governing legal standard in California

2023Claire’s intent to disinherit Kenneth’s children from holding any interests in the LLCs appears nowhere in the LLC operating agreements themselves (Chang, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 82 [intent is clear where nonclient plaintiff “was an expressly named beneficiary of an express bequest”]) and was never conceded by the lawyers (Paul, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100 [intent is clear where lawyer admits to what client’s intent was]).

2023Claire’s intent to disinherit Kenneth’s children from holding any interests in the LLCs appears nowhere in the LLC operating agreements themselves (Chang, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 82 [intent is clear where nonclient plaintiff “was an expressly named beneficiary of an express bequest”]) and was never conceded by the lawyers (Paul, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100 [intent is clear where lawyer admits to what client’s intent was]).

2023Claire’s intent to disinherit Kenneth’s children from holding any interests in the LLCs appears nowhere in the LLC operating agreements themselves (Chang, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 82 [intent is clear where nonclient plaintiff “was an expressly named beneficiary of an express bequest”]) and was never conceded by the lawyers (Paul, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100 [intent is clear where lawyer admits to what client’s intent was]).

2023Claire’s intent to disinherit Kenneth’s children from holding any interests in the LLCs appears nowhere in the LLC operating agreements themselves (Chang, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 82 [intent is clear where nonclient plaintiff “was an expressly named beneficiary of an express bequest”]) and was never conceded by the lawyers (Paul, supra, 235 Cal.App.4th at p. 1100 [intent is clear where lawyer admits to what client’s intent was]).

2026(Rosevear, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 682 .) Also, an appellate court will not reverse “in the absence of a clear showing of abuse [of discretion], resulting in injury sufficiently grave as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Ibid.) But traditional appellate deference to discretionary trial court decisionmaking must sometimes give way on questions of law.

2026(Rosevear, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 682 .) Also, an appellate court will not reverse “in the absence of a clear showing of abuse [of discretion], resulting in injury sufficiently grave as to amount to a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (Ibid.) But traditional appellate deference to discretionary trial court decisionmaking must sometimes give way on questions of law.

2023(F.T., supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 15 [if the juvenile court’s decision “reflects an unawareness of the full scope of its discretion, it cannot be said the court has properly exercised its discretion under the law.”].) 14 DISPOSITION The visitation portions of the exit orders are reversed and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

2023(Sapp, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 104 [an abuse of discretion may be found where we conclude that “under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the trial court’s action, no judge reasonably could have reached the challenged result.”].) Accordingly, because the record does not reflect the juvenile court was aware of and applied the governing legal standard, we must reverse.

2022(Baker, supra, 10 Cal.5th at 1078 [“Deference may also be inappropriate when the court evinces a misunderstanding of the legal inquiry”].) When the prosecutor stated he excused Juror 8061 solely because of her response to his pool hypothetical, the trial court said, in pertinent part, “I do remember her response along those lines.

2022That is particularly so 20 (Hardy); see also People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 624 [“[C]omparative juror evidence is most effectively considered in the trial court where the defendant can make an inclusive record, where the prosecutor can respond to the alleged similarities, and where the trial court can evaluate those arguments based on what it has seen and heard”].) Third and finally, the on-the-record ruling the trial court made after the prosecution stated its ostensible reason for striking Juror 8061 reveals a misapprehension of the governing legal framework.

2021(In re Shannon M. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 282, 285, 288 .) The governing legal standard was a disputed issue in the juvenile court (id. at 25 p. 290) and the appellate court simply resolved that legal question on appeal.

2020We address each issue in turn after laying out the governing legal framework. 6 “The vexatious litigant statute (§ 391 et seq.) was enacted ‘ “to curb misuse of the court system” ’ by ‘ “persistent and obsessive” litigants.’ [Citation.]” (Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1198 (Thompson).) Relevant here, a 6 Thomas raises a host of other issues not properly before this court, including (but not limited to) whether this court denied him due process when dismissing several of his past appeals (most recently in 2014) and denying his motions for reconsideration and request for permissi

2016The governing legal principle is clear, “Where a cause of action based on the contract providing for attorney’s fees is joined with other causes of action beyond the contract, the prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees under section 1717 only as they relate to the contract action. . . . [¶] Conversely, . . . ‘[a]ttorney’s fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed.” (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 129-130; see Bell v. Vista Unified Schoo

2016The governing legal principle is clear, “Where a cause of action based on the contract providing for attorney’s fees is joined with other causes of action beyond the contract, the prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees under section 1717 only as they relate to the contract action. . . . [¶] Conversely, . . . ‘[a]ttorney’s fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed.” (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 129-130; see Bell v. Vista Unified Schoo

2016The governing legal principle is clear, “Where a cause of action based on the contract providing for attorney’s fees is joined with other causes of action beyond the contract, the prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees under section 1717 only as they relate to the contract action. . . . [¶] Conversely, . . . ‘[a]ttorney’s fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not allowed.” (Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alperson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 129-130; see Bell v. Vista Unified Schoo

2007(People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 279 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 , 6 P.3d 193 ].) The Attorney General’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress.

2007(People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 279 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532 , 6 P.3d 193 ].) The Attorney General’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress.

2004(See Davis v. Georgia, supra, 429 U.S. 122, 123 ; Gray v. Mississippi, supra, 481 U.S. 648, 659-667 (opn. of the court); id., at pp. 667-668 (plur. opn.); id., at p. 672 (cone. opn. of Powell, J.); People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 962 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ]; accord, Chanthadra, supra, 230 F.3d 1237, 1272-1273, 1275 .) As in another recent case ( Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946 ), we are troubled by this result because the error here at issue easily could have been avoided.

2004(See Davis v. Georgia, supra, 429 U.S. 122, 123 ; Gray v. Mississippi, supra, 481 U.S. 648, 659-667 (opn. of the court); id., at pp. 667-668 (plur. opn.); id., at p. 672 (cone. opn. of Powell, J.); People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 962 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ]; accord, Chanthadra, supra, 230 F.3d 1237, 1272-1273, 1275 .) As in another recent case ( Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946 ), we are troubled by this result because the error here at issue easily could have been avoided.

2004(See Davis v. Georgia, supra, 429 U.S. 122, 123 ; Gray v. Mississippi, supra, 481 U.S. 648, 659-667 (opn. of the court); id., at pp. 667-668 (plur. opn.); id., at p. 672 (cone. opn. of Powell, J.); People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 962 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ]; accord, Chanthadra, supra, 230 F.3d 1237, 1272-1273, 1275 .) As in another recent case ( Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946 ), we are troubled by this result because the error here at issue easily could have been avoided.

2004(See Davis v. Georgia, supra, 429 U.S. 122, 123 ; Gray v. Mississippi, supra, 481 U.S. 648, 659-667 (opn. of the court); id., at pp. 667-668 (plur. opn.); id., at p. 672 (cone. opn. of Powell, J.); People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 962 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ]; accord, Chanthadra, supra, 230 F.3d 1237, 1272-1273, 1275 .) As in another recent case ( Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946 ), we are troubled by this result because the error here at issue easily could have been avoided.

2004(See Davis v. Georgia, supra, 429 U.S. 122, 123 ; Gray v. Mississippi, supra, 481 U.S. 648, 659-667 (opn. of the court); id., at pp. 667-668 (plur. opn.); id., at p. 672 (cone. opn. of Powell, J.); People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 962 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ]; accord, Chanthadra, supra, 230 F.3d 1237, 1272-1273, 1275 .) As in another recent case ( Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946 ), we are troubled by this result because the error here at issue easily could have been avoided.

2004(See Davis v. Georgia, supra, 429 U.S. 122, 123 ; Gray v. Mississippi, supra, 481 U.S. 648, 659-667 (opn. of the court); id., at pp. 667-668 (plur. opn.); id., at p. 672 (cone. opn. of Powell, J.); People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 962 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112 , 820 P.2d 214 ]; accord, Chanthadra, supra, 230 F.3d 1237, 1272-1273, 1275 .) As in another recent case ( Heard, supra, 31 Cal.4th 946 ), we are troubled by this result because the error here at issue easily could have been avoided.

1998(Maj. opn., ante, at 80 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 759, 968 P.2d p. 470; see also id. at 80 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 760, 968 P.2d p. 471.) "`It is the general rule that the language of an opinion must be construed with reference to the facts presented by the case, and the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with such facts.' [Citations.]" ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 734-735 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 708 , 771 P.2d 406 .) As the majority perforce concedes, reconsideration of factual findings "did not actually occur here...." (Maj. opn., ante, at 80 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 759, 968 P.2d p.

1998(Maj. opn., ante, at 80 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 759, 968 P.2d p. 470; see also id. at 80 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 760, 968 P.2d p. 471.) "`It is the general rule that the language of an opinion must be construed with reference to the facts presented by the case, and the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with such facts.' [Citations.]" ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 734-735 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 708 , 771 P.2d 406 .) As the majority perforce concedes, reconsideration of factual findings "did not actually occur here...." (Maj. opn., ante, at 80 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 759, 968 P.2d p.

1998(Maj. opn., ante, at 80 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 759, 968 P.2d p. 470; see also id. at 80 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 760, 968 P.2d p. 471.) "`It is the general rule that the language of an opinion must be construed with reference to the facts presented by the case, and the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with such facts.' [Citations.]" ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 734-735 , 257 Cal.Rptr. 708 , 771 P.2d 406 .) As the majority perforce concedes, reconsideration of factual findings "did not actually occur here...." (Maj. opn., ante, at 80 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 759, 968 P.2d p.

1994The majority holds as a matter of law that plaintiffs have a legally recognized privacy interest (maj. opn., ante, pp. 39-40; accord, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., supra, 489 U.S. 602, 617 [ 103 L.Ed.2d 639, 659-660 ] ["collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable"]).

1994The majority holds as a matter of law that plaintiffs have a legally recognized privacy interest (maj. opn., ante, pp. 39-40; accord, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., supra, 489 U.S. 602, 617 [ 103 L.Ed.2d 639, 659-660 ] ["collection and testing of urine intrudes upon expectations of privacy that society has long recognized as reasonable"]).

1978“Expert evidence in a malpractice suit is conclusive as to the proof of the prevailing standard of skill and learning in the locality and of the propriety of particular conduct by the practitioner in particular instances because such standard and skill is not a matter of general knowledge and can only be supplied by expert testimony. [Citations.] . . .” (Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 156 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 28 A.L.R.3d 368 ].) We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the motion for nonsuit based on its conclusion that legal consequences of the facts by which Lips

1978“Expert evidence in a malpractice suit is conclusive as to the proof of the prevailing standard of skill and learning in the locality and of the propriety of particular conduct by the practitioner in particular instances because such standard and skill is not a matter of general knowledge and can only be supplied by expert testimony. [Citations.] . . .” (Lysick v. Walcom (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 136, 156 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 406 , 28 A.L.R.3d 368 ].) We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the motion for nonsuit based on its conclusion that legal consequences of the facts by which Lips

1978In those, the question is treated as one of law and not of fact, as it is in any negligence action. [Citations.] There are cases where regardless of the attorney’s negligence his advice or action was correct because of a governing legal principle so that the negligence does not proximately *976 cause harm. [Citations.] Except in those situations, the issue is one of fact. . . .” (Wright v. Williams, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d 802, 808-809 , fn. omitted.) “Generally, the creation of the attorney-client relationship imposes upon the lawyer the obligation to represent his client with ‘ “such skill, pru

1978In those, the question is treated as one of law and not of fact, as it is in any negligence action. [Citations.] There are cases where regardless of the attorney’s negligence his advice or action was correct because of a governing legal principle so that the negligence does not proximately *976 cause harm. [Citations.] Except in those situations, the issue is one of fact. . . .” (Wright v. Williams, supra, 47 Cal.App.3d 802, 808-809 , fn. omitted.) “Generally, the creation of the attorney-client relationship imposes upon the lawyer the obligation to represent his client with ‘ “such skill, pru