pattern jury instruction in North Dakota

2013Further, we have observed that a pattern jury instruction may even “contain! ].an incorrect statement of the law.” State v. Johnson, 2001 ND 184, ¶ 7 , 636 N.W.2d 391 . [¶ 19] On appeal, the narrow issue raised by Romero is whether the district court committed reversible error in refusing to grant his request for a specific instruction defining the phrase “great bodily injury.” In instructing the jury, the court defined “serious bodily injury” as meaning “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement,, unconsciousness, extreme pain, perm

2013Further, we have observed that a pattern jury instruction may even “contain! ].an incorrect statement of the law.” State v. Johnson, 2001 ND 184, ¶ 7 , 636 N.W.2d 391 . [¶ 19] On appeal, the narrow issue raised by Romero is whether the district court committed reversible error in refusing to grant his request for a specific instruction defining the phrase “great bodily injury.” In instructing the jury, the court defined “serious bodily injury” as meaning “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement,, unconsciousness, extreme pain, perm

2010Jahner , at ¶ 13. [¶ 26] In Schneider , we thoroughly reviewed various constitutional challenges to the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt and concluded that, taken as a whole, the instruction “correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury” and “informed the jury of the law, without misleading or confusing the jury.” Schneider, 550 N.W.2d at 410 (quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 22 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 ).

2010Jahner , at ¶ 13. [¶26] In Schneider , we thoroughly reviewed various constitutional challenges to the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt and concluded that, taken as a whole, the instruction “correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury” and “informed the jury of the law, without misleading or confusing the jury.” Schneider , 550 N.W.2d at 410 (quoting Victor , 511 U.S. at 22 ).

2013This Court, however, has repeatedly cautioned against using pattern jury instructions as “representative statements of substantive law.” Erickson v. Brown , 2012 ND 43, ¶ 10 , 813 N.W.2d 531 .

2013This Court, however, has repeatedly cautioned against using pattern jury instructions as “representative statements of substantive law.” Erickson v. Brown, 2012 ND 43, ¶ 10 , 813 N.W.2d 531 .

2013Estrada cites State v. Jaster, 2004 ND 223, ¶ 23 , 690 N.W.2d 213 , in which this Court said, “The omission of the term ‘particular’ could lead a jury to believe it is irrelevant whether a person’s safety is actually jeopardized or endangered,” and concluded the “omission of the word ‘particular’ from the pattern jury instruction’s definition of reckless endangerment renders that part of the instruction erroneous.” We concluded in Jaster , however, though the part of the instruction standing alone was erroneous, the instruction as a whole appropriately informed the jury of the applicable law.

2013Estrada cites State v. Jaster, 2004 ND 223, ¶ 23 , 690 N.W.2d 213 , in which this Court said, “The omission of the term ‘particular’ could lead a jury to believe it is irrelevant whether a person’s safety is actually jeopardized or endangered,” and concluded the “omission of the word ‘particular’ from the pattern jury instruction’s definition of reckless endangerment renders that part of the instruction erroneous.” We concluded in Jaster , however, though the part of the instruction standing alone was erroneous, the instruction as a whole appropriately informed the jury of the applicable law.

2013This Court, however, has repeatedly cautioned against using pattern jury instructions as “representative statements of substantive law.” Erickson v. Brown , 2012 ND 43, ¶ 10 , 813 N.W.2d 531 .

2013This Court, however, has repeatedly cautioned against using pattern jury instructions as “representative statements of substantive law.” Erickson v. Brown, 2012 ND 43, ¶ 10 , 813 N.W.2d 531 .

2011The pattern jury instruction provides: A person’s conduct is excused if the person believes that the facts are such that the conduct is necessary and appropriate, even though that belief is mistaken. [However, if that belief is negligent ly or recklessly held, it is not an excuse in a prosecution for any offense for which negligent or reckless conduct suffices to establish culpability.] Zottnick claims phone records established he was entitled to that instruction because Abt initiated contact with him to reestablish a prior relationship with him and he was excused in replying to her contacts w

2011The pattern jury instruction provides: A person’s conduct is excused if the person believes that the facts are such that the conduct is necessary and appropriate, even though that belief is mistaken. [However, if that belief is negligent ly or recklessly held, it is not an excuse in a prosecution for any offense for which negligent or reckless conduct suffices to establish culpability.] Zottnick claims phone records established he was entitled to that instruction because Abt initiated contact with him to reestablish a prior relationship with him and he was excused in replying to her contacts w

2011The pattern jury instruction provides: A person’s conduct is excused if the person believes that the facts are such that the conduct is necessary and appropriate, even though that belief is mistaken. [However, if that belief is negligent ly or recklessly held, it is not an excuse in a prosecution for any offense for which negligent or reckless conduct suffices to establish culpability.] Zottnick claims phone records established he was entitled to that instruction because Abt initiated contact with him to reestablish a prior relationship with him and he was excused in replying to her contacts w

2011The pattern jury instruction provides: A person’s conduct is excused if the person believes that the facts are such that the conduct is necessary and appropriate, even though that belief is mistaken. [However, if that belief is negligent ly or recklessly held, it is not an excuse in a prosecution for any offense for which negligent or reckless conduct suffices to establish culpability.] Zottnick claims phone records established he was entitled to that instruction because Abt initiated contact with him to reestablish a prior relationship with him and he was excused in replying to her contacts w

2010Jahner , at ¶ 13. [¶ 26] In Schneider , we thoroughly reviewed various constitutional challenges to the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt and concluded that, taken as a whole, the instruction “correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury” and “informed the jury of the law, without misleading or confusing the jury.” Schneider, 550 N.W.2d at 410 (quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 22 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 ).

2010Jahner , at ¶ 13. [¶ 26] In Schneider , we thoroughly reviewed various constitutional challenges to the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt and concluded that, taken as a whole, the instruction “correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury” and “informed the jury of the law, without misleading or confusing the jury.” Schneider, 550 N.W.2d at 410 (quoting Victor, 511 U.S. at 22 , 114 S.Ct. 1239 ).

2026We will reverse the decision of the trier of fact only if the record presents no substantial evidence to support the verdict. 458 N.W.2d at 499 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Matuska, 379 N.W.2d 273, 275 (N.D. 1985)); see also State v. Ohnstad, 359 N.W.2d 827 (N.D. 1984); State v. Lawenstein, 346 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1984); State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1980); State v. McMorrow, 286 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1979); State v. Allen, 237 N.W.2d 154 (N.D. 1975); State v. Carroll, 123 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1963). [¶36] Specifically, Krall proposed language from a former pattern jury instruction, requestin

2026We will reverse the decision of the trier of fact only if the record presents no substantial evidence to support the verdict. 458 N.W.2d at 499 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Matuska, 379 N.W.2d 273, 275 (N.D. 1985)); see also State v. Ohnstad, 359 N.W.2d 827 (N.D. 1984); State v. Lawenstein, 346 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1984); State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1980); State v. McMorrow, 286 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1979); State v. Allen, 237 N.W.2d 154 (N.D. 1975); State v. Carroll, 123 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1963). [¶36] Specifically, Krall proposed language from a former pattern jury instruction, requestin

2026The State argues the pattern jury instruction is not a misrepresentation of the law and is a fair and accurate representation of case law. [¶40] Here, in rejecting Krall’s requested instructions, the district court correctly noted the pattern jury instructions are not binding, but concluded the pattern instruction on circumstantial evidence “is a fair and accurate representation of not only case law, but how direct and circumstantial evidence is to be contemplated.” We have explained that “[t]he North Dakota Pattern Jury Instructions are published as a guide by the State Bar Association, in co

2026“The pattern jury instructions are not controlling law, and are published with the caution that they are ‘neither a restatement nor an encyclopedia of the prevailing law.’” Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 2001 ND 184, ¶ 7 , 636 N.W.2d 391 ).

2026We will reverse the decision of the trier of fact only if the record presents no substantial evidence to support the verdict. 458 N.W.2d at 499 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Matuska, 379 N.W.2d 273, 275 (N.D. 1985)); see also State v. Ohnstad, 359 N.W.2d 827 (N.D. 1984); State v. Lawenstein, 346 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1984); State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1980); State v. McMorrow, 286 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1979); State v. Allen, 237 N.W.2d 154 (N.D. 1975); State v. Carroll, 123 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1963). [¶36] Specifically, Krall proposed language from a former pattern jury instruction, requestin

2026We will reverse the decision of the trier of fact only if the record presents no substantial evidence to support the verdict. 458 N.W.2d at 499 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Matuska, 379 N.W.2d 273, 275 (N.D. 1985)); see also State v. Ohnstad, 359 N.W.2d 827 (N.D. 1984); State v. Lawenstein, 346 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1984); State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1980); State v. McMorrow, 286 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1979); State v. Allen, 237 N.W.2d 154 (N.D. 1975); State v. Carroll, 123 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1963). [¶36] Specifically, Krall proposed language from a former pattern jury instruction, requestin

2026We will reverse the decision of the trier of fact only if the record presents no substantial evidence to support the verdict. 458 N.W.2d at 499 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Matuska, 379 N.W.2d 273, 275 (N.D. 1985)); see also State v. Ohnstad, 359 N.W.2d 827 (N.D. 1984); State v. Lawenstein, 346 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1984); State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664 (N.D. 1980); State v. McMorrow, 286 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1979); State v. Allen, 237 N.W.2d 154 (N.D. 1975); State v. Carroll, 123 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1963). [¶36] Specifically, Krall proposed language from a former pattern jury instruction, requestin

2004Jaster requested that the word “particular” be included in the instruction, but the court refused. [¶ 23] Section 12.1-17-03, N.D.C.C., states that “[t]here is risk within the meaning of this section if the potential for harm exists, whether or not a particular person’s safety is actually jeopardized.” In Hanson, 256 N.W.2d at 368 , this Court concluded that in situations where a group of persons, not individually identified, is endangered the “State need not prove that any one ‘particular person’ ... was endangered,” but the State must prove “that one or more persons in the group were endange

2001Lack of criminal responsibility is not explicitly designated as an affirmative defense, and the State concedes on appeal that it is an ordinary defense upon which the State should have *394 borne the burden of proof. 1 See also State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649 , 653 n. 4, 654 n. 5 (N.D.1982) (trial court correctly instructed the jury that the State had burden of proof on lack-of-criminal-responsibility defense beyond a reasonable doubt). . [¶ 9] This does not, however, end our inquiry in this case.

1979Applying the criteria of Tvedt v. Haugen, supra , Sagmiller v. Carlsen, supra , and Swanson v. Hill, supra , the circumstances of this case make the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable.