pattern jury instruction in California

2025Post-Housley, courts have held the pattern jury instruction accurately informs the jury on the limited use of CSAAS evidence, but the instruction does not: (a) improperly allow an alleged minor victim of sexual abuse to corroborate her own testimony; (b) violate due process; or (c) misapply the burden of proof. ( Gonzales, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 503-504; accord, People v. Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 473-474.) Contrary to defendant’s contention, the instruction does instruct the jury to not use the expert’s testimony in determining whether the victim’s molestation claim is true.

2025Second, he 14 asserts it improperly allowed the jurors to use the CSAAS evidence to find the victims’ behaviors were consistent with having been abused.2 “We review a claim of instructional error de novo. [Citation.] The challenged instruction is considered ‘in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an impermissible manner.’” (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326 ; accord, Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 175.) Addressing a claim concerning CALCRIM No. 1193, a panel of

2025(Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 142 .) The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the correct standard for implied malice murder “requires proof that a defendant acted with conscious disregard of the danger to human life.” (Id. at p. 156.) In relying upon Reyes to argue that the jury should have been instructed that the act must involve a high degree of probability of death, Eriz seems to argue that Reyes overruled Nieto Benitez and Knoller.

2024Malice is implied when a person willfully does an act, the natural and probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and the person knowingly acts with conscious disregard for the danger to life that the act poses. [Citation.]” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653 .) Both the pattern jury instruction and the Supreme Court’s opinion in Gonzalez use variations of the term “natural and 4 Sahibi claims he also stated a prima facie case for resentencing on his attempted murder conviction, but he offers no argument on this point other than that “it is . . . highly likely that

2018(See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ( Batson ); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ( Wheeler ).) He also argues the trial court erroneously instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 460, the pattern jury instruction for attempt, which he asserts is unconstitutionally vague and impermissibly creates a mandatory presumption of intent.

2018(See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 ( Batson ); People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 , 148 Cal.Rptr. 890 , 583 P.2d 748 ( Wheeler ).) He also argues the trial court erroneously instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 460, the pattern jury instruction for attempt, which he asserts is unconstitutionally vague and impermissibly creates a mandatory presumption of intent.

2025The defendant in Nieto Benitez argued that CALJIC No. 8.31, a pattern jury instruction predating CALCRIM No. 520, “misstate[d] the law because the instruction omit[ted] a requirement that defendant commit the act with a high probability that death will result.” (Nieto Benitez, supra, at p. 111 .) The Supreme Court disagreed, noting it had previously concluded in People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 , 300 “that the two linguistic formulations—‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life’ and ‘an act [committed] with a high probability that it will result in death’ are equiv

2020The physical component requires “‘“the performance of ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.’”’” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 508 ; People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587 , overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, fn. 12 .) The pattern jury instruction on implied malice murder states that “[a] natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.” (CALCRIM No. 520, italics omitted.) “Phrased in a different way, malice may be implied when [the] defendan

2025This is an objective standard for measuring the knowledge of the actor.” (Ibid.) The knowledge requirement as first articulated in Lopez, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 592 was incorporated into the pattern jury instruction for section 148(a)(1), first in CALJIC No. 16.102 and currently in CALCRIM No. 2656.

2025This is an objective standard for measuring the knowledge of the actor.” (Ibid.) The knowledge requirement as first articulated in Lopez, supra, 188 Cal.App.3d 592 was incorporated into the pattern jury instruction for section 148(a)(1), first in CALJIC No. 16.102 and currently in CALCRIM No. 2656.

2024(See Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237 .) Consistent with Martinez, the pattern jury instruction for a simple kidnapping does not require the jury to find that the distance of the movement “was beyond that merely incidental to the commission of” an underlying crime.

2016In order for the defendant to be guilty of kidnapping, the other person must be moved or made to move a 12 The Bell court noted the California Supreme Court's admonition in Martinez that " 'in a case involving an associated crime, the jury should be instructed to consider whether the distance a victim was moved was incidental to the commission of that crime in determining the movement's substantiality.' " (Bell, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 437 , quoting Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237 .) The Bell court defined an " 'associated crime' " as "any criminal act the defendant intends to commi

2018In our case, this interpretation is consistent with the pattern jury instruction for a violation of section 25850, subdivision (a). " 'Section 25850, subdivision (a), is the successor statute to former section 12031, subdivision (a)(1), which was repealed in 2010 as part of the Deadly Weapons Recodification Act of 2010 (the Act). (§ 16000 et seq.)' " ( Wade , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 140 , 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 , 369 P.3d 546 .) As the court explained, the Deadly Weapons Recodification Act did not " 'substantially change the law relating to deadly weapons and "[wa]s intended to be entirely nonsu

2018In our case, this interpretation is consistent with the pattern jury instruction for a violation of section 25850, subdivision (a). " 'Section 25850, subdivision (a), is the successor statute to former section 12031, subdivision (a)(1), which was repealed in 2010 as part of the Deadly Weapons Recodification Act of 2010 (the Act). (§ 16000 et seq.)' " ( Wade , supra , 63 Cal.4th at p. 140 , 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 876 , 369 P.3d 546 .) As the court explained, the Deadly Weapons Recodification Act did not " 'substantially change the law relating to deadly weapons and "[wa]s intended to be entirely nonsu

2025(People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 258 .) It also includes the force used to accomplish ‘the penetration and the physical movement and positioning of [the victim’s] body in accomplishing the act.’ (Ibid.)” (Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071 .) The Thomas court could not have anticipated or intended that a single sentence about what force “also includes” would be taken out of context, modified, and grafted onto a pattern jury instruction.

2025(People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 258 .) It also includes the force used to accomplish ‘the penetration and the physical movement and positioning of [the victim’s] body in accomplishing the act.’ (Ibid.)” (Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071 .) The Thomas court could not have anticipated or intended that a single sentence about what force “also includes” would be taken out of context, modified, and grafted onto a pattern jury instruction.

2025(People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 258 .) It also includes the force used to accomplish ‘the penetration and the physical movement and positioning of [the victim’s] body in accomplishing the act.’ (Ibid.)” (Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071 .) The Thomas court could not have anticipated or intended that a single sentence about what force “also includes” would be taken out of context, modified, and grafted onto a pattern jury instruction.

2025(People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 258 .) It also includes the force used to accomplish ‘the penetration and the physical movement and positioning of [the victim’s] body in accomplishing the act.’ (Ibid.)” (Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071 .) The Thomas court could not have anticipated or intended that a single sentence about what force “also includes” would be taken out of context, modified, and grafted onto a pattern jury instruction.

2021Any mistake in the related instructions concerning the purpose for which the jury could consider this evidence, would not constitute a violation of defendant’s due process rights because the instructions did not ‘infect[ ] the entire trial.’ ” (Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 54 .) Indeed, the admissibility of the evidence, the strong evidence of guilt, and the requirement that the jury rely on other evidence to find defendant guilty “lead us to conclude that the instruction did 27 not corrupt the factfinding process.” (Ibid.; see Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1335 ; Rivas, supra, 214 Cal.App

2020Any mistake in the related instructions concerning the purpose for which the jury could consider this evidence, would not constitute a violation of defendant’s due process rights because the instructions did not ‘infect[ ] the entire trial.’ ” (Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 54 .) Indeed, the admissibility of the evidence, the strong evidence of guilt, and the requirement that the jury rely on other evidence to find defendant guilty “lead us to conclude that the instruction did 27 not corrupt the factfinding process.” (Ibid.; see Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1335 ; Rivas, supra, 214 Cal.App

2021Any mistake in the related instructions concerning the purpose for which the jury could consider this evidence, would not constitute a violation of defendant’s due process rights because the instructions did not ‘infect[ ] the entire trial.’ ” (Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 54 .) Indeed, the admissibility of the evidence, the strong evidence of guilt, and the requirement that the jury rely on other evidence to find defendant guilty “lead us to conclude that the instruction did 27 not corrupt the factfinding process.” (Ibid.; see Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1335 ; Rivas, supra, 214 Cal.App

2020Any mistake in the related instructions concerning the purpose for which the jury could consider this evidence, would not constitute a violation of defendant’s due process rights because the instructions did not ‘infect[ ] the entire trial.’ ” (Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 54 .) Indeed, the admissibility of the evidence, the strong evidence of guilt, and the requirement that the jury rely on other evidence to find defendant guilty “lead us to conclude that the instruction did 27 not corrupt the factfinding process.” (Ibid.; see Foster, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 1335 ; Rivas, supra, 214 Cal.App

2021(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579 .) 2 CALCRIM No. 375 (Uncharged Conduct) The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 375, a pattern jury instruction pertaining to uncharged conduct.

2020(People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579 .) 2 CALCRIM No. 375 (Uncharged Conduct) The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 375, a pattern jury instruction pertaining to uncharged conduct.

2020The physical component requires “‘“the performance of ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.’”’” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 508 ; People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587 , overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, fn. 12 .) The pattern jury instruction on implied malice murder states that “[a] natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.” (CALCRIM No. 520, italics omitted.) “Phrased in a different way, malice may be implied when [the] defendan

2020The physical component requires “‘“the performance of ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.’”’” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 508 ; People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587 , overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, fn. 12 .) The pattern jury instruction on implied malice murder states that “[a] natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.” (CALCRIM No. 520, italics omitted.) “Phrased in a different way, malice may be implied when [the] defendan

2020The physical component requires “‘“the performance of ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.’”’” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 508 ; People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587 , overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, fn. 12 .) The pattern jury instruction on implied malice murder states that “[a] natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.” (CALCRIM No. 520, italics omitted.) “Phrased in a different way, malice may be implied when [the] defendan

2020The physical component requires “‘“the performance of ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.’”’” (Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 508 ; People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587 , overruled on other grounds by People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, fn. 12 .) The pattern jury instruction on implied malice murder states that “[a] natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes.” (CALCRIM No. 520, italics omitted.) “Phrased in a different way, malice may be implied when [the] defendan

2019Hendrix , the principal case relied upon by Atkins, states that " Penal Code section 69 requires actual knowledge on the part of the defendant that the person being resisted is an executive officer and that the officer is engaged in *978 the performance of his/her duty." ( Hendrix , supra , 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 237 , 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 740 .) However, Hendrix does not contain the language "reasonably should have known." ( Ibid. ) Similarly, the pattern jury instruction for the second way of violating section 69 states that the prosecution must prove that "[w]hen the defendant acted, (he/she) kne

2019Hendrix , the principal case relied upon by Atkins, states that " Penal Code section 69 requires actual knowledge on the part of the defendant that the person being resisted is an executive officer and that the officer is engaged in *978 the performance of his/her duty." ( Hendrix , supra , 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 237 , 153 Cal.Rptr.3d 740 .) However, Hendrix does not contain the language "reasonably should have known." ( Ibid. ) Similarly, the pattern jury instruction for the second way of violating section 69 states that the prosecution must prove that "[w]hen the defendant acted, (he/she) kne

2017Defendant argues this instruction was inadequate because the trial court should have further defined for the jury what distinct acts were included within "construction of a residence." But the instruction is a pattern jury instruction that correctly states the applicable law ( CALCRIM No. 581 ), and defendant never proposed an alternative or additional instruction further defining "construction of a residence." 4 Since defendant did not propose a different or additional instruction defining the term, he forfeited any claim of instructional error. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 , 12

2017Defendant argues this instruction was inadequate because the trial court should have further defined for the jury what distinct acts were included within "construction of a residence." But the instruction is a pattern jury instruction that correctly states the applicable law ( CALCRIM No. 581 ), and defendant never proposed an alternative or additional instruction further defining "construction of a residence." 4 Since defendant did not propose a different or additional instruction defining the term, he forfeited any claim of instructional error. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164 , 12

2016In order for the defendant to be guilty of kidnapping, the other person must be moved or made to move a 12 The Bell court noted the California Supreme Court's admonition in Martinez that " 'in a case involving an associated crime, the jury should be instructed to consider whether the distance a victim was moved was incidental to the commission of that crime in determining the movement's substantiality.' " (Bell, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 437 , quoting Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237 .) The Bell court defined an " 'associated crime' " as "any criminal act the defendant intends to commi

2016In order for the defendant to be guilty of kidnapping, the other person must be moved or made to move a 12 The Bell court noted the California Supreme Court's admonition in Martinez that " 'in a case involving an associated crime, the jury should be instructed to consider whether the distance a victim was moved was incidental to the commission of that crime in determining the movement's substantiality.' " (Bell, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 437 , quoting Martinez, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 237 .) The Bell court defined an " 'associated crime' " as "any criminal act the defendant intends to commi