pattern jury instruction in Kansas

2025State v. Thomas, 313 Kan. 660 , 662-63, 488 P.3d 517 (2021).

2024Though this section has not been adopted in Kansas, our caselaw—reflected in the pattern jury instruction provided to the jury here—recognizes that interference with a contract may be justified in certain instances, including if it occurs for a "legitimate business purpose." See Burcham, 276 Kan. at 425 .

2024The Kansas Supreme Court has explained that this justification "'denote[s] the presence of exceptional circumstances which show that no tort has been in fact committed.'" Turner, 240 Kan. at 12 -13 (quoting 45 Am.

2020Had that instruction been given, the jury would have been told: "Evidence of voluntary intoxication may be considered in determining whether such intoxication impaired the defendant's mental faculties to the extent that he was incapable of forming the necessary intent to commit intentional murder with premeditation." See PIK Crim 4th 52.060 (2018 Supp.); State v. Pabst, 273 Kan. 658, 666 , 44 P.3d 1230 (2002).

2020Had that instruction been given, the jury would have been told: "Evidence of voluntary intoxication may be considered in determining whether such intoxication impaired the defendant's mental faculties to the extent that he was incapable of forming the necessary intent to commit intentional murder with premeditation." See PIK Crim 4th 52.060 (2018 Supp.); State v. Pabst, 273 Kan. 658, 666 , 44 P.3d 1230 (2002).

2020Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, as we are required to do on a sufficiency challenge, Chandler, 307 Kan. at 668 , we find the circumstances provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude Bowen possessed both the methamphetamine in the dresser and that in the bedroom closet.

2004The Court specifically noted that `there is no . . . constitutional requirement of unfettered sentencing discretion in the jury, and States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence `in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.'" [Citation omitted.] "Walton's arguments in this case are no more persuasive than those made in Blystone and Boyde . " (Emphasis added.) 497 U.S. at 651-52 .

2004The Court specifically noted that ‘there is no . . . constitutional requirement of unfettered sentencing discretion in the jury, and States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence ‘in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.’ ” [Citation omitted.] “Walton’s arguments in this case are no more persuasive than those made in Blystone and Boyde.” (Emphasis added.) 497 U.S. at 651-52 .

2004The Court specifically noted that `there is no . . . constitutional requirement of unfettered sentencing discretion in the jury, and States are free to structure and shape consideration of mitigating evidence "in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty."' Id., at 377 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988) (plurality opinion)).

1998However, in State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987), we held that the jury need not be instructed on mere association, because the pattern jury instruction clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction.

1998However, in State v. Hunter, 241 Kan. 629, 639 , 740 P.2d 559 (1987), we held that the jury need not be instructed on mere association, because the pattern jury instruction clearly informs the jury that intentional acts by a defendant are necessary to sustain a conviction.

1997However, Ninci points out that this is a well-settled principle of law as set out in the Comment to PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 and State v. Green, 237 Kan. 146 ; Syl. ¶ 4, 697 P.2d 1305 (1985).

1997However, Ninci points out that this is a well-settled principle of law as set out in the Comment to PIK Crim. 3d 54.05 and State v. Green, 237 Kan. 146 ; Syl. ¶ 4, 697 P.2d 1305 (1985).

1995The instruction stated: “ 'The term “used a firearm” includes not only an intentional discharge thereof but also the use thereof as an object with which to hit or strike or display in a menacing manner.’ ” 42 Cal. App. 3d at 856 .