6 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jack Bobkergreen2 sentences2024In addition to the grounds enumerated in 9 U.S.C. § 10 that warrant vacatur of an arbitration award, an arbitration award may also be vacated under the unenumerated "manifest disregard" standard "where an arbitrator 'appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.'" Whitehead v. Pullman Grp., LLC, 811 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986)). 1992It requires that “the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.” Ibid. | 1 | 2 |
Rodriguez v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2026A Terry stop must be no more intrusive than necessary to achieve "the purpose that justified the stop in the first place." Shaw, 237 N.J. at 612 ; see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 348-49 (explaining that a stop's "tolerable duration is determined by the seizure's mission"). | 1 | 1 |
Whitehead Ex Rel. Estate of Whitehead v. Pullman Group, LLCgreen1 sentence2024In addition to the grounds enumerated in 9 U.S.C. § 10 that warrant vacatur of an arbitration award, an arbitration award may also be vacated under the unenumerated "manifest disregard" standard "where an arbitrator 'appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.'" Whitehead v. Pullman Grp., LLC, 811 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Harrisgreen1 sentence2021The careful review of police actions and decisions requires a painstaking step-by-step analysis that identifies precisely (1) when a Fourth Amendment liberty or privacy intrusion occurs; (2) the legal standard triggered by that intrusion (e.g., reasonable suspicion, probable cause, the warrant requirement, etc.); and (3) whether the liberty or privacy intrusion was justified at the moment it occurred, applying the governing legal standard to the totality of the circumstances known to police at that moment. provides [New Jersey] citizens with greater rights . . . than those available under the | 1 | 1 |
Bell Aerospace Co. Division of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of Americagreen2 sentences1992Bell Aerospace Company Division of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516, 356 F.Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y.1973), rev’d on other grounds, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.1974). 1992Bell Aerospace Company Division of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516, 356 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 500 F. 2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nathan Shaw State v. Keon L. Bolden (078247) (Monmouth County and Statewide)
green
1 sentence2026A Terry stop must be no more intrusive than necessary to achieve "the purpose that justified the stop in the first place." Shaw, 237 N.J. at 612 ; see also Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 348-49 (explaining that a stop's "tolerable duration is determined by the seizure's mission"). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Zayas v. Bacardi Corp.
green
1 sentence2022Defendant makes no showing the arbitrator recognized a clearly governing legal principle but then decided to ignore it, Westerbeke, 304 F.3d at 209 , that the arbitrator's decision is unfounded in reason and logic, is based on reas oning so faulty no judge could conceivably have made the same decision, or is based on a critical assumption of a non-fact, Zayas, 524 F.3d at 68 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Westerbeke Corporation v. Daihatsu Motor Co., Ltd.
green
1 sentence2022Defendant makes no showing the arbitrator recognized a clearly governing legal principle but then decided to ignore it, Westerbeke, 304 F.3d at 209 , that the arbitrator's decision is unfounded in reason and logic, is based on reas oning so faulty no judge could conceivably have made the same decision, or is based on a critical assumption of a non-fact, Zayas, 524 F.3d at 68 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. William L. Witt(074468)
green
1 sentence2021The careful review of police actions and decisions requires a painstaking step-by-step analysis that identifies precisely (1) when a Fourth Amendment liberty or privacy intrusion occurs; (2) the legal standard triggered by that intrusion (e.g., reasonable suspicion, probable cause, the warrant requirement, etc.); and (3) whether the liberty or privacy intrusion was justified at the moment it occurred, applying the governing legal standard to the totality of the circumstances known to police at that moment. provides [New Jersey] citizens with greater rights . . . than those available under the | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Borough of Moonachie v. Port of New York Authority
green
2 sentences1998Auth., 38 N.J. 414 , 185 A. 2d 207 (1962): [P]roperty owned by a public agency but employed primarily to obtain revenue or profit through private business uses is not immune from taxation, but property employed primarily for a public use does not lose immunity because the agency incidentally derives some private business income from it. [ Id. at 426-27 , 185 A. 2d 207 .] The legally significant property owned in this case is not the billboard but the land on which it sits. 1998Auth., 38 N.J. 414 , 185 A. 2d 207 (1962): [P]roperty owned by a public agency but employed primarily to obtain revenue or profit through private business uses is not immune from taxation, but property employed primarily for a public use does not lose immunity because the agency incidentally derives some private business income from it. [ Id. at 426-27 , 185 A. 2d 207 .] The legally significant property owned in this case is not the billboard but the land on which it sits. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Bell Aerospace Company Division Of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace And Agricultural Implement Workers Of America (Uaw)
green
2 sentences1992Bell Aerospace Company Division of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516, 356 F.Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y.1973), rev’d on other grounds, 500 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.1974). 1992Bell Aerospace Company Division of Textron, Inc. v. Local 516, 356 F. Supp. 354, 356 (W.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 500 F. 2d 921 (2d Cir. 1974). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.