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41 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1996–2025 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Saturn Construction Co. v. Premier Roofing Co.green2 sentences2017We have emphasized, however, that "the 'manifest disregard of the law' ground for vacating an arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator's extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal principles." Id. "[T]hree elements ... must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the exis 2017We have emphasized, however, that "the 'manifest disregard of the law' ground for vacating an arbitration award is narrow and should be reserved for circumstances of an arbitrator's extraordinary lack of fidelity to established legal principles." Id. "[T]hree elements ... must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the exis | 1 | 11 |
Department of Public Safety v. State Board of Labor Relationsgreen2 sentences2017Accordingly, we conclude that remand to the board is required for fact-finding in accordance with the proper legal standard. 15 See Almada v. Administrator, Unem ployment Compensation Act , 137 Conn. 380 , 392-93, 77 A.2d 765 (1951) (remanding case to administrative agency for new hearing and finding of facts in accordance with court's articulated definition of lockout); Fabrizi v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act , 12 Conn.App. 207 , 209-12, 530 A.2d 203 (1987) (trial court should have remanded case to agency to determine factually whether employee quit voluntarily and without cau 2017Accordingly, we conclude that remand to the board is required for fact-finding in accordance with the proper legal standard. 15 See Almada v. Administrator, Unem ployment Compensation Act , 137 Conn. 380 , 392-93, 77 A.2d 765 (1951) (remanding case to administrative agency for new hearing and finding of facts in accordance with court's articulated definition of lockout); Fabrizi v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act , 12 Conn.App. 207 , 209-12, 530 A.2d 203 (1987) (trial court should have remanded case to agency to determine factually whether employee quit voluntarily and without cau | 1 | 1 |
Matthiessen v. Vanechgreen2 sentences2017See Matthiessen v. Vanech , supra, 266 Conn. at 833 -34 , 836 A.2d 394 . 2017See Matthiessen v. Vanech , supra, 266 Conn. at 833 -34 , 836 A.2d 394 . | 1 | 1 |
Westerbeke Corporation v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd.green2 sentences2015An arbitrator’s manifest disregard of a clearly governing legal principle is estab- lished if a party seeking vacatur ‘‘demonstrate[s] that the arbitrator knew of the relevant principle, appreci- ated that this principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it.’’ Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd., 304 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 2002). 2015Although an arbitrator’s ‘‘[e]xplicit rejection of governing law provides the strongest evidentiary basis for a finding that the arbitrator acted with the requisite intent’’; id.; a reviewing court also ‘‘may find intentional disregard if the reasoning supporting the arbitrator’s judgment strain[s] credulity . . . or does not rise to the standard of barely colorable . . . .’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 218 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Industrial Risk Insurers v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Insurance
green
2 sentences2018Co. , 273 Conn. 86 , 95, 868 A.2d 47 (2005). 2018Co. , 273 Conn. 86 , 95, 868 A.2d 47 (2005). | 4 | 2005–2018 |
Economos v. Liljedahl Bros., Inc.
green
2 sentences2025The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbi- tration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly appli- cable.’’ ( 2025The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbi- tration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly appli- cable.’’ ( | 3 | 2018–2025 |
Alexson v. Foss
green
2 sentences2025The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly per- ceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the exis- tence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.’’ ( 2025The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly per- ceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the exis- tence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.’’ ( | 2 | 2008–2025 |
Arciniega v. Feliciano
green
2 sentences2024We invite the legislature to clarify whether the 1978 amendments to § 9-325; Public Acts 1978, No. 78-125, § 10; authorize direct appeals to this court outside of the certified question process. 5 For a more extensive discussion of the governing legal framework, the reader is directed to this court’s decision in Arciniega v. Feliciano, 329 Conn. 293 , 296–300, 184 A.3d 1202 (2018). 2024We invite the legislature to clarify whether the 1978 amendments to § 9-325; Public Acts 1978, No. 78-125, § 10; authorize direct appeals to this court outside of the certified question process. 5 For a more extensive discussion of the governing legal framework, the reader is directed to this court’s decision in Arciniega v. Feliciano, 329 Conn. 293 , 296–300, 184 A.3d 1202 (2018). | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Fields v. Giron
green
2 sentences2021Even if an arbitrator misapplies the relevant law, such a misconstruction of the law [does] not demonstrate the [arbitrator’s] egregious or patently irrational rejec- tion of clearly controlling legal principles.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC, 65 Conn. App. 509, 514 , 783 A.2d 83 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 936 , 785 A.2d 231 (2001). ‘‘[M]anifest disregard of the law may be found only where the arbitrators understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Rai v. 2011A review of the panel's decision does not reveal that it "knew that [its] award was contrary to the law"; Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC, 65 Conn.App. 509, 515 , 783 A.2d 83 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 936 , 785 A.2d 231 (2001); or that it "understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 514, 783 A.2d 83 . | 2 | 2011–2021 |
Kalimian v. Zoning Board of Appeals
green
2 sentences2021Even if an arbitrator misapplies the relevant law, such a misconstruction of the law [does] not demonstrate the [arbitrator’s] egregious or patently irrational rejec- tion of clearly controlling legal principles.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC, 65 Conn. App. 509, 514 , 783 A.2d 83 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 936 , 785 A.2d 231 (2001). ‘‘[M]anifest disregard of the law may be found only where the arbitrators understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Rai v. 2011A review of the panel's decision does not reveal that it "knew that [its] award was contrary to the law"; Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC, 65 Conn.App. 509, 515 , 783 A.2d 83 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 936 , 785 A.2d 231 (2001); or that it "understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 514, 783 A.2d 83 . | 2 | 2011–2021 |
Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC
neutral
2 sentences2021Even if an arbitrator misapplies the relevant law, such a misconstruction of the law [does] not demonstrate the [arbitrator’s] egregious or patently irrational rejec- tion of clearly controlling legal principles.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC, 65 Conn. App. 509, 514 , 783 A.2d 83 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 936 , 785 A.2d 231 (2001). ‘‘[M]anifest disregard of the law may be found only where the arbitrators understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Rai v. 2021Even if an arbitrator misapplies the relevant law, such a misconstruction of the law [does] not demonstrate the [arbitrator’s] egregious or patently irrational rejec- tion of clearly controlling legal principles.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lathuras v. Shoreline Dental Care, LLC, 65 Conn. App. 509, 514 , 783 A.2d 83 , cert. denied, 258 Conn. 936 , 785 A.2d 231 (2001). ‘‘[M]anifest disregard of the law may be found only where the arbitrators understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also Rai v. | 2 | 2011–2021 |
Cheverie v. Ashcraft & Gerel
green
2 sentences2008The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” (Inter 2008The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” (Inter | 2 | 2004–2008 |
Cheverie v. Ashcraft & Gerel
green
2 sentences2008The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” (Inter 2008The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” (Inter | 2 | 2004–2008 |
Preston v. State
green
2 sentences2001The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable." (Inter 2001The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” (Inter | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Preston v. State
green
2 sentences2001The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” (Inter 2001The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” (Inter | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jack Bobker
green
2 sentences1997Saturn , 238 Conn. 305 , citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner Smith, Inc. v. Bobker , 808 F.2d 930 , 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986). 1996Saturn, 238 Conn. 305 , citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930 , 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986). | 2 | 1996–1997 |
State v. Connecticut State Employees Ass'n, SEIU Local 2001
green
2 sentences2025The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly per- ceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the exis- tence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.’’ ( 2025The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly per- ceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the exis- tence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.’’ ( | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Norwalk Police Union, Local 1727, Council 15, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Norwalk
green
2 sentences2020Under this ‘‘highly deferential standard’’; Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275 Conn. 102 ; our precedent instructs that three elements must be satis- fied before we will ‘‘vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the 2020Under this ‘‘highly deferential standard’’; Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., supra, 275 Conn. 102 ; our precedent instructs that three elements must be satis- fied before we will ‘‘vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the | 1 | 2020–2020 |
AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Department of Correction
green
2 sentences2019As we have explained previously in this opinion, the board must show that "(1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the [arbitrator] appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the [arbitrator] is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable." AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction , supra, 298 Conn. at 848 n.12, 6 A.3d 1142 . 2019As we have explained previously in this opinion, the board must show that "(1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the [arbitrator] appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the [arbitrator] is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable." AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565 v. Dept. of Correction , supra, 298 Conn. at 848 n.12, 6 A.3d 1142 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Asherman v. State
green
1 sentence2018The majority points out that the fact that "judges often disagree on the correct outcome under the governing legal standard ... does not, itself, convert a question of law into an exercise of discretion." Conversely, however, this court's adoption of guidelines, like those set forth in the four part test in Asherman v. State , supra, 202 Conn. at 434, 521 A.2d 578 , for determining whether a petition for a new trial should be granted, does not convert a discretionary judgment into a question of law. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
City of Bridgeport v. Kasper Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018"A trial court's decision to vacate an arbitrator's award under § 52-418 involves questions of law and, thus, we review them de novo." Bridgeport v. Kasper Group., Inc. , 278 Conn. 466 , 475, 899 A.2d 523 (2006). *649 To vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, three elements must be met: "(1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; a 2018"A trial court's decision to vacate an arbitrator's award under § 52-418 involves questions of law and, thus, we review them de novo." Bridgeport v. Kasper Group., Inc. , 278 Conn. 466 , 475, 899 A.2d 523 (2006). *649 To vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, three elements must be met: "(1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; a | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Fabrizi v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act
neutral
2 sentences2017Accordingly, we conclude that remand to the board is required for fact-finding in accordance with the proper legal standard. 15 See Almada v. Administrator, Unem ployment Compensation Act , 137 Conn. 380 , 392-93, 77 A.2d 765 (1951) (remanding case to administrative agency for new hearing and finding of facts in accordance with court's articulated definition of lockout); Fabrizi v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act , 12 Conn.App. 207 , 209-12, 530 A.2d 203 (1987) (trial court should have remanded case to agency to determine factually whether employee quit voluntarily and without cau 2017Accordingly, we conclude that remand to the board is required for fact-finding in accordance with the proper legal standard. 15 See Almada v. Administrator, Unem ployment Compensation Act , 137 Conn. 380 , 392-93, 77 A.2d 765 (1951) (remanding case to administrative agency for new hearing and finding of facts in accordance with court's articulated definition of lockout); Fabrizi v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act , 12 Conn.App. 207 , 209-12, 530 A.2d 203 (1987) (trial court should have remanded case to agency to determine factually whether employee quit voluntarily and without cau | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Almada v. Administrator
green
2 sentences2017Accordingly, we conclude that remand to the board is required for fact-finding in accordance with the proper legal standard. 15 See Almada v. Administrator, Unem ployment Compensation Act , 137 Conn. 380 , 392-93, 77 A.2d 765 (1951) (remanding case to administrative agency for new hearing and finding of facts in accordance with court's articulated definition of lockout); Fabrizi v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act , 12 Conn.App. 207 , 209-12, 530 A.2d 203 (1987) (trial court should have remanded case to agency to determine factually whether employee quit voluntarily and without cau 2017Accordingly, we conclude that remand to the board is required for fact-finding in accordance with the proper legal standard. 15 See Almada v. Administrator, Unem ployment Compensation Act , 137 Conn. 380 , 392-93, 77 A.2d 765 (1951) (remanding case to administrative agency for new hearing and finding of facts in accordance with court's articulated definition of lockout); Fabrizi v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act , 12 Conn.App. 207 , 209-12, 530 A.2d 203 (1987) (trial court should have remanded case to agency to determine factually whether employee quit voluntarily and without cau | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Harty v. Cantor Fitzgerald and Co.
green
2 sentences2015It is well settled that, in order for an arbitration award to be set aside on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, the party challenging the award has the burden to establish three elements: ‘‘(1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.’’ (Internal q 2015It is well settled that, in order for an arbitration award to be set aside on the ground of manifest disregard of the law, the party challenging the award has the burden to establish three elements: ‘‘(1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.’’ (Internal q | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Town of Marlborough v. Afscme, Council 4, Local 818-052
neutral
2 sentences2013“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the [arbitrator] manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the [arbitrator] appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the [arbitrator] is well defined, explicit, 2013“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the [arbitrator] manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the [arbitrator] appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the [arbitrator] is well defined, explicit, | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Town of Marlborough v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 818-052
green
2 sentences2013“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the [arbitrator] manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the [arbitrator] appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the [arbitrator] is well defined, explicit, 2013“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the [arbitrator] manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the [arbitrator] appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the [arbitrator] is well defined, explicit, | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Zelvin v. JEM Builders, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011"Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defi 2011"Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defi | 1 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Greer
green
2 sentences2010To the contrary, the writings of former Chief Justice Swift indicate that it was, in fact, regarded as a governing legal principle in this state. 41 We, therefore, must presume that the legislature did not intend to abrogate the rule when it enacted the Penal Code in 1971. 42 Indeed, in the absence of legislation “expressly includ ing a fetus within the definition of victims of homicide or [the passage of] a separate feticide statute ... no court of last resort in this country [had] held [prior to the enactment of our Penal Code] that the killing of a fetus is murder unless the fetus is bom al 2010To the contrary, the writings of former Chief Justice Swift indicate that it was, in fact, regarded as a governing legal principle in this state. 41 We, therefore, must presume that the legislature did not intend to abrogate the rule when it enacted the Penal Code in 1971. 42 Indeed, in the absence of legislation “expressly includ ing a fetus within the definition of victims of homicide or [the passage of] a separate feticide statute ... no court of last resort in this country [had] held [prior to the enactment of our Penal Code] that the killing of a fetus is murder unless the fetus is bom al | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Garrity v. McCaskey
green
2 sentences2008“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defi 2008“Under this highly deferential standard, the defendant has the burden of proving three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defi | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Nikituk v. Field Co. Builders, LLC
neutral
2 sentences2008The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” (Inter 2008The test consists of the following three elements, all of which must be satisfied in order for a court to vacate an arbitration award on the ground that the arbitration panel manifestly disregarded the law: (1) the error was obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator; (2) the arbitration panel appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore it; and (3) the governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitration panel is well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable.” (Inter | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. Department of Transportation green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Johnson v. De Toledo green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.