at least two persons who attest that, within the preceding 48 hours, they have seen the person to be taken into custody and . . . have reason to 11 See Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F3d 725, 7

2007See Lanier Worldwide v. Bridgecenters at Park Meadows, LLC, 279 Ga. App. 879, 882 (1) ( 633 SE2d 49 ) (2006) (no manifest disregard where arbitrator acknowledged the governing legal principle, then applied it to the facts of the case).

2007See Lanier Worldwide v. Bridgecenters at Park Meadows, LLC, 279 Ga. App. 879, 882 (1) ( 633 SE2d 49 ) (2006) (no manifest disregard where arbitrator acknowledged the governing legal principle, then applied it to the facts of the case).

2007DeYoung, supra, 268 Ga. at 787 (7), 493 S.E.2d 157 .

2007DeYoung, supra, 268 Ga. at 787 (7), 493 S.E.2d 157 .

2006Both of these prongs must be met before a court may find that there has been a manifest disregard of law. *399 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F3d 200, 209 (2nd Cir. 2002).

2002Therefore, “[a]n arbitration board that incorrectly interprets the law has not manifestly disregarded it.” Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., supra at 1461. “[T]he term ‘disregard’ implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it. [Cit.]” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying federal law).

2002Therefore, "[a]n arbitration board that incorrectly interprets the law has not manifestly disregarded it." Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., supra at 1461. "[T]he term `disregard' implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it. [Cit.]" Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying federal law).

2002Therefore, "[a]n arbitration board that incorrectly interprets the law has not manifestly disregarded it." Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., supra at 1461. "[T]he term `disregard' implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it. [Cit.]" Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying federal law).