23 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Berenda v. Langfordgreen2 sentences2006While these questions are usually left to the trial court, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when "the facts are so clear that reasonable persons could not disagree about the underlying facts or about the application of the governing legal standard to the facts." Id. (citing Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54 ). ¶ 38 Because the undisputed facts underlying the case before us unquestionably meet the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule, this case is one of "the clearest of cases" in which judgment as a matter of law is warranted. 2006While these questions are usually left to the trial court, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when "the facts are so clear that reasonable persons could not disagree about the underlying facts or about the application of the governing legal standard to the facts." Id. (citing Berenda, 914 P.2d at 54 ). ¶ 38 Because the undisputed facts underlying the case before us unquestionably meet the concealment version of the equitable discovery rule, this case is one of "the clearest of cases" in which judgment as a matter of law is warranted. | 2 | 7 |
Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc.green2 sentences2016Third, the panel must have "appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decide{d] to ignore or pay no attentlon to it." Id. (citation omitted). 12 On the other hand, we see no reason to defer to the panel's construction of the UUAA sections that govern the panel's own powers. 2016Third, the panel must have “appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decide[d] to ignore or pay no attention to it.” Id. (citation omitted). ¶12 On the other hand, we see no reason to defer to the panel’s construction of the UUAA sections that govern the panel’s own powers. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Cuttlergreen2 sentences2024Our supreme court has pulled back from previous extra-textual additions to rule 403, holding that “the governing legal standard for evaluating whether evidence satisfies rule 403 is the plain language of the rule, nothing more and nothing less.” State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶ 2 , 367 P.3d 981 . 2024Our supreme court has pulled back from previous extra-textual additions to rule 403, holding that “the governing legal standard for evaluating whether evidence satisfies rule 403 is the plain language of the rule, nothing more and nothing less.” State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶ 2 , 367 P.3d 981 . | 1 | 2 |
Westgate Resorts, Ltd. v. Adelgreen2 sentences2022Second, the error ―must have been obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator.‖ Third, the [arbitrator] must have ―appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decide[d] to ignore or pay no attention to it.‖ Id. (third and fourth alterations in original) (citation omitted). ¶80 David first argues that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law when he calculated Jill‘s imputed income. 2022David claims that the arbitrator failed to ―consider the significant money that [Jill] will 25 TAYLOR v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court be able to earn from investing her property division.‖ And he contends that the arbitrator based Jill‘s income ―not on the statutory factors, but on his own judgment that [Jill] should be allowed to work in the field of her choice . . . and given time to complete her degree.‖ ¶81 Utah Code specifies that imputation of income for alimony or child support purposes must ―be based upon employment potential and probable earnings.‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-12-203(8)(b). ―In eva | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schmidtgreen2 sentences2016See State v. Schmidt, 2015 UT 65, ¶ 18 , 356 P.3d 1204 (the prosecution is not required "to eliminate alternative inferences that could be drawn from the evidence in favor of the defense" (citation omitted)). 2016See State v. Schmidt, 2015 UT 65, ¶ 18 , 356 P.3d 1204 (the prosecution is not required "to eliminate alternative inferences that could be drawn from the evidence in favor of the defense" (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
National City Bank, Northwest v. Columbian Mutual Life Insurance Companygreen2 sentences2015Additionally, "the term 'disregard' implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it." Id. {citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 10 In support of his arguments that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding that Nielsen's seizure of Evans's interests in the Tax Companies constituted an allowable setoff under the Note's Setoff Provision, Evans contends that "[sletoff only works to cancel out mutual debts through disposition of the creditor's obligation to the debtor, while a security i 2015Additionally, "the term 'disregard' implies that the arbitrator appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it." Id. {citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 10 In support of his arguments that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding that Nielsen's seizure of Evans's interests in the Tax Companies constituted an allowable setoff under the Note's Setoff Provision, Evans contends that "[sletoff only works to cancel out mutual debts through disposition of the creditor's obligation to the debtor, while a security i | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.green1 sentence2001Id. at 54 . {21 The trial court mistakenly relied on the case of Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 920 P.2d 575, 579-80 (Utah Ct.App.1996), to find that Hill did not fulfill her duty to inquire, based upon what she knew in 1990. | 1 | 1 |
Crowther v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.green1 sentence1999Co., 762 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah Ct.App.1988) (citations omitted). ¶ 6 We review the governing statute and the rules at issue in this appeal against this governing legal principle. | 1 | 1 |
Harline v. Barkergreen1 sentence1996See Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (1996) (discussing propriety of summary judgment to decide issues of proximate cause). | 1 | 1 |
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Jack Bobkergreen1 sentence1996Id. at 933 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carrell v. State
green
1 sentence2023Addressing the governing legal standard, the court held that Carrell was required 20210145-CA 7 2023 UT App 93 Carrell v. State to (1) “bring forth admissible evidence proving that ‘no competent attorney’ would have so acted” and (2) “demonstrate an ability to prove that there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome absent his trial counsel’s deficient performance.” (Citation omitted.) The court then expressed its view that Carrell had made “virtually no attempt to overcome summary judgment on anything but his untimely Jury Instruction Claims” and that his lack of meaningful re | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bond v. Bond
green
2 sentences2022David claims that the arbitrator failed to ―consider the significant money that [Jill] will 25 TAYLOR v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court be able to earn from investing her property division.‖ And he contends that the arbitrator based Jill‘s income ―not on the statutory factors, but on his own judgment that [Jill] should be allowed to work in the field of her choice . . . and given time to complete her degree.‖ ¶81 Utah Code specifies that imputation of income for alimony or child support purposes must ―be based upon employment potential and probable earnings.‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-12-203(8)(b). ―In eva 2022David claims that the arbitrator failed to ―consider the significant money that [Jill] will 25 TAYLOR v. TAYLOR Opinion of the Court be able to earn from investing her property division.‖ And he contends that the arbitrator based Jill‘s income ―not on the statutory factors, but on his own judgment that [Jill] should be allowed to work in the field of her choice . . . and given time to complete her degree.‖ ¶81 Utah Code specifies that imputation of income for alimony or child support purposes must ―be based upon employment potential and probable earnings.‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-12-203(8)(b). ―In eva | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2019Defendant incorrectly applies the governing legal standard in his analysis, arguing that the exchange suggests that “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the improper statement influenced the jury.” We take this opportunity to emphasize the distinction between the legal standard applied by a trial court on a motion for a mistrial and the legal standard applied by appellate courts (continued…) 20170193-CA 20 2019 UT App 64 State v. Murphy We recognize that the exchange suggests that the improper testimony may have been on the minds of the jurors during the second day of trial, but we nonethe | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Butterfield
green
1 sentence2019Defendant incorrectly applies the governing legal standard in his analysis, arguing that the exchange suggests that “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the improper statement influenced the jury.” We take this opportunity to emphasize the distinction between the legal standard applied by a trial court on a motion for a mistrial and the legal standard applied by appellate courts (continued…) 20170193-CA 20 2019 UT App 64 State v. Murphy We recognize that the exchange suggests that the improper testimony may have been on the minds of the jurors during the second day of trial, but we nonethe | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Cardall
green
2 sentences2019When ruling on a motion for a mistrial, a trial court must determine whether the “incident may have or probably influenced the jury, to the prejudice of the defendant.” State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ¶ 18 , 982 P.2d 79 (emphasis in original) (quotation simplified). 2019When ruling on a motion for a mistrial, a trial court must determine whether the “incident may have or probably influenced the jury, to the prejudice of the defendant.” State v. Cardall, 1999 UT 51, ¶ 18 , 982 P.2d 79 (emphasis in original) (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Allen
green
1 sentence2019Defendant incorrectly applies the governing legal standard in his analysis, arguing that the exchange suggests that “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the improper statement influenced the jury.” We take this opportunity to emphasize the distinction between the legal standard applied by a trial court on a motion for a mistrial and the legal standard applied by appellate courts (continued…) 20170193-CA 20 2019 UT App 64 State v. Murphy We recognize that the exchange suggests that the improper testimony may have been on the minds of the jurors during the second day of trial, but we nonethe | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Lowther
green
2 sentences2018Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of," among other things, "unfair prejudice." In weighing the probative value and potentially unfair prejudice of evidence under rule 403, trial courts are instructed to "bind [their] analysis to the text of [that] rule." State v. Lowther , 2017 UT 34 , ¶ 45, 398 P.3d 1032 ; see also State v. Cuttler , 2015 UT 95 , ¶ 2, 367 P.3d 981 (stating that "the governing legal standard for evaluating whether evidence satisfies rule 403 is the plain l 2018Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "the court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of," among other things, "unfair prejudice." In weighing the probative value and potentially unfair prejudice of evidence under rule 403, trial courts are instructed to "bind [their] analysis to the text of [that] rule." State v. Lowther , 2017 UT 34 , ¶ 45, 398 P.3d 1032 ; see also State v. Cuttler , 2015 UT 95 , ¶ 2, 367 P.3d 981 (stating that "the governing legal standard for evaluating whether evidence satisfies rule 403 is the plain l | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Elmer v. Vanderford
green
1 sentence2016In any event, we look to the governing standard in rule 56: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Oliver v. Labor Commission
green
2 sentences2015By applying the qualifying term "reasonably" or "reasonable" in evaluating Guzman's limitations, the Board improperly imposed a higher burden on Guzman than the statute dictates; "it requires him to demonstrate a limitation and then show it is reasonable." Oliver, 2015 UT App 225, ¶ 11 , 359 P.3d 684 , We therefore conclude the Board incorrectly applied the governing legal standard. 2015By applying the qualifying term "reasonably" or "reasonable" in evaluating Guzman's limitations, the Board improperly imposed a higher burden on Guzman than the statute dictates; "it requires him to demonstrate a limitation and then show it is reasonable." Oliver, 2015 UT App 225, ¶ 11 , 359 P.3d 684 , We therefore conclude the Board incorrectly applied the governing legal standard. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bolden v. Doe (In re Adoption of J.S.)
green
1 sentence2014The question is not one of narrow tailor- ing; the required fit between means and ends is only a matter of substantiality, and we find the rough comparability between the mother‘s expression of commitment and planning and that re- quired of the father to be sufficient. 44 Cite as: 2014 UT 51 NEHRING, A.C.J., dissenting ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING, dissenting: INTRODUCTION ¶85 I dissent. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Murray v. Utah Labor Commission
green
2 sentences2013Thus, the School District's argument presents "a traditional mixed question of law and fact." See Murray v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38 , ¶ 24, 308 P.3d 461 . 2013Thus, the School District's argument presents "a traditional mixed question of law and fact." See Murray v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 38 , ¶ 24, 308 P.3d 461 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Russell Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson
green
2 sentences2005“Consequently, it would be inappropriate for this court to make a factual determination as to when Plaintiffs should be charged with constructive notice of their claims.” Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,¶ 40 , 108 P.3d 741 . 2005“Consequently, it would be inappropriate for this court to make a factual determination as to when Plaintiffs should be charged with constructive notice of their claims.” Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14,¶ 40 , 108 P.3d 741 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.